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Obesity is a foremost public health concern that has received considerable 
attention. Because of this so-named “epidemic,” law-makers are challenged with 
implementing effective policies that the public supports. Little is known, however, about 
the antecedents and consequences of these policies—especially attributions of 
blameworthiness. Study 1 developed the Obesity Blame Attribution Scale (OBAS). 
Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that controllability, responsibility and 
dispositional blame were separate constructs and were part of a higher-order dispositional 
blame factor. Situational blame was a separate higher-order factor, not correlated with 
dispositional blame, consisting of blame toward the food industry and towards 
government policy. Using the OBAS, Study 2 examined how blame is attributed 
according to target characteristics within the context of two prominent blame theories 
(Shaver’s Theory of Blame and Alicke’s Culpable Control Model); and whether blame is 
a necessary antecedent for support of obesity-targeted policies. The results indicated 
weight group (obese versus average), but not health choice (makes healthy versus 
unhealthy food choices) or attribution type (specific or general), predicted blame-related 
attributions. And, although measured variables such as anti-fat attitudes, stereotype 
content, and disgust were significantly correlated with blame attributions, they did not 
uniquely predict blame attributions above controllability and responsibility attributions. 
Higher blame attributions toward the target, and higher general dispositional blame 
 
 
predicted support for the dispositional-framed policy. Study 3 tested the behavioral 
assumptions of a policy presented in Study 2 to observe whether laws that blame people 
who are obese contributed to behaviors congruent to the law’s intent. After reading one 
of three vending machine laws that varied by the legislative intent behind them (blamed 
individuals, blamed the food environment or no blame control), participants with varying 
BMI were more likely to choose the stairs over the elevator and take a gym flyer 
following the individual-blame framed policy than the other two policies. Policy type did 
not affect food consumption, taking additional snacks, internalization of stigma, or 
negative emotions. These studies suggest people who endorsed higher blame attributions 
are more likely to support policies that focus on personal responsibility and blame, and 
these policies in turn may have short-term effects on health outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1  
LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In October 2012, a news anchor from Wisconsin directly responded on air to a 
letter she received criticizing her about her weight. The letter, in sum, stated that the news 
anchor was not a “suitable exemplar” for the community, that “obesity is one of the worst 
choices a person can make,” and that the news anchor should “reconsider her 
responsibility” as a public personality. On-air, the news anchor responded by criticizing 
the letter-writer as a bully. The video of her response went viral and many championed 
her for standing up to the bullying. Others, however, did not see the letter as bullying and 
instead found the comments in the letter as concerns for the news anchor’s health 
(Michelle, 2012). In an era when reality television is consumed with weight loss 
programs (e.g., The Biggest Loser, Extreme Makeover: Weight Loss Edition, Heavy), 
there are mixed feelings about the best way to address obesity—either blaming people 
who are obese as a way to motivate them to lose weight or accepting them to avoid an 
increase in weight-based stigma (Puhl & Heuer, 2010). Policy-makers are similarly 
challenged with how blame is apportioned in generating law and policy to improve the 
public’s health.   
Popular culture and media accounts often seek to assign blame for the obesity 
“epidemic” (Boero, 2007) to either individuals for unhealthy lifestyles (Jameson, 2010), 
policy and zoning laws (Begley, 2012), the media (Freeman, 2011), or fast food 
companies (Woodhouse, 2011). This is not a surprising response—considering “who’s to 
blame?” is often one of the first questions asked following a misfortune or moral affront 
(Shaver, 1985). Within social psychology, the cognitive processes laypeople use for 
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making blame judgments to explain behaviors and outcomes can be explained by 
attribution theories (Heider, 1958). Although attributions of blame are ubiquitous in the 
legal system (Feigenson & Park, 2006; Shaver, 1985), most psycholegal research has 
only examined the construct of blame when a wrong-doer is blamed for criminally 
inflicting harm on a victim (e.g., Feigenson & Park, 2006). The attribution of blame in 
non-criminal health settings, however, has received less attention from researchers. 
Furthermore, the application of social psychology to issues related to health is also ripe 
for investigation (Klein, et al., 2015).  As such, the aim of the current research is to 
examine the construct of blame within the context of obesity-targeted health law and 
policy. 
In part one, I will provide the legal background for various types of legal 
strategies and health policies aimed at reducing obesity. Because reviewing all 
governmental strategies would be far too extensive, I have selected a few examples that 
illustrate both consumer-based and provider-based strategies most relevant to blame and 
social science research. In part two, I will discuss several areas of psychological theory to 
provide background on the psychological issues relevant to obesity and blame. I will 
discuss weight-based stereotypes and the effects of stigma. Then, I will generally discuss 
attribution theory and the theoretical underpinnings of attributions of blame, including 
both Shaver’s (1985) prescriptive model of blame and Alicke’s (2000) Culpable Control 
model of blame. Finally, I will detail three studies aimed at examining the antecedents 
and consequences of obesity-targeted law and policy. In study 1, I developed and tested 
the factor structure of a scale to measure attributions of blame toward people who are 
obese and toward environmental factors. In study 2, I sought to elucidate several 
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hypothesized antecedents for support of obesity-targeted policies using theoretical 
models of blame. In study 3, I examined the consequences of blame-based obesity-
targeted policies on health-related outcomes including food consumption, physical 
activity and mental health.  
I. Legal Issues 
The Obesity “Epidemic” 
In 2001, the Surgeon General released a report warning that the obesity 
“epidemic” had become a public health concern—demonstrated by every state having at 
least a 20% prevalence rate of obesity (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2015a). According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the cause of 
obesity is multifaceted, which makes it difficult to blame a single causal factor (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2012). However, laws and policies often 
target a single factor. In general, these factors have been grouped according to two 
categories: 1) individual consumer-based factors, such as eating habits, physical 
inactivity and sedentary lifestyles; and 2) societal or environmental provider-based 
factors, such as the poor food industry practices and government actions or inactions 
(Benjamin, 2006; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012; Winstanley, 
2007).  
Obesity contributes to an increased risk of developing high cholesterol, 
hypertension, respiratory ailments, orthopedic problems, depression and type II diabetes 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012).  Moreover, because of the social 
stigma surrounding obesity, there are social consequences that can contribute to physical 
and emotional health issues (Puhl & Heuer, 2010). In addition to individual health 
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consequences, there are also financial consequences for society—with the cost of obesity-
related medical expenses in the United States amounting to $147 billion annually 
(Cawley & Liu, 2008; Finkelstein, Trogdon, Cohen, & Dietz, 2009). Many of these costs 
are paid by taxpayers through Medicaid or Medicare (Byrd, 2005) and payers of private 
insurance through premiums (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Because obesity has been labeled 
a public health concern that affects both people who are obese and society, laws and 
policies have been proposed/implemented by local and national governments to address 
obesity. These strategies, however, are often highly debated and many consumers argue 
that the government should not be involved in personal health decisions. Others, 
including public health scholars and government administrative agencies (e.g., Food and 
Drug Administration), argue that states have a duty to protect society in areas of public 
health risk. 
States’ Interest in Public Health 
The academic and legal scholarship on the intersection of law and health is 
widespread, and is commonly termed health care law, health law, or law and medicine. 
Although public health law overlaps with these areas, scholars have suggested that public 
health law is a distinct discipline (Gostin, 2000; Parmet, 2009). Lawrence Gostin, a lead 
scholar in the area of public health law defines public health law as: 
the study of the legal powers and duties of the state to assure the conditions for  
people to be healthy and the limitations on power of the state to constrain the  
autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, or other legally protected interests of  
individuals for the protection of promotion of community health (Gostin, 2000,  
p.4)  
 
The source and scope of the state government’s authority to pursue various public 
health measures fall under the state’s police power, generally enumerated in the state 
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legislature or state constitution.1 Beginning with Jacobson v. Commonwealth (1905) the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized the state’s police power to enact reasonable regulations 
as long as the goal was to protect public health and safety, and the regulation did not 
infringe on any right granted or secured in the U.S. Constitution. In Jacobson the issue 
was whether Massachusetts could sanction individuals for neglecting or refusing to 
undergo mandatory vaccination for smallpox. The plaintiff in the case, Jacobson, asserted 
that the vaccination requirement was an “assault upon his person” and invaded his liberty 
to make decisions about the welfare of his own body and health. The Court held the law 
valid, citing that the Constitution does not provide an absolute right for autonomous 
decision making because there are times when every person must give up some of their 
rights for the welfare of the common good. This case illustrates the primary argument 
within the scholarship of public health law—that the health of the population is best 
achieved through a high level of health throughout society, and not just the best possible 
health for a few (Gostin, 2010). Furthermore, it illustrates the tension between self-
determination and government strategies for paternalistically protecting the public’s 
health, a tension that is generated by many public health strategies. 
Scholars and practitioners alike, however, are conflicted with the scope of public 
health agencies. Those who subscribe to a narrow focus suggest the scope of public 
health agencies should include exercising discrete powers in surveillance (e.g., screening 
for diseases and reporting of disease occurrence to appropriate agencies), preventing 
injury (e.g., ensuring safety), and controlling infectious disease (e.g., vaccinations and 
                                                          
1 The Federal government’s power to regulate public health is mostly enumerated by Congress’ 
ability under the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, section 8 that allows regulation of interstate 
commerce and to spend money in order to promote the public welfare. The Federal government 
may also exercise authority in areas that have been ceded by the states to the Federal government. 
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quarantines). Those who subscribe to a broader focus suggest the scope of public health 
agencies should encompass anything that promotes the value of societal well-being. This 
latter, more paternalistic, view is gaining acceptance and public health law has moved 
toward social policy issues such as discrimination, city planning, safe housing, as well as 
eating an exercise (Gostin, 2010).   
Although the individual and societal effects of obesity are alarming, many believe 
what we eat is a personal decision and the government should not interfere (Gostin, 2010; 
Zernicke, 2003). Furthermore, there is a belief that what we eat does not affect others’ 
health like other public health concerns such as second-hand smoke or infectious diseases 
(Creighton, 2010; Gostin, 2007). People who oppose government intervention for obesity 
argue that as autonomous decision-makers, each individual is responsible for their health 
and the financial consequences of their illnesses. However, proponents contend that 
because obesity affects society there is a compelling state interest in governing the 
medical and social costs of individuals’ unhealthy choices (Parmet, 2009). 
 This tension between self-determination and paternalistic government health 
policies, however, is not new (e.g., the ban on contraception and abortion in 1872 and 
prohibition of alcohol sales in 1920); however, legal scholars suggest there is a political 
surge to regulate private behavior on issues such as tobacco, drug use, and obesity (Kersh 
& Marone, 2002; Kersh & Morone, 2005). To regulate these private behaviors, scholars 
note that a “culprit” for the problem must be identified in order to assert blame by either 
demonizing users or demonizing providers (Kersh & Morone, 2002). Blame, according to 
these scholars, is required to demonstrate that a public health risk is great enough to 
warrant government intervention. Blame may also be necessary to identify where the law 
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should focus its regulatory attention—on the consumers of food or on its producers. For 
instance, blame for obesity may be assigned to the individual for having a weak will or to 
the food industry for creating an unhealthy food environment (Kersh & Morone, 2005). 
Government Anti-obesity Strategies  
According to Benforado and Hanson (2008), “law is centrally concerned with making 
attributions” and most law seeks to answer three questions: 1) What caused an outcome? 
2) Who or what was responsible? 3) Is anyone to blame? Correctly making these 
attributions is important for addressing the problem the law is aimed to address. Framing 
theory may provide insight into how these questions are answered. According to 
Goffman’s framing theory (1974), the way in which social problems are framed can 
direct how we attribute cause, effect, and response to the problem. As such, explanations 
for obesity are often either dispositionally (consumer-based) or situationally (provider-
based) framed. If obesity is framed as an individual health problem, then individuals’ 
dispositions towards consumption are more blameworthy and policies should encourage 
changes in individual lifestyles. If obesity is framed as the result of situational factors, 
then individuals are less blameworthy and policies should encourage modifying the 
environment (Kwan, 2008).   
A. Consumer-based strategies 
In general, consumer-based strategies stem from dispositional attributions; where 
people who are obese are perceived as having causal responsibility and being 
blameworthy for their obesity. Those who subscribe to consumer-based strategies believe 
that the government is within its power to intervene to prevent people who are obese 
from making poor choices. The two examples discussed here, the failure litigation against 
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fast food companies and fat taxes, both illustrate blaming the individual for making bad 
choices and emphasize personal responsibility. On the surface, litigation against fast food 
companies may seem to be provider-focused, however, to date, plaintiffs have not 
convinced the courts that the food companies’ food directly caused the plaintiff’s obesity 
(Barber v. McDonald’s restaurant, Inc., 2000 but see Mello, Rimm, & Studdert, 2003; 
Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp, 2003); instead, the courts have concluded that plaintiffs 
themselves are responsible for what they eat (Burnett, 2007). The second example 
includes a junk food tax proposal.  These taxes would increase the price of unhealthy 
foods in an attempt to alter an individual’s food choices by making the foods less 
desirable based on cost (Strnad, 2005; Winstanley, 2007). 
Failed litigation against fast food companies. In Barber (2000), the plaintiff, a 
diabetic, sued Burger King, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Wendy’s and McDonald’s claiming 
that because he ate at these restaurants daily, he suffered two heart attacks. He claimed 
these restaurants intentionally produced fatty foods and failed to warn customers of the 
dangers of the food. The plaintiff’s lawyer eventually removed the case from court 
because the lawyer believed that re-litigating the case with children as plaintiffs might 
make a stronger case against fast food restaurants. The subsequent lawsuit, Pelman v. 
McDonald’s Corp (2003), involved four youths who regularly ate McDonald’s and later 
developed diabetes, high blood pressure and coronary heart disease, for which they 
alleged McDonald’s was responsible. Although the judge agreed the restaurant’s 
advertising was deceptive, the New York court held the deceptive advertising was not 
legally relevant because the “reasonable consumer” in New York would not share the 
view that the advertising is deceptive. The court also held that the plaintiffs could not 
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show “but for” causation (i.e., “but for” the defendant’s behavior, the injuries would not 
have occurred), especially in light of the plaintiffs’ genetic history.   
In another instance, following the passage of a San Francisco ordinance that regulates 
how fast food restaurants can provide toys2, a class action lawsuit was filed claiming that 
McDonald’s uses toys to induce kids to persistently request to eat at McDonalds and to 
develop a preference for unhealthy foods (Parham v. McDonald’s, as cited in Center for 
Science in Public Interest, 2010). Although the judge dismissed Parham without 
providing legal reasoning, and the dismissal was not published (Levine & Baertlein, 
2012), McDonald’s and the food industry have responded publicly by stating that 
decisions about what a child eats should be left up to the parents and that providing 
parents with nutritional information about the restaurant’s food should be enough to 
inform their decisions (Levine, 2011). In response to such litigation and demonstrating 
further strategies aimed at personal responsibility, Congress has twice attempted to pass 
the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act (2005) also known as the 
“Cheeseburger Bill,” which sought to protect restaurants such as McDonald’s from 
litigation and class action suits brought by obese customers. Although the bill has been 
passed by the U.S. House of Representatives twice, it has twice failed to achieve a Senate 
vote.  
Fat taxes. A second example, and one of the most controversial strategies that has 
been proposed, are “fat taxes” or “Twinkie taxes” pioneered by Dr. Brownell, a 
psychology professor at Yale University (Brownell, et al., 2009). Fat taxes, which are 
similar to taxes on tobacco and alcohol, is principally a sin tax levied on commodities 
                                                          
2 I later discuss this ordinance under the provider-based strategy section 
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deemed harmful or morally blameworthy (Winstalay, 2007).  Some argue that the lower 
cost of unhealthy foods, in comparison to healthy foods, is one of the contributing factors 
to obesity (Brownell & Frieden, 2009). Forty states currently have some small taxes on 
sugary drinks and snack foods, but states such as Maine, New York, Arizona, and Nevada 
have discussed larger taxes on sugared sodas (Brownell & Frieden, 2009; Vogel, 2011). 
In 2014, Berkeley, California passed (75% of the vote) the first soda tax that placed a 1 
penny tax per ounce on most sugar beverages (Measure D).  
The rationale for fat taxes is that the additional cost would deter people from 
purchasing unhealthy foods and instead encourage them to purchase healthier options, 
while generating revenue to help offset the financial costs of obesity. Proponents argue 
that by taxing foods that are unhealthy, the price of healthy and unhealthy food would be 
more comparable and consumers may select to eat healthy foods (Brownell & Frieden, 
2009). In Berkeley, where the soda tax was passed, there is not yet information on 
whether soda consumption decreased. However, the city generated $116,000 in revenue 
in its first month, but has not yet decided how to spend it (Whitman, 2015).  
Opponents argue these “fat taxes” are a paternalistic governmental response to “trick” 
consumers, and that they erroneously assume that consumers are unable to adequately 
assess the future risks of consuming the unhealthy foods (Strnad, 2005; Winstanley, 
2007). Although these taxes may ultimately reduce food companies’ profits because of 
decreased sales (unless they sell healthier alternatives instead), fat taxes are thought to 
target individuals to induce healthier choices and reduce unhealthy food consumption 
(Creighton, 2010). A comprehensive review from Yale University’s Rudd Center for 
Food Policy and Obesity Research found that for every 10% increase in price, 
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consumption of unhealthy beverages decreased by 7.8% (Brownell & Frieden, 2009). In 
general, however, behavioral economics decision-making research suggests that people 
more often make “extra-rational” food decisions, especially when they are distracted or 
have little time (Just & Payne, 2009; Wansink, Just, & Payne, 2009). Because food 
decisions are often made without much cognitive effort, food policies that require 
cognitive attention, such as the price comparisons that are suggested with fat taxes, may 
have little impact on healthy decision-making (Just & Payne, 2009).  
B. Provider-based strategies 
Provider-based strategies, on the other hand, are the result of situational attributions 
where environmental factors like the food industry are perceived as having causal 
responsibility and being to blame for obesity. Within this perspective, the environment is 
perceived as fostering and reinforcing lifestyles that favor high caloric intake, and low 
caloric expenditure. Those who ascribe to provider-based strategies hold that obesity is 
created by the unprincipled behavior of the food industry and that the government should 
intervene to prevent the food industry from taking advantage of consumers. The two 
examples discussed here, advertising toward children and mandatory nutrition posting in 
restaurants, both illustrate governmental strategies that appear to blame food companies 
for business tactics and hold them responsible for changing their business practices 
(Benjamin, 2006). 
Advertising to children. One intervention that has gained attention is the regulation of 
food and marketing towards children. In 2006, a lawsuit was filed by the Center for 
Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) against Kellogg’s, for marketing unhealthy foods to 
children. According to the settlement agreement with Kellogg’s, in order to advertise on 
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media (television, radio, print and third party websites) that have an audience constituting 
at least 50% of those under age 12, the food will have to meet specified nutritional value. 
Kellogg’s also agreed that it will not focus its advertising to children under 12 in schools, 
sponsor product placements, license characters in mass media, or brand toys (Center for 
Science in the Public Interest, 2007). Advertising in these ways will still be allowed for 
products that do meet the nutritional value set forth or if the focus is not toward children 
under 12. 
In 2010, an ordinance in San Francisco was passed that required restaurants to meet 
certain nutritional standards in order to provide toys with kids’ meals (Healthy Food 
Incentives Ordinance, 2010). The ordinance gained the media's attention (e.g., Brank & 
Wylie, 2010; Hensley, 2010) because San Francisco was the first large city to enact a 
“Happy Meal” ordinance, but other cities nationwide have also placed nutritional 
restrictions on children's meals (see Anderson, 2008). In response to the “Happy Meal” 
ordinance, the food industry lobbied to ban ordinances that restrict restaurant advertising. 
These efforts were successful in Arizona and gained support in Florida. As such, in 
Arizona, the government may not regulate restaurants’ practice to provide toys, games, 
coloring books, or prizes that appeal to children (Reuters, 2011). 
The argument fueling both “Happy Meal” ordinances and Parham (the class action 
lawsuit that was filed against McDonald’s for using free toys with meals) is that 
advertising, which may not be understood to be advertising, is inherently deceptive and 
violates consumer protection laws (Center for Science in Public Interest, 2010). 
Proponents argue that the food industry is to blame for undermining parental influence 
and intentionally manipulating children’s inherent trust and lack of cognitive maturity. In 
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fact, public health scholars state that marketing, such as including toys with meals, 
strongly influences children's food preferences, requests and consumption and that young 
children are unable to distinguish between advertising and educational information 
(Nestle, 2006).  
Following the passage of the San Francisco ordinance, researchers examined the 
impact of the toy ordinance on restaurants and children’s purchases. Using a pre-post 
design, the researchers examined restaurant response (e.g., marketing, press releases, test 
purchases, menu changes) and interviewed 762 children/caregiver dyads (e.g., eating out 
practices, food and beverage orders, awareness of ordinance) in regards to two major 
chain restaurants (n = 30).  Because the ordinance forbade pairing free toys with meals, 
both chains in the study charged 10 cents for the toy. According to the study’s findings, 
88% of the sample who purchased a children’s meal also purchased the toy. Although 
neither chain met the nutritional criteria required by the ordinance, both chain restaurants 
made changes to the children’s meals—but, the authors noted this was irrespective of the 
ordinance requirements. One changed the default side-item to fruit instead of fries and the 
other announced employees would verbally offer all drinks and side-items as opposed to 
the default fries and soda (Otten et al., 2012).  
Mandatory nutrition posting. Many Americans eat a high proportion of their meals 
outside of the home, therefore, another initiative that blames the providers and holds the 
food industry responsible for changing its business practices is mandatory nutrition 
publishing regulations. Although the goal of nutrition posting is to make nutritional 
information more available so that consumers could make better decisions for their 
health, mandatory nutrition posting is considered provider-based because it places 
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responsibility on the food companies to disclose the nutritional content of the food in an 
effort to improve business practices.  
Beginning in 1973, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) introduced nutrition 
labeling for packaged food and required that labels had standard formats, minimum font 
sizes, and uniform placements; however, these did not become mandatory until 1990 after 
the passage of The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA). NLEA added two new 
provisions (q) and (r) to the original Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1938) that 
merely required food not to be mislabeled. The first provision (q) provided that foods 
designated for human consumption must provide nutritional information, such as the 
familiar nutrition facts found on the back of grocery goods (e.g., grams of sugar, number 
of calories). Congress explicitly exempted restaurants from this requirement [21 U.S.C. § 
343(q)(5)(A)(i)] because the dynamic nature of their menus would make it “impractical” 
(Anderson, 2008; H.R.Rep. No. 101–538, at 7). The second provision (r) stated that if a 
food company was to voluntarily make nutrient content or health-related nutritional 
claims (e.g., low sodium, high fiber), the claim must meet specified nutritional 
requirements based on generally accepted science. Restaurants are not exempt from this 
latter provision and must comply with the NLEA in order to make nutritional claims [21 
U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(B)]. 
Within the NLEA, there are two express preemption clauses that correspond to the (q) 
and (r) provisions. Both clauses preempt any state or local government from creating 
regulations that are not identical to the NLEA, except for nutrition labeling that is already 
exempt under the NLEA. Because restaurants are exempt from provision (q), which 
mandates nutritional information, but are not exempt from provision (r), which mandates 
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nutritional information if the restaurant voluntarily chooses to make a nutrient content 
claim or health-related claims, state and local governments may adopt laws governing 
nutrition labeling for restaurants but are preempted from passing healthclaim regulatory 
laws. In other words, the NLEA does not regulate restaurant labeling (or quantitative) 
claims (i.e., 200 calories), only restaurant health (or qualitative) claims (i.e., “low fat”); 
thus Congress left it up to the states and municipalities to create their own restaurant 
labeling regulations.  
In an effort to reduce consumer’s caloric intake and to encourage restaurants to offer 
lower calorie items, New York City passed such a regulation titled Regulation 81.50—
which required restaurants to post the total number of calories on their menus and menu 
boards if they already voluntarily made nutrition content publicly available (i.e., on the 
internet or pamphlets). This first ordinance was deemed unconstitutional because even 
though the city did have the right to mandate nutrition labeling, it must do so in a way 
that does not contradict the federal NLEA (by requiring quantitative information like 
nutritional facts, rather than qualitative health claims). The court’s analysis stated that 
because of the federal Constitution’s supremacy clause, federal law must prevail if the 
state’s law contradicts the federal law. 
In 2008, after the previous attempt that was deemed unconstitutional, New York City 
revised the ordinance only requiring “chain restaurants” (having 15 or more stores 
nationally) to post the total number of calories (revised Regulation 81.50). Similar to the 
first ordinance, the calories must be prominently displayed on the menu or menu board. 
The law was again challenged based on preemption of NELA and restrictions on the 
restaurants’ First Amendment speech. The court upheld the regulation stating that the 
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ordinance was no longer in conflict with NELA because it required all chain restaurants 
(and not just those who voluntarily provided information) to post the information. 
Furthermore, the court declared that posting the information was “negligible” (non-
significant) and not considered compelled speech (which would be unconstitutional) 
because nutritional information is “factual and uncontroversial” (New York State 
Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health, 2008, p.29).  
More recently at the Federal level, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(2010) includes a provision that requires chain restaurants, retail food establishments and 
vending machine companies (those that have 20 or more locations) to post calorie content 
on their menus and to provide additional nutritional information upon request (Sec. 
4205). The Food and Drug Administration is charged with implementing the new 
regulation. Execution of the policy has been delayed for several years but should take 
effect by December 2015.  
Despite efforts in New York and now the Federal government, research generally 
shows that posting nutritional information may not be effective for all consumers. Studies 
conducted in places that have implemented calorie postings in New York have shown 
that only about 30% of consumers notice the calorie information (Bleich, 2014). 
However, calorie posting requirements may have an effect on restaurants’ menu 
offerings. For instance, Bleich and colleagues (2015) compared menu information in 
New York from 2012 and 2013 for 2/3 of the largest fast food restaurants. The findings 
revealed that although mean calories did not change, there was a decline in calories for 
newly introduced items (−12% decline)—especially for new main course items (−10%), 
new beverages (−8%), and new children’s options (−20%).  
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In addition to not noticing the information, other barriers to the effectiveness of 
calorie posting include consumers’ use of heuristics for making food decisions. Thus, 
even if restaurants are required to post such information, consumers may not use that 
information in a meaningful manner. Kozup and colleagues (2003) found that consumers 
do have more favorable attitudes toward a single restaurant food item when nutrition 
facts are provided; however, the effect changes when more than one restaurant food item 
is presented and consumers make relative comparisons using other items as references. In 
this study, participants perceived the food item as being more “healthy,” when compared 
to two additional “unhealthy” food items. This suggests that as long as the menu includes 
an item that appears more “healthy” than other food items (regardless of whether it 
actually is), consumers may make relative judgments of healthiness, rather than absolute 
judgments of healthiness. For example, people may choose the 700 calorie item because, 
relative to the 1000 calorie items, it seems like the “healthy” choice even if the 700 
calorie item is not actually healthy. Furthermore, environmental factors, such as the type 
of restaurant or the health claims made, can also affect food consumption decisions;  
when  told a food is “low fat” people often eat more of the product (Wansink et al., 
2009). Therefore, it follows that some unintended effects of calorie positing in restaurants 
may be that consumers will make relative judgments and/or eat more of the lower calorie 
food items. 
C. Combination of consumer and provider-based strategies 
Scholars have proposed that instead of focusing on one perspective, strategies to 
reduce obesity should consider both consumer-based and provider-based perspectives 
(Benjamin, 2006; Brownell et al., 2010; Greener, Douglas, & Teijlingen, 2010). 
18 
 
Strategies that focus on both, however, may be difficult to implement because even 
though obesity is primarily perceived as something that is caused by personal 
responsibility factors, public support for consumer-based strategies that regulate behavior 
is often low (Hilbert, Rief, & Braehler, 2007; Oliver & Lee, 2005). A recent study (in 
which participants could select as many entities as they desired) reported that 80% of the 
sample indicated individuals were primarily to blame for the rise in obesity, with only 
35% selecting food manufacturers as primarily to blame, and 18% selecting government 
policies as primarily to blame (Lusk & Ellison, 2013). Despite these beliefs, participants 
who endorsed personal responsibility causes for obesity were less likely to support 
general obesity-targeted policies, whereas those who endorsed food environment causes 
for obesity were more likely to support general obesity-targeted policies (Barry et al., 
2009). Although studies examining support for public policies provide us with some 
information on how the public perceives anti-obesity strategies, research that more 
closely examines obesity within the context of blame attribution theories may provide 
further insight into the antecedents and consequences of obesity-targeted law and policy.  
II. Psychological Theory and Research 
Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory and research has generally assumed that people engage in 
attributional processes, either explicitly or implicitly, because of a human need to predict 
the future and control outcomes (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). Contemporary work on 
attribution theory is founded on the comprehensive work of Heider (1958) who theorized 
about the way “naïve psychologists” or laypeople interpret the actions of others. 
According to Heider’s (1958) theory, perceivers distinguish dispositional aspects of the 
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person, from situational aspects of the environment. Dispositional factors include the 
ability to achieve the action and the motivation (intentions and efforts) for doing so. 
Situational factors, which either facilitate or inhibit dispositional factors, include things 
such as task difficulty, opportunity, and luck. According to Hedier’s (1958) Hydraulic 
Function, the more one attributes to dispositional factors, the less one will attribute to 
situational factors. Using these properties, Heider suggested that perceivers 
systematically search for factors that may reliably account for change and stability in the 
environment (Fiske & Taylor, 2008).  
Another early theory proposed by Kelley (1967, see Kelley 1973), concerned the 
conditions under which perceivers seek to confirm their causal attributions. According to 
Kelley’s Covariation model, if causal information is weak, perceivers rely on three 
dimensions for inferring causality: distinctiveness (does the effect occur with or without 
the entity?), consistency over time and modality (does it consistently occur across 
multiple domains?), and consensus (is the effect experienced by others in the same 
way?). If an event or person is high on all three dimensions, then the perceiver may make 
a confident causal inference attribution. Kelley suggested that perceivers process each 
dimension systematically by serially deciding one dimension, while holding the other 
dimensions constant. In this way, perceivers seek information that is highly distinctive 
and does not vary by circumstances or persons.  
Finally, Weiner’s Attribution Model (1979, see Weiner, 1988), which is derived 
from Heider’s theory, initially focused on the successes or failures of achievement-related 
tasks, or social acceptance. The theory proposes that perceivers search for the cause of an 
outcome using three dimensions: stability (causes that do not change garner stronger 
20 
 
associations), locus (attributed to internal or external factors, and controllability 
(perceived control over the outcome). Weiner’s theory differs from others discussed 
because it incorporates affective responses to causal attributions, which is hypothesized 
to influence perceivers’ expectations and behavior. For instance, as applied to helping 
behavior, anger may be elicited (and subsequent non-helping) if someone is perceived as 
requiring help due to low effort, but pity may be elicited (and subsequent helping) if 
someone is perceived as requiring help due to low ability or situational barriers (Weiner, 
1988).  
These early theories focused on decision-stage models that are described as 
“prescriptive” because criteria at each stage of the attribution process are thought to be 
rationally considered before a final judgment is made. In other words, these models offer 
a formal and idealized set of guidelines for understanding how perceivers ought to make 
attributions. Although stage models, such as these, outline the criteria from which people 
ought to make attributions of others, these models often ignore cognitive shortcomings 
and motivational biases that emerge during less controlled processing. Furthermore, they 
do not adequately explain how perceivers make attributions under conditions where 
information about the requisite dimensions is unavailable.  
More recently, therefore, attribution theories have focused on dual-processing 
accounts of cognition because they better explain how attributions are made according to 
complex processes, such as personal expectations and emotional reactions. According to 
dual-process models, cognition occurs as both an automatic and a controlled process. 
Automatic processes are unintentional, uncontrollable, rapid, autonomous and outside 
awareness (Bargh, 1994); whereas controlled processes are intentional, slow, controlled, 
21 
 
and within awareness. As scholars have noted, most of the attributions we make occur 
quickly and virtually automatically; perceivers rarely engage in explicit and systematic 
processing to find the best possible causal explanation for an outcome—rather they rely 
upon a single sufficient explanation (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). 
Although sometimes social perceivers are interested in attributing temporary 
characteristics of a person, such as intentions, emotions, or desires to explain a behavior 
or outcome; most often perceivers infer enduring dispositions, such as beliefs, traits, and 
abilities (Gilbert, 1998). This has been especially demonstrated in groups with 
stigmatizing conditions. As such, enduring dispositional causes for the stigma are often 
automatically assumed and temporary situational causes are minimized. 
Attributions and Obesity 
One stigmatized group where attributions are often automatically assumed are 
people who are obese.  People who are obese are often perceived according to several 
negative stereotypes: lazy, weak-willed, unsuccessful, unintelligent or incompetent, 
undisciplined, non-compliant with weight reduction techniques, immoral, and unclean 
(Puhl & Heuer, 2010). Furthermore, weight-related perceptions are often the focus of 
moral assertions (Greener et al., 2010) and moral judgments (Townend, 2009). For 
example, people who eat unhealthy fatty foods (e.g., cheeseburgers and milkshakes) are 
perceived as morally inferior to those who eat healthy non-fatty foods (e.g., chicken and 
salads), which is mediated by the “you are what you eat” heuristic and the Puritan Ethic 
of restrictive self-indulgence (Stein & Nemeroff, 1995). Negative perceptions of people 
who are obese are pervasive and thought to negatively affect housing, employment, 
education, healthcare, and interpersonal relationships (Puhl & Latner, 2007).  
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 Compared to other groups, people who are obese have received less attention in 
research than other stereotyped groups such as gender, race, or ethnicity. Unlike other 
stigmatized groups, there may not be any in-group protection because both obese and 
average-weight people report dislike toward overweight people (Crandall, 1994; 
Teachman et al., 2003). One reason for this is that negative perceptions of people who are 
obese are socially condoned, which is evidenced in the media that disproportionally 
frames the causes and solutions for obesity in terms of personal responsibility (McClure, 
Puhl, & Heuer, 2011). For instance, in a review of 751 articles in The New York Times, 
Boero (2007) found that obesity is often discussed in terms of pre-existing cultural and 
moral understandings that fatness is due to lack of willpower. By focusing on individual 
causes of obesity (e.g., overeating) and individual-level solutions (e.g., changing one’s 
diet), environmental factors may be ignored, possibly leading to blaming individuals and 
increasing weight-based stigma (McClure, et al., 2011; Puhl & Brownell, 2003; Puhl, & 
Heuer, 2011; Teachman et al., 2003). Weight stigmatization, therefore, is perceived as 
justifiable because people who are obese are thought to be responsible for their weight 
(Holub et al., 2011; Puhl & Heuer, 2010). According to stigma researchers (Crandall, 
1994), weight stigmatization is believed to be caused by anti-fat attitudes embraced by a 
just world ideology (Crandall, 1994; Crandall & Martinez, 1996). According to the Just 
World Theory, people strive to believe the world is just and fair as a method for feeling in 
control (Lerner, 1980)—especially in U.S. culture that has strong beliefs in self-
determination (Crandall, 1994). According to Crandall (1994), if one subscribes to these 
just world views then the person will “chronically attribute controllable causality to 
others, he or she will tend to blame fat people for their weight and stigmatize them” (p. 
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884).  
Although Crandall (1994) and others have suggested there is a strong relationship 
between blame and negative perceptions of people who are obese, research that has 
empirically tested this relationship is limited. In addition, research that has examined 
“blame” and obesity has used the term blame interchangeably with controllability and 
personal responsibility; thus, less is known about the role of blame within the obesity 
context. Before discussing the limited research on blame attributions and obesity, I will 
summarize the research on weight-based stigma and stereotypes, which is thought to be 
related to blame in an obesity context. Research has noted that certain stigmatizing 
conditions, such as obesity, carry an assumption of causality and responsibility (Weiner, 
1993), which are two components hypothesized to affect blame judgments according to 
blame theories (Alicke, 2000; Shaver, 1985). Weight-based stigma and stereotypes, 
therefore, may be interconnected with judgments of blame. In addition, because there is 
limited empirical research on the effects of blame on people who are obese, the literature 
on the effects of stigma on people who are obese may provide a framework for thinking 
about the effects of blame. 
Weight-based Stigma  
 Although discrimination is traditionally frowned upon, weight stigma remains a 
socially acceptable form of bias and has been documented in a variety of settings 
including employment, health-care settings, educational settings, interpersonal 
relationships, and the media (Puhl & Heuer, 2009; Puhl & Heuer, 2010). Central to this 
debate is whether stereotypes are motivating or stigmatizing. Some scholars have 
proposed that reinforcing pre-existing stereotypes through stereotype priming procedures 
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(Pechmann, 2001) or increasing stigma (Callahan, 2013) may be a way to frame health 
messages to improve health-related choices. According to stereotype priming literature, 
when a stereotype is primed, it becomes more accessible to the perceiver, and is more 
likely to influence information processing and behavior (Kelly, 1955). To reduce obesity, 
according to Pechmann (2001), positive stereotypes of people who engage in 
recommended behaviors, and negative stereotypes of people who fail to engage in 
recommended behaviors, should be made more salient. By doing so, the positive 
stereotypes should encourage positive behavior and the negative stereotypes should 
discourage negative behavior. Although obesity-related behaviors were not specifically 
studied according to this paradigm, previous work by the same researcher (Pechmann & 
Goldberg, 1998) demonstrated that the paradigm of stereotype priming (i.e., exposing 
participants to negative smoker stereotypes such as yellow teeth) was more effective at 
reducing reported intentions to smoke than traditional health risk messages (i.e., 
providing participants with information that smoking causes cancer).  
Other scholars strongly disagree with making negative stereotypes of obesity 
more salient and argue that this may have unintended consequences such as weight gain, 
increased stigma and other negative consequences (Puhl & Heuer, 2009; Puhl & Heuer, 
2010). Specifically, women in a weight loss program who endorsed weight-based 
stereotypes reported more binge eating than women who did not endorse weight-based 
stereotypes and reported eating more food to cope with perceived stigma (Seacat & 
Mickelson, 2009). In a longitudinal study, Sutin and Terracciano (2013) surveyed a 
national sample of 6,157 participants at two time points. Their findings revealed that 
overweight participants who experienced self-reported weight discrimination at time 1 
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were 2.5 times more likely to become obese at time 2; and participants who were obese at 
time 1 and experienced self-reported weight discrimination were three times more likely 
to remain obese at time 2. Weight-based discrimination has also been linked to lower 
self-esteem (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993) and increased body dissatisfaction 
(Farrow & Tarrant, 2009), which has been found to contribute to more eating as a method 
to cope with perceived stigma (Farrow & Tarrant, 2009; Puhl & Brownell, 2006). 
Although these studies demonstrated a relationship between weight-related stereotypes 
and obesity-increasing behavior, the findings are somewhat limited by self-report data 
and non-experimental methods.  
In addition, stereotype threat research (Steele & Aronson, 1995) describes how an 
individual’s performance may be hindered if the individual is concerned with confirming 
his or her group’s stereotype in a stereotype-relevant domain. Studies examining 
stereotype threat have mostly been conducted in domains that examine academic or 
athletic performance and have found that performance is hindered because the anxiety 
experienced leads to diminished performance (Smith, 2004). Stereotype threat literature 
has examined whether coping with a non-related stereotype threat situation may 
contribute to unhealthy eating. In a traditional stereotype threat paradigm, Inzlicht and 
Kang (2010) had average weight women complete a series of math problems (either 
under stereotype threat or not) followed by an ostensible ice cream taste test study. As 
hypothesized, women in the threat condition ate more ice cream than the women in the 
non-threat condition. According to the authors, because stereotype threat increases 
cognitive load and decreases executive resources, there are few resources left to resist 
tempting foods.  
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Although no known study has examined whether exposure to a stereotype threat 
situation would increase food consumption as a coping strategy for overweight/obese 
participants, one study examined the effects of priming negative stereotypes and 
intentions for food consumption and exercise. Seacat and Mickelson (2009) examined the 
effects of stereotype threat on overweight women who were exercising two times a week. 
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either a negative prime or a control 
condition with no prime. In both conditions, participants received a brief description 
about a research study on the health consequences of being an overweight woman. The 
negative prime experimental condition included an additional sentence that stated the 
mock study found that poor diet and exercise (individual causes) was the cause of 
obesity. Furthermore, participants in the negative prime experimental condition provided 
their height and weight directly after the prime (making weight more salient), whereas the 
control condition participants provided their height and weight at the end of the study. 
The study’s findings suggested that women in the negative weight-based stereotype 
prime group reported lower intentions to exercise and eat nutritionally than women in the 
control group.  
Although scholars have suggested that weight-based stereotypes and stigma may 
increase food consumption, some research suggests that when one’s body is made salient, 
it could contribute to short-term restrained eating as opposed to increased eating. Self-
objectification theory describes the process whereby a person may become pre-occupied 
with his or her own appearance as a result of internalization of others’ perceptions. In 
other words, self-objectification means that a person is more likely to take a third person 
perspective, focusing on observable body attributes. Previous research has found that 
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self-objectification increases body shame, which in turn contributes to restrained eating 
(Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 1998; Noll & Fredrickson, 1998). 
Although this research has not specifically examined whether restrained eating is a 
possible consequence of feeling blamed for one’s weight, research has found that targets 
of blame in general do experience shame (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Hetherton, 1994). As 
such, targets of blame may engage in restrained eating, rather than increased eating as 
proposed by stigma researchers.  
Blame Theories 
Within criminal and civil law, the overall goal is to resolve conflict by assigning 
fault in instances where there are opposing claims. In other legal contexts—specifically 
in public health law and policy—finding fault is a central element in deciding how law 
and policy should be implemented. As scholars have noted, even though blame is 
ubiquitous in the legal system, the everyday assignment and avoidance of blame is not as 
theoretically simple as it appears (Shaver, 1985). Because blame involves identifying 
behaviors that are morally or socially reproachful, the assignment of blame is more 
complex than assigning responsibility. To complicate matters, the terms blame, 
responsibility and controllability are often used interchangeably, despite arguments by 
theorists that they are separable constructs (Mantler, Schellenberg, & Page, 2003; Shaver, 
1985). Typically, the distinction between blame, responsibility, and controllability (also 
causality) are blurred whereby researchers use items that measure controllability and 
responsibility and assume blame. Thus, claims that “obese people are blamed” may be 
misleading. To clarify some of these measurement issues and summarize the theoretical 
28 
 
literature, two prominent theories of blame will be discussed including Shaver’s (1985) 
Theory of Blame and Alicke’s (2000) Culpable Control model.  
Shaver’s Theory of Blame  
According to Shaver’s (1985) classic prescriptive Theory of Blame attribution, 
questions of blameworthiness only arise when at least one of the causal elements is a 
human action. Once the person has been determined to be the “cause” of the negative 
outcome, the next step involves judgments of the degree of “responsibility” the person 
has for the outcome. In other words, causation can be thought of dichotomously, and 
once determined, the person’s position on the dimension of responsibility contributes to 
judgments of responsibility. If the person has been found responsible, then the perceiver 
decides whether the person is blameworthy. A person is considered blameworthy if they 
do not offer a justification, excuse, or lack of intention to mitigate the culpability or 
liability for punishment. As Shaver notes, this demonstrates the difference between 
responsibility and blameworthiness—a distinction that has not always been readily 
apparent in previous research or theoretical models.  
The model outlines five dimensions that a person would systematically and 
sequentially proceed through in order to attribute blame—as each of these dimensions 
increases, so too should the attribution of blame. (1) The actor’s contribution to the harm 
(causality); (2) The actor’s awareness of the consequences of her action (knowledge); (3) 
The actor’s desire to bring about the consequence (intentionality); (4) The actor’s 
freedom (lack of coercion) and (5) The actor’s appreciation of the moral wrongfulness of 
the action. According to Shaver’s theory, once causality and responsibility are 
established, blame follows unless the actor successfully offers either a justification, 
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which does not deny responsibility but presents a reason to not assign blame; or an 
excuse, which denies responsibility according to one of the dimensions.  
Alicke’s Culpable Control model 
On the other hand, Alicke’s (2000) Culpable Control model integrates rational 
analysis with cognitive and affective-based biases. The model treats cognitive and 
affective biases as inherent in blame attribution, rather than treating them as exceptions to 
rationality norms. The Culpable Control model proposes that attributions of blame are 
based on two main components: (1) making “spontaneous evaluations,” which are 
affective reactions to the participators and harmful events that are caused; and (2) 
assessing the actor’s personal control and responsibility over the harmful outcome termed 
“structural linkages.” According to the model, the spontaneous evaluations can be 
triggered by evidential aspects, such as intentions and foreknowledge, but also by extra-
evidential aspects, such as stereotypes.  Spontaneous evaluations may affect blame 
attributions in alternative ways. They may directly influence blame judgements or they 
may indirectly influence blame judgements by first influencing beliefs about structural 
linkages (controllability and responsibility), which then influence blame judgements 
(Alicke, 2000; Alicke, Davis, & Pezzo, 1994). Because Alicke’s model proposes that 
spontaneous evaluations can distort both blame judgements and structural linkages that 
predict blame judgments, this model deviates from Shaver’s (1985) sequential process 
model that proposes a single path to blame judgements.  
With respect to assessment of an actor’s personal control over the event, Alicke’s 
model purports that people engage in blame-validation—the tendency to assign blame for 
harmful outcomes and downplay any mitigating features, and to perceive people, rather 
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than environmental cues as primarily in control of negative events (human agency 
control). For these reasons, evidence that supports control by a human agent will be 
weighed more heavily by the person assigning blame than environmental reasons that 
may mitigate blame because human actions are perceived as more controllable than 
environmental actions. The model assumes that both spontaneous evaluations and 
structural linkages contribute to blame-validation, but Alicke suggests that even when 
evidence of structural linkages is weak, spontaneous evaluations can prompt blame-
validation processing. Thus, according to the model, spontaneous evaluations such as 
stereotypes, emotions, and attitudes may be sufficient for blame judgments even if 
attributions of controllability and responsibility are low.  
Comparing theories 
Both models suggest that causality (Shaver, 1985) or causal controllability 
(Alicke, 2000) is deliberately and consciously assessed; but the models differ with 
respect to the cognitive processes behind these elements. For instance, Shaver’s theory 
(1985) assumes a decision-stage model that purports the assignment of blame is a 
controlled process that describes how rational actors systematically move through stages 
of judgment before assigning blame. On the other hand, Alicke’s model (2000) assumes a 
dual-process model where evaluations of blame include both controlled and automatic 
processes win which spontaneous affective evaluations influence judgments before 
assigning blame. Scholars have suggested that because Shaver’s theory is prescriptive 
(what people ought to do), rather than descriptive (what people actually do), it fails to 
account for cognitive and motivational biases that are important for making blame 
attributions (Alicke, 2000; Lagnado & Channon, 2008). Shaver (1985), however, does 
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not completely ignore these biases, but rather suggests that biases are peripheral to the 
basic structure of the theory. Alicke’s (2000) Culpable Control model, nevertheless, 
argues that these biases should be central to a blame attribution model.  
Although Shaver’s theory offers an extensive framework for understanding blame as 
a construct (as well as sub-constructs causality/controllability and responsibility) and was 
instrumental in the scale development in Study 1 of this research, previous empirical 
research seems to support Alicke’s (2000) descriptive Culpable Control model over 
Shaver’s (1985) prescriptive Theory of Blame decision-stage model. Lagnado and 
Channon (2008) had participants make judgments of cause and blame for several 
negative outcomes that varied by degree of intentionality (intentional human action, 
unintentional human action, and physical event that removes human action). According 
to the authors, their findings supported both models in that the degree of intentionality 
was important for blame attributions and influenced causal judgments. In support of 
Alicke’s model, conversely, blame judgments were much higher for unintentional rather 
than physical events, which support Alicke’s argument that people engage in blame-
validation and prefer to hold human agents blameworthy, rather than environmental cues. 
Furthermore, causal judgments were only marginally higher for an unintentional event, 
which is also supported by Alicke’s model because blame-validation acts directly on 
blame judgments and indirectly on causal judgments.  
In light of previous research, Alicke’s dual-process Culpable Control model that 
accounts for both controlled and automatic processing may best explain attributions of 
blame within an obesity context. Although neither of the aforementioned models has 
been applied to how attributions of blame are applied to obesity, Weiner (1988, 1993) has 
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suggested that with obesity, blameworthiness of the individual may be assumed absent a 
causal explanation—suggesting attributions of blame for obesity are automatic. 
Furthermore, Alicke’s model may explain why, despite environmental cues, people often 
attribute obesity to the person’s behavior. Because of normative propensities to blame 
human actions, environmental factors that may mitigate blame are often downplayed. 
According to Alicke, even if cues for human agency are low (i.e., food industry factors 
are provided as causing obesity), spontaneous evaluations such as weight biases and 
negative emotional reactions theoretically strengthen the relationship blame-validation 
for persons who are obese. 
The following sections will discuss the major constructs described in the previous 
models as they have been examined within an obesity context—namely, controllability 
(also called causality in some research and models), responsibility, and affective 
evaluations. Although controllability and responsibility are separate constructs according 
to blame theories, they are discussed in the same section because research in this area 
either measures both constructs or uses these terms interchangeably, making the research 
findings difficult to disentangle. 
Controllability and Responsibility in Obesity 
Although commentary surrounding obesity often centers on both individual and 
situational factors, scholars have suggested that the focus is often stronger for ascribing 
obesity to individual causes and personal responsibility-related factors (Brownell, et al., 
2010). Because of the strong focus on personal responsibility, understanding how people 
make attributions of responsibility is central within an obesity context. According to 
Attribution Theory research, controllability—the capacity to alter an outcome 
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voluntarily—is a necessary component for determining responsibility (Weiner, 1993). As 
stated above, however, although the constructs of controllability and responsibility can 
overlap (and often interchangeable in research studies), blame theory proposes they are 
separate but related constructs (Shaver, 1985).  
Attributions of responsibility are concerned with whom or what can be held 
responsible for an event, especially when the event is negatively valenced (Shaver, 1985). 
Scholars have noted several precursors to attributing responsibility including: having an 
identifiable source such as a specific person, a belief that the person should have foreseen 
the event, the perception that the person’s behavior was not justified, and the perception 
that the person exercised free will (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Furthermore, according to 
meta-analyses procedures, attributions of responsibility will be higher when the event is 
more severe, and when the target is personally and situationally different from the 
perceiver (Burger, 1981). Within the context of groups who are stigmatized based on 
physical illness or disability, controllability for the illness is a strong predictor of 
responsibility (DeJong, 1980; Weiner, 1993). Scholars have suggested, however, that the 
stigma itself may automatically imply a cause and negate perceivers’ need to search for 
further controllability information. Obesity, for example, may automatically engender 
thoughts of overeating or behaviors that are personally under the control of the person 
(Weiner, 1993)—especially for those who are high on measures of weight bias (Hilbert et 
al., 2008).  
Despite the prevalence of strong personal responsibility attitudes for the cause of 
obesity, researchers have attempted to shift attributions based on the causal and 
responsibility information that is provided. Studies commonly manipulate the level of 
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control the person has over their weight as a method to test the effects of controllability 
on participants’ judgements of responsibility. In these studies, controllability is typically 
manipulated by describing the person who is obese as becoming obese because of low 
controllability means (e.g., a biological disorder) or high controllability means (e.g., lack 
of exercise or poor eating habits). The results from these studies, however, have been 
mixed with some studies finding low controllability reasons result in more positive 
judgements than high controllably reasons (DeJong, 1980; Latner, Puhl, Murakami, & 
O,Brien, 2014; Pearl & Lebowitz, 2014; Pryor et al., 2004; Monterosso, Royzman, & 
Schwartz, 2005; Rodin, Price, Sanchez, & McElligot, 1989), but others finding little 
difference based on controllability (Teachman et al., 2003). 
For instance, DeJong (1980) examined the responsibility and likability of an obese 
adolescent. Participants were randomly assigned to either receive a photograph of an 
obese peer or a normal-weight peer. Half received an explanation that the obese peer had 
a thyroid problem that resulted in weight gain or paleness, respectively; and the other half 
received no explanation. Findings revealed that the obese peer was perceived as less 
disciplined and less likable than the normal weight peer in the no explanation condition, 
but was not perceived any differently than the normal weight peer in the thyroid 
explanation condition. Monterosso and colleagues (2005) examined whether biological 
(e.g., chemical imbalance) or experiential (e.g., abusive parents) evidence would have on 
mitigating perceptions of responsibility for four different scenarios that included 
overeating (as well as fire setting, murder, and failure to follow through on plans). For all 
four scenarios, participants were more likely to categorize the biological explanations as 
automatic, and were less likely to perceive the actors as responsible.  
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Conversely, Teachman and colleagues (2003) examined whether implicit or 
explicit biases were moderated by the personal causal controllability of obesity and found 
that genetic reasons did not decrease negative perceptions. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either receive one of two articles that explained the cause of obesity as either 
predominately due to genetics or predominately due to behavior (over-eating and lack of 
exercise), or a control condition with no information. Each participant completed both an 
implicit measure (Implicit Association Task; Greenwald et al., 1998) and explicit 
measure (Fat Phobia Scale; FBS; Robinson, Bacon, & O’Reilly, 1993) of weight-based 
bias. A manipulation check asked participants what the primary cause of obesity was and 
confirmed that there were significant differences of perceived causality by each group. 
With respect to measured biases, their findings revealed that implicit weight-biases (but 
no effects of explicit biases) were highest for the behaviorally primed group, but there 
were no differences between the control and genetic group, indicating that people still 
attributed obesity to over-eating despite genetic information.  
Most of the research has examined perceptions of targets, but recent research 
tested whether causal beliefs about a participant’s own weight status contributed to 
attitudes and whether these predicted support for obesity-targeted policy. In a national 
online sample of people who are overweight and obese, Pearl and Lebowitz (2014) 
examined whether four manipulated passages that varied by causal beliefs (personal 
responsibility, biological, food environment, or a control condition with no cause) 
predicted attitudes towards people who are obese, attitudes about their own weight, and 
support for food-policy and non-discrimination policy. According to the findings, there 
was a significant passage-type effect for self-efficacy and support for food policy, but not 
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for self-blame or internalization of weight bias. Specifically, participants who received 
the food environment condition had greater beliefs in their own ability to lose weight and 
more support for food-based policies compared to the control condition, without the 
negative consequences related to blame and weight stigma.  
Taken together, research generally suggests that people who are obese are often 
assumed to have contributed to becoming obese and are subsequently held responsible for 
their weight. These attributions are especially prevalent when negative attitudes toward 
obesity are high and when information is presented for behavioral contributions to 
weight, as opposed to biological contributions to weight. According to both blame 
theories discussed (Alicke, 2000; Shaver, 1985) controllability and responsibility are both 
necessary precursors to blame attributions, but descriptive models of blame (Alicke, 
2000) propose that extra-evidential factors such as affective reactions are also considered 
by perceivers when making blame attributions.  
Affective Evaluations of People who are Obese  
The primary function of emotions is to signal changes in the environment so that the 
person experiencing the emotion can choose between competing goals and values 
(Damasio, 1994; Schwarz, 2011). The cognitive theory of emotions (Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988) explains that each emotion depends on an appraisal of the significance of 
the change in the environment for that person. In doing so, people often use their moral 
affective intuitions to guide their support for matters of public policy and public health 
(Baron, 1998). Understanding how people’s intuitions affect decision-making, therefore, 
may be useful for helping decision-makers improve the quality of public policies 
(Blumenthal, 2005; Haidt, 2001).  
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According to Alicke’s (2000) Culpable Control model, attributions of blame are 
influenced by relatively unconscious, spontaneous, affective reactions to the event and 
people involved. This notion is supported by other research including Haidt’s (2001) 
argument that moral judgments arise from quick and automatic moral intuitions or 
feelings that are positively or negatively valenced. Within legally-relevant judgments, 
Feigenson and Park (2006), suggest that emotions can be distinguished from one another 
by their cognitive appraisal structures, which can lead to informational cues about how to 
assign legal responsibility and blame. For example, the cognitive appraisal for anger is 
disapproval of a target’s blameworthy behavior and unhappiness about the outcome; thus, 
anger provides a cue to the person that guides their assignment of legal responsibility. 
Research that has specifically examined the role of emotions in public policy also 
suggests that support for public policies may be guided by affective reactions. After 
priming people with either stereotypical or non-stereotypical Black exemplars, 
participants’ prejudicial feelings (disgust, fear, nervous, dislike,  anger) in the 
stereotypical exemplar condition, but not the non-stereotypical exemplar, predicted lack 
of support for affirmative action policies, which was further mediated by internal 
attributions for the out-group’s failures (Ramasubramanian, 2010, 2011).  
The Stereotype Content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), amongst 
other research, has found that certain outgroups elicit different emotional reactions based 
on cognitive appraisals of specific threats the outgroup elicits (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005; Fiske et al., 2002). According to the SCM, outgroups are stereotyped along two 
dimensions—warmth (or perceptions of intent) and competence (or their ability to pursue 
it) —which creates four quadrants (i.e., high warmth-low competence, low warmth-low 
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competence, high warmth-high competence, and low warmth-low competence) that are 
hypothesized to predict specific intergroup emotional reactions. As the SCM predicts for 
outgroups, warm but not competent subordinates elicit pity; competent but not warm 
competitors elicit envy; and those that are neither warm nor competent elicit contempt. 
The warm and competent quadrant is reserved for the in-group and positive feelings, such 
as pride (Fiske et al., 2002).   
Some of the emotional reactions proposed by the SCM are consistent with other 
studies on other-based emotions. One study found that disgust was a common emotional 
reaction toward people who are obese (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009). Disgust is 
believed to be a contamination or avoidance emotion (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Park, 
Schaller, & Crandall, 2007) that emerges when people look down on someone as having 
no redeeming qualities (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). In general, when stigmatized groups are 
not held responsible for their condition they often elicit pity, but if perceived as 
responsible for their condition they elicit anger or contempt (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Fiske et al., 2002; Weiner, 1993). Pity involves unequal status and undermines a person’s 
own control; thus, if an obese person is perceived as lacking control over eating then pity 
may be elicited (Weiner, 2005). Anger occurs when the out-group is perceived as 
demanding resources or as a barrier to desired outcomes (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Fiske & Taylor, 2008); thus, if an obese person is perceived as taking away resources 
from the perceiver (i.e., financial resources such as healthcare expenses, or consumable 
resources such as food), anger may also be elicited. Pryor and colleagues (2004) have 
proposed that emotional reactions toward stigmatized groups may be based on a dual-
process reflexive/reflective model. Initially, negative emotional reactions, such as 
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disgust, are evoked, but following attributional considerations of the controllability of the 
stigma, pity (uncontrollable) or anger (controllable) may be evoked.  
Previous research has suggested that perceivers often make moral judgments based on 
these affective reactions (Blumenthal 2005; Haidt, 2001). According to Haidt (2001), 
moral judgments such as attributions of obesity are made according to moral intuitions, 
which are quick and automatic affective reactions; rather than more traditional controlled 
rational-based moral reasoning theories (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969). The model purports that 
people make these quick and automatic affective reactions, and then after the fact, 
explain their judgment was made through a more systematic moral reasoning as part of 
social demand. Taken together, it seems that people often make judgments based on 
affective reactions to stigmatized groups and that these reactions can contribute directly 
to moral judgments of blame (Alicke, 2000; Haidt, 2001) or can indirectly affect 
perceived controllability or responsibility (Alicke, 2000).  
Blame for Obesity and Consequences of Blame 
Several legal scholars and psychological researchers have suggested that people 
who are obese are blamed for being obese, but fewer have empirically tested this 
assumption. One issue, as previously discussed, is that studies often state they are 
assessing “blame” but items facially measure “controllability.” If theories of blame are 
correct, then these terms are not interchangeable because while controllability considers 
whether a person caused the condition, blame further considers whether there is a moral 
transgression.  
To date, there is no known research that has examined the consequences of blame 
on people who are obese. Research examining the consequences of blame, in general, is 
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quite limited. A qualitative study that examined the effects of stigma in a sample of 
patients with lung cancer found that patients felt blamed for their condition because of the 
assumption that lung cancer is self-inflicted. As a result of being blamed, the lung cancer 
patients reported experiencing negative feelings even though some acquired lung cancer 
from non-smoking related causes (Chapple, Ziebland, & McPherson, 2004). Clinical 
psychology research has found that children who feel blamed following an incident of 
sexual abuse feel guilty and shameful (Lamb, 1986). According to a review of the 
medical literature, medical professionals who feel a “culture of blame” following a 
serious adverse medical event, report experiencing guilt and shame, and poor physical 
health (O’Connor, Kotze, & Wright, 2011). For healthcare providers, it appears the felt or 
perceived consequences of blame are so adverse that health care providers report they 
fear being blamed more than being punished following a serious adverse medical event 
(Gorini, Miglioretti, & Pravetonni, 2012).  
Even if the specific effects of blame are not well researched, it is well-established 
that people are motivated to avoid being blamed. In a criminal case, for example, 
defendants offer mitigating evidence to reduce blameworthiness because of blame’s 
effects on sentencing (Gray & Wegner, 2011). Although the consequences of blame are 
not well-known, blame does seem to have an impact on people emotionally and 
physically, and guides how one would want to present him or herself to escape blame. 
Empirical research that examines the consequences of blame more specifically—
especially in the context of obesity—seems an important next step in better understanding 
the effects of being blamed. 
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CHAPTER 2  
STUDY 1: VALIDATION OF THE OBESITY BLAME ATTRIBUTION SCALE 
 
 
To parse the complexities of blame in the context of obesity and to understand 
social judgments underlying anti-obesity public policies, I developed a 40-item Obesity 
Blame Attribution Scale (OBAS) to examine controllability, responsibility, and blame for 
obesity. Although scholars have developed theoretical models that describe these three 
constructs (Alicke, 2000; Shaver 1985); actual measures of these latent (unobserved) 
constructs are limited. In studies that have measured controllability, responsibility, and 
blame as separate constructs, often a single item is used; however, there are both 
measurement and pragmatic reasons a multi-item scale should be created.  
Item Development 
My aim was to construct a scale to reliably and validly measure the constructs of 
interest: Controllability, Responsibility, and Blame (Dispositional and Situational). To do 
so, I researched theoretical models of blame (Alicke, 2000; Shaver 1985); previous 
research that has measured blame; and research that has examined controllability, 
responsibility, and blame as separate constructs in attributions for serious illnesses 
(Mantler et al., 2003). The theoretical models offered rich information with respect to 
potential items (see discussion on models of blame in literature review), but scales that 
measure blame according to these theories are limited and have often measured blame 
incongruent with theoretical presumptions. 
For example, researchers have often combined attributions of controllability, 
responsibility, and blame and/or use the terms interchangeably (e.g., Allison, Basile, & 
Yuker, 1991), but because theoretical work suggests they are separate constructs, an 
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empirical analysis of the factor structure of these constructs is necessary. In addition, 
typically researchers ask a single question to measure each construct (e.g., Alicke & Zell, 
2009), but because theoretical models of blame are complex, a multi-item scale that 
reliably measures each construct is warranted. Furthermore, many blame scales were 
developed for attributions of blame when someone has committed crime (e.g., 
Gudjonsson, & Singh, 1989; Rogers, Josey, & Davies, 2007) but attributions of blame are 
common in settings beyond criminal settings (e.g., public health issues, non-criminal 
misbehavior, and environmental problems). Other measures examine blame from the 
perspective of the victim, such as blameworthiness of the offender or self-blame (e.g., 
Cramer et al., 2010; Sleed et al., 2002); however, these measures may not generalize to 
non-victims who are making attributions of others who have not personally harmed them.  
One known study by Mantler and colleagues (2003) has measured these as 
separate constructs in an area that does not involve criminal behavior (i.e., severe 
illnesses, AIDS, and lung cancer); however, the empirical analysis of the scale items was 
somewhat limited. The authors examined the hierarchical nature of the constructs using a 
decision-stage model that purported to move from objective to subjective judgments 
(controllability responsibility blame). According to their hypotheses, because they 
are separate constructs that operate in sequential stages, the three judgements should 
increase in magnitude as each judgement is sequentially made. Because responsibility is 
required for blame, and responsibility is required for controllability, then blame 
judgements should be lower than responsibility judgments, which in turn should be lower 
than controllability judgements (measured on a 1 to 7 point scale). Their analysis has 
limitations, however, because it assumed unidimensionality (they averaged the four items 
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for each construct) and used correlations to assess whether the constructs were separate, 
but related factors. 
With the literature in mind, the items for the Obesity Blame Attribution Scale 
(OBAS) were developed using the four components outlined in Wilson (2005) for 
instrument construction: construct (and context), item generation, response (outcome) 
space, and the measurement model.  
Pilot study 1a – do blame attributions consist of separate factors? 
 Prior to creating items for the OBAS, we examined general obesity-related 
attributions with a sample of university students (N=710) to explore whether our scale 
should include separate factors. Participants indicated perceived responsibility and blame 
for three factors known to cause obesity that varied by amount of human controllability: 
a) controllable dispositional factor (e.g., lack of exercise); b) non-controllable 
dispositional factor (e.g., medical condition); and c) situational factor (e.g., laws or 
restaurant policies). Responsibility and blame were measured with a single item each and 
response options were on a 6-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (−3) to strongly 
agree (3) without a neutral midpoint in order to create a forced choice. In general, results 
provided support that responsibility and blame were perceived as different constructs 
within an obesity context as previous theoretical work has posited (e.g., Shaver, 1985). 
Across the three levels of controllability, agreement with responsibility and blame 
differed and were in the hypothesized direction (means ranged from −0.52 to 2.25); 
ratings for responsibility and blame were highest for the controllable dispositional factor 
and lowest for non-controllable situational factors. As a result of these findings, I created 
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a 40-item Obesity Blame Attribution Scale (OBAS) to measure blame with four factors: 
controllability, responsibility, dispositional blame, and situational blame.  
Wilson’s Component 1: Construct (and context): First, I created a construct map 
for the blame construct that consists of four separate sub-constructs: controllability, 
responsibility, dispositional blame, and situational blame (Figure 1.1). The purpose of the 
construct map is to provide a definition of the construct by ordering persons and items 
from high to low (or low to high). According to Wilson’s framework, each latent variable 
is assumed to be unidimensional and continuous, therefore, sub-constructs are depicted 
separately but part of a hypothesized higher-order model. According to both Shaver’s 
(1985) and Alicke’s (2000) models of blame, controllability and responsibility are 
antecedents to blame attributions. As depicted in Figure 1.1, an obese person must be 
perceived as having some dispositional control before being perceived as dispositionally 
responsible. Similarly, an obese person must be perceived as having some dispositional 
responsibility before being perceived as dispositionally blameworthy. Because 
dispositional blame is not the direct opposite of situational blame, these are not labeled 
on opposite ends of a single blame construct. Rather, and similar to Heider’s (1958) 
Hydraulic Function, I predicted that if a person is perceived as being dispositionally 
blameworthy, then situational blameworthiness will be lower. Conversely, if situational 
blame is high, I predicted that dispositional blame will be lower (although I do not think 
these relationships will be symmetrical). If there is no support for the Hydraulic Function, 
then dispositional blame and situational blame may be separate blame constructs, 
whereby dispositional blame is positively correlated with controllability and 
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responsibility, but situational blame is negatively correlated with controllability and 
responsibility. 
Figure 1.1 A sketch of the construct map for the attributions of blame 
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Wilson’s Component 2: Item generation. Second, and with the construct map in 
mind, items were created according to theoretical models (Alicke, 2000; Shaver, 1985) 
and previous research (Mantler, 2003). For each construct, there was an iterative process 
of deciding what items would best measure the construct and to avoid measuring more 
than one concept in each item (i.e., not including “and,” which may measure two 
different concepts). In addition, words for items were chosen that I thought would be 
clear and easy to understand and I avoided negatively-worded items.3 Attention was paid 
to both construct components and descriptive components. Construct components provide 
the interpretational levels within the construct, such as the location on the construct map 
                                                          
3 Items 1 for controllability and 10 for responsibility, however, were negatively worded because I 
thought they could not be worded positively.  
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(Wilson, 2005). In creating items, therefore, I considered items that would provide 
observations across the construct map continuum. Using the dispositional blame items as 
an example, I anticipated that people who strongly agree with the item, “People who are 
obese should be criticized for being obese” will be high on dispositional blame 
attributions; therefore this item is placed at the high end of the continuum for this 
construct. Conversely, I anticipated that people who strongly agree with “People who are 
obese should be excused for their weight” would be low on dispositional blame 
attributions; therefore this item was placed at the low end of the continuum for this 
construct. Descriptive components provide other characteristics of the items that describe 
some feature of the items, such as the language, context, method of administration, and 
unit of analysis (Wilson, 2005). For instance, I decided I would refer to “people who are 
obese” as opposed to “obese people” in accordance with the American Psychological 
Association’s suggestion to “put the person first.” Once items were designed, they were 
ordered on the construct map (Figure 1.2). Finally, once items were created, for face 
validity and clarity, I asked several colleagues to read the items and items were revised 
based on suggestions.  
Figure 1.2 Construct map for Dispositional Obesity Attribution Scale with items and 
respondents 
 Controllability  
 Item    Respondent 
People who are obese…  
10C … cause their own obesity Participants with high 
individual controllability 
attributions 
9C … are obese because of their own free will 
8C … are obese because they lack will power 
7C … can prevent becoming obese  
6C … can personally control their weight  
5C ...are obese because they overeat  
4C ...are obese because they do not exercise  
3C … are obese as a result of their own behaviors Participants with low  
individual controllability 
attributions 
2C … contribute to their own obesity 
1C ...are obese as a result of a medical or biological 
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condition (R) 
 
  
Responsibility 
 
 Item Respondent 
People who are obese…  
10R 
… are forced by external pressures to act on behaviors 
that lead to gaining weight (R) 
Participants with high 
individual responsibility 
attributions 9R … could be thin if they changed their behavior. 
8R … can restrain themselves from overeating 
7R …  choose behaviors that lead to gaining weight  
6R … intentionally act in ways that lead to weight gain  
5R 
…  are aware of the consequences of poor eating and 
exercise 
 
4R … willingly participate in behaviors that lead to obesity  
3R 
…  do not understand how their behaviors contribute to 
their weight 
Participants with low 
individual responsibility 
attributions 
2R 
…  are not responsible for the behaviors that lead to 
their obesity. 
1R 
…  should not be accountable for the behaviors that lead 
to gaining weight. 
 
  
Dispositional Blame 
 
 Item Respondent 
People who are obese…  
  Participants who provide high 
dispositional blame 
attributions 
10DB … should be criticized for being obese 
9DB 
… are to blame even if their weight was caused by 
genetic   factors 
8DB … are to blame even if they exercise regularly  
7DB … are to blame even if they eat healthy foods  
6DB … should be ashamed of their weight  
5DB … have no good reasons for being obese  
4DB 
… should do something differently so they no longer 
gain weight 
 
3DB … are to  not blame for their obesity Participants who provide low 
dispositional blame 
attributions 
2DB … are at not fault for their weight 
1DB … should be excused for their weight 
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Situational Blame 
 Item Respondent 
People who are obese…  
1SB The food industry should be ashamed that it promotes 
unhealthy foods that increase an individual’s obesity. 
Participants who provide low 
situational blame attributions 
2SB Fast food restaurants are at fault for an individual’s 
obesity 
3SB Fast food restaurants are to blame for an individual’s 
obesity 
4SB Poor governmental public policies are to blame for an 
individual’s obesity 
 
5SB Fast food marketing techniques are to blame for an 
individual’s obesity 
 
6SB Government public policies should have prevented an 
individual’s obesity 
 
7SB Government public policies need to do a better job at 
reducing an individual’s obesity 
 
8SB Restaurants that serve unhealthy food should be liable 
for an individual’s obesity 
Participants who provide high  
situational blame attributions 
9SB The food industry should be criticized for an 
individual’s obesity. 
10SB    Fast food restaurants should be punished for causing an 
individual’s obesity 
   
   
   
 
Wilson’s Component 3: Response (outcome) space. Third, response options were 
selected (Wilson, 2005) that I thought best represented the construct, while balancing 
notions important for measurement. There are seven response options for the OBAS on a 
Likert scale that include a label for each point: “strongly disagree,” “moderately 
disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly agree,” “moderately 
agree,” and “strongly agree.”  
Wilson’s Component 4: Measurement model. The final component of scale 
construction includes the measurement model, which is the statistical process of making 
inferences of where participants fall on the latent factor (Wilson, 2005). Selecting the 
appropriate measurement model depends mostly on the response option format (i.e., 
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ordered responses). See the analytic strategy portion below for a more detailed discussion 
of the measurement model.  
Pilot study 1b and 1c-- initial testing and item refinement 
The aim of pilot studies 1b and 1c were to determine if any of the items needed to 
be refined. The four factors each included 10 items measured on a 7-point scale ranging 
from strongly disagree (−3) to strongly agree (3) with labels for each point and a neutral 
midpoint (0). Although offering a neutral midpoint may influence poorly motivated 
participants to select it, we included it to avoid forced directional responding when 
participants truly felt neutral (Sturgis, Roberts, & Smith, 2014). The midpoint was not 
included in pilot study 1a because in earlier phases of item development I wanted 
participants to make a forced choice. We administered the 40-item OBAS to a national 
online sample (N=169) using Amazon’s MTurk and to a sample of college students 
(N=157). All four factors had sufficient reliability according to Cronbach’s alpha for both 
the Mturk sample (α =.80 to .97) and the college sample (α =.77 to .94) and if removed, 
no items increased alpha outside of that range. However, alpha assumes all items are tau-
equivalent with uncorrelated errors and unidimensionality, which limits the utility of 
alpha. In examining the inter-items correlations, most of the items correlated with other 
items within their respective factor, but four items4 did not correlate with other items, 
which is problematic. Means for each item were in the hypothesized direction according 
to the hypothesized construct map. Finally, after averaging the item responses within 
each factor, correlation analyses revealed responses for the controllability, responsibility 
and dispositional blame factors were all positively correlated, but that responses for the 
                                                          
4 One reversed coded item from the controllability subscale; one reverse coded item from the 
responsibility subscale; and two items from the dispositional blame subscale. 
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situational blame factor were not correlated with any of the other scales. This suggests 
that the final latent factor structure may include one higher-order with a situational blame 
factor (measured by controllability, responsibility, and dispositional blame) and a 
situational blame factor; however, final conclusions will be drawn following the 
reliability and validity analyses with the community sample. It was decided that all items 
would be retained and included in the actual sample and factor analysis, and may be 
removed in the future if still problematic. 
One decision that was made after initial construction of the items was to include 
the alternative stem “people who are fat” as a comparison to “people who are obese.” The 
rationale was that “people who are fat” may invoke more stigmatization, whereas “people 
who are obese” may invoke perceptions of someone who is heavier (Puhl, Peterson, & 
Luedicke, 2006). As such, both item stems were included and participants were randomly 
assigned to receive one of the two item stems to empirically compare them. 
Method 
Participants 
Measurement of the Obesity Blame Attribution Scale (OBAS) included responses 
from 601 participants (Mage = 38.34, SD = 13.02; 57% women) from a national sample 
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an internet service that allows 
access to over 500,000 members who are available to participate in online research. 
Empirical research suggests that data obtained from Mechanical Turk are as reliable as 
those obtained from traditional sources (Buhrmester, et al., 2011; Paolacci, et al., 2010). 
Participants were paid $0.50 as compensation for their time with an opportunity to earn 
an additional $1.00 if they were randomly selected to participate in part two of the 
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research (Study 2). A total of 8115 participants clicked on the survey in Mturk; however, 
participants (n=108) were removed for not completing the study (i.e., clicking on the link 
and not completing any questions), answering any of the three attention questions 
incorrectly (n=98), and for taking the study more than once (n=4). For those who took the 
study more than once, only their first response was retained and the second response was 
deleted.  
Procedure 
Participants completed an online survey that included the OBAS and several 
measures to examine construct validity. Each participant was randomly assigned to 
receive either the obese stem (”people who are obese,” n = 301) or the fat stem (“people 
who are fat,” n = 300). For convergent and divergent validity, the OBAS was compared 
to several scales that measure beliefs about the causes of obesity, negative stereotypes 
and attitudes of people who are obese, behavioral discrimination of people who are 
obese, and beliefs that people get what they deserve. Additional measures were included 
in the online study as pre-study measures that will be discussed in Study 2.  
Materials 
Causes of obesity. The Causes of Obesity Scale (COS; Klaczynski et al., 2004) is 
a 31-item scale that measures beliefs about the causes of obesity with three subscales. 
The Internal Causes subscale (18 items) measures beliefs that obesity is caused by 
personal shortcomings and people who are obese are responsible for their weight. The 
Internal Causes subscale includes items such as: “If obese people had more willpower, 
                                                          
5 Research suggests that Confirmatory Factor Models are most stable when there are at least 15-
20 participants per item (Muthén & Muthén, 2002); thus 800 participants were recruited to ensure 
we have adequate sample size even if cases need to be removed. 
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they’d stop eating too much.”  The Physical Causes subscale (7 items) measures beliefs 
that obesity is uncontrollable and is the outcome of genetic or medical conditions. The 
Physical Causes subscale includes items such as: “Obese people are stuck being obese 
because of hormones they can’t control.”  The Social Causes subscale (6 items) measures 
beliefs that environmental factors are responsible for obesity. The Social Causes subscale 
includes items such as: “People get obese because in school, at work, and at home, they 
can get their hands lots of fatty food.” Higher scores for each subscale indicate stronger 
beliefs for that cause of obesity. Items are presented in Appendix A. 
Attitudes toward people who are obese. The Anti-fat Attitudes Questionnaire 
(AFA; Crandall, 1994) is a 13-item scale that measures negative attitudes toward people 
who are obese with three subscales. The Dislike subscale (7 items) measures prejudice 
toward fat people. The Dislike subscale includes items such as: “I really don’t like fat 
people much.” The Fear of Fat subscale (3 items) measures one’s self-relevant concerns 
about fatness. The Fear of Fat subscale includes items such as: “I feel disgusted with 
myself when I gain weight.”  The Willpower subscale (3 items) measures belief about 
controllability. The Willpower subscale includes items such as: “Some people are fat 
because they have no willpower.” Each subscale is measured using a Likert-type 
response format (0 = very strongly disagree; 9 = very strongly agree) and is scored by 
averaging the responses for that subscale. Higher scores on each subscale indicate 
stronger anti-fat attitudes. Items are presented in Appendix B. 
Obesity stereotypes. The Obese Stereotypes Scale (OSS; Klaczynski et al., 2004) 
is a 40-item scale that measures beliefs about personalities of obese people. Response 
options are on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly 
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agree” (4). The beliefs consist of both negative and positive personality traits. The 
positive items such as “popular,” “talented,” and “friendly,” are reversed coded. Higher 
scores indicate more negative beliefs about the personalities of people who are obese. 
Items are presented in Appendix C. 
Behavioral discrimination toward people who are obese. Social distance toward 
a person who is obese will be measured using an adapted version of the Social Distance 
Scale (SDS; Link et al., 1999). The social distance scale is a 5-item proxy measure for 
behavioral discrimination toward people with mental illness that I changed to say “person 
who is obese” instead of “a person with mental illness.” Response options are on a 4-
point Likert scale ranging from “definitely not willing” (0) to “definitely willing” (3). An 
example item includes: “How willing would you be to make friends with someone who is 
obese?” Higher values indicate more willingness to engage with a person who is obese. 
Items are presented in Appendix D. 
Beliefs about justice for self and others. Previous research has found that blame 
attributions are related to beliefs about distributive and procedural justice for self and 
others. The Belief about Justice for Self and Others Scale (BJSOS; Lucas et al., 2011) is a 
16-item scale with response options on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly 
agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (7). The scale has four subscales that consist of four 
items each: Distributive Justice Beliefs for Others, Distributive Justice Beliefs for Self, 
Procedural Justice Beliefs for Others, and Procedural Justice Beliefs for Self. An example 
item that measures distributive justice for self includes “I feel that I usually receive the 
outcomes that are due” and for others includes: “I feel that other people usually receive 
the outcomes that they are due.” An example item that measures procedural justice for 
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self includes “I am generally subjected to processes that are fair” and for others includes: 
“Other People are generally subjected to processes that are fair.” Higher scores indicate 
stronger beliefs in justice for self and others. Items are presented in Appendix E. 
Beliefs in a just world. Previous research has found that blame attributions are 
related to beliefs in a just world. The Global Beliefs in a Just World Scale (GBJW; 
Lipkus, 1991) is an 8-item scale with response options on a 6-point Likert scale that 
ranges from ”strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6). An example item includes “I 
feel that I get what I deserve.” Higher scores indicate beliefs that people are more likely 
to get what they deserve. Items are presented in Appendix F. 
Hypotheses and Analytic strategy 
First, I analyzed the factor structure of the construct(s) within each stem group. I 
hypothesized that the factor structure of the OBAS consisted of one higher-order factor 
with four separate lower-order factors: individual controllability for obesity, individual 
responsibility for obesity, dispositional blame for obesity, and situational blame for 
obesity. It is not clear whether the results will comport with theoretical literature that 
purports each is a separate construct (Shaver, 1985) or with previous attributional 
literature suggesting lay people may perceive these constructs more similarly because of 
held negative stereotypes that obese people have both control and are responsible for 
their weight (Weiner, 1988, 1993).  
Once the factor structure of the OBAS was tested, I examined whether there is 
measurement invariance between the obese stem and fat stem items. Establishing 
measurement invariance is important part of demonstrating the psychometric reliability of 
any measure (e.g., South, Krueger, & Iacono, 2009) because it determines whether the 
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construct is being measured similarly across groups. It is hypothesized that the stem types 
will achieve at least partial scalar invariance (i.e., factor loadings will be similar on to 
each factor by stem type and most thresholds will be similar across stem types), because 
full invariance is more difficult to achieve with a larger number of items. Structural 
invariance analyzes whether each stem type differed according to the factor variance, 
covariance and factor means—which represent actual differences between stem type on 
the construct (not differences due to measurement, which is what is tested in the 
invariance analysis). It is hypothesized that the constructs measured using the fat stem 
items will have higher means because the word “fat” tends to be more stigmatizing 
(Crandall, 1994; Puhl, Peterson, & Luedicke, 2006). In sum, I expect the stem types to 
measure the same underlying latent trait (general blame-related attributions), but that the 
“fat” stem items will result in higher means of the latent trait than the “obese” stem items.  
Third, several scales were examined for convergent and divergent validity with 
the OBAS. Because each of these scales also measure latent traits, global fit for each 
scale will be examined prior to construct validity analyses. In general, it was expected 
that the OBAS factors will be correlated, but not substantially overlapped with any of 
these measures. For specific hypotheses, see Table 1 below. It was hypothesized that 
scales that measure individual causes of obesity (COS: Internal subscale and AFA: 
Willpower subscale) were positively correlated with the OBAS Controllability factor, but 
negatively correlated with scales that measure external causes of obesity (COS: Physical 
and Social subscales) because individual controllability and individual causes are similar 
constructs. Scales that measure negative stereotypes and attitudes toward people who are 
obese were also expected to be positively correlated with the OBAS Controllability factor 
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because previous research suggests that people who have negative perceptions of people 
who are obese are more likely to believe people who are obese are in control of their 
weight (e.g., Klaczynski et al., 2004). Controllability was also thought to be positively 
correlated with the just world belief scales (BJSOS and GBJW) because people who 
believe that people “get what they deserve” are more likely to think individuals 
contribute to their own health problems (e.g., Nudelman & Shiloh, 2011). The 
Controllability factor was not predicted to be related to the AFA: Fear of Fat factor or the 
Social Distance Scale.  
In addition, the pattern for the Responsibility factor is expected to be similar to 
the pattern for convergent and divergent validity for Controllability because 
Responsibility and Controllability are expected to be positively correlated (e.g., Mantler 
et al., 2003) and related similarly to the other constructs. With respect to Dispositional 
Blame factor, the pattern is expected to be similar to Controllability and Responsibility 
because Dispositional Blame is hypothesized to be positively correlated with 
Controllability and Responsibility—with one exception— Dispositional Blame is also 
expected to be positively correlated with Social Distance similar to previous research that 
has examined victim blaming (Johnson, Mullick & Mulford, 2002). Furthermore, 
Situational Blame is expected to be negatively correlated with Controllability, 
Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame, as well as the measures for which 
Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame are expected to be positively 
correlated. Situational Blame is also expected to be negatively correlated with Social 
Distance (Johnson et al., 2002). 
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Results 
Preliminary psychometric analysis 
 
Item statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics for each item, separated by the each of the four factors and by 
item stem language (“obese” or “fat”), are presented in Table 2, Table 3, Table 5, and 
Table 5. For all items, the minimum and maximum values consisted of the full range of 
the scale (−3 to 3), except Item 2db from the “obese” dispositional blame scale (“People 
who are obese are at fault for their weight”), which had a range of −2 to 3. This may 
indicate that this item was not good at measuring lower levels of obesity dispositional 
blame attributions. With respect to individual item means across all four factors, in 
general, participants were more likely to endorse agreement that people who are obese/fat 
have controllability and responsibility over their weight (most item means were greater 
than 0); participants were more likely to endorse disagreement that people who are 
obese/fat are dispositionally blameworthy for their weight (many item means were less 
than 0). Finally, participants were more likely to endorse disagreement that the food 
industry and other environmental factors were situationally to blame for the public’s 
obesity/fatness. Although the subsequent invariance analysis is necessary to determine 
whether item endorsement differed significantly by scale language—whether items 
included “obesity” or “fat” as the stems—in general, item descriptive suggest they may 
not differ significantly. Contrary to hypotheses, informally examining item means 
suggests participants endorsed more agreement with controllability and responsibility 
when the stem included “obesity” rather than “fat” (i.e., more positive means for obesity 
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than fat) and less agreement with dispositional and situational blame when the stem 
included “fat”  rather than “obesity” (i.e., more negative means for fat than obesity).   
Overall, Cronbach’s alpha reliability were good (all α ranged from .79 to .95, see Table 2 
to Table 5. Table 2 to Table 5 also display the corrected item-total correlations and 
Cronbach’s alpha if the item were deleted. For instance, item 10r would increase alpha to 
.84 and .82 for “obesity” and “fat,” respectively. Because alphas assume 
unidimensionality, however, they are not appropriate statistics for assessing reliability 
unless dimensionality has been empirically modeled. The inter-item correlations for the 
four factors for “obesity” and “fat” are presented in Table 6 through   
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Table 13. Most of the items had a medium to high correlation with each other within 
each factor. For both stems on the Controllability factor, however, item1c (i.e., “People 
are obese/fat as a result of a medical or biological condition”) had relatively lower inter-
item correlations with the other items (ranging from .16 to .40 on both stems); this is not 
surprising considering this item was reverse coded. For the Responsibility factor, there 
appear to be a few problem items. Item 10r, which was reverse coded, has relatively low 
inter-item correlations (ranging from −.05 to .11 on both stems). Items 3r (“People who 
are obese/fat understand how their behaviors contribute to their weight”) and 5r (“People 
who are obese/fat are aware of the consequences of poor eating and exercise”) also have 
some relatively low inter-item correlations (.04 to .19 and −.05 to .22 on both stems) 
though they were correlated with each other at .53/.54). Both of these items seem to 
measure knowledge or insight into their obesity, so perhaps this is a separate construct 
not captured within the Responsibility factor. With respect to the dispositional blame 
factor, although some of the items have lower inter-item correlations, there does not seem 
to be a discernable pattern among any problem items for both stems. The inter-item 
correlations for the Situational Blame factor are all relatively high and it appears there are 
no problem items. 
Psychometric analysis 
 
Latent trait analyses were estimated using a graded response model, which is a 
latent trait model that can estimate models when data are non-normal (i.e., skewed) and 
data with ordinal response options. IFA essentially divides each ordinal item into a series 
of cumulative binary sub-items, known as thresholds (e.g., 1 vs. 2-6, 1-2 vs. 3-6, and so 
forth). It then uses a probit link function, so that rather than predicting the probability of a 
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response in the higher category directly, the predicted outcome is instead the value of the 
standard normal curve that corresponds to the area to the left associated with that 
probability. Thus, the measurement model parameters for each item include a factor 
loading, which is the regression of the probit response onto the latent factor, as well as 
thresholds up to the number of possible response options minus 1. Given the seven 
possible response options, six thresholds will be estimated for each item, which can be 
interpreted as the probit of the probability of responding in the lower category of each 
cumulative sub-item given a latent factor score of 0.  
The reliability of the 40 OBAS items was assessed in an online national sample 
(N=601) using IFA in Mplus v. 6.12 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). All items had 
response options on a seven-point ordered category Likert scale with anchors ranging 
from −3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree) and a midpoint 0 (neither agree nor 
disagree). Larger positive values indicate more agreement with the attribution (e.g., 3) 
and larger negative values indicate more disagreement (e.g., −3). For one item (item 2r), 
response option −3 was not selected for “obese” (see Table 3). To correct for this so that 
Mplus can estimate the models, response option −3 was collapsed into response option 
−2 for “fat” for this item (this affected only a single response option out of 24,040 
possible responses, which is less than .01%). There was missing data for one item 
response (item 9sb for “obese”) and is assumed to be Missing Completely at Random 
(MCAR) with WLSMV.  
Item fit 
First, to make sure items were similarly contributing to each factor, I assessed the ten 
items for each of the hypothesized factors (Controllability, Responsibility, Dispositional 
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Blame, and Situational Blame) separately for each stem type (“obese” or “fat”) including: 
1) global fit, 2) local fit, 3) parameter significance, and 4) effect size and reliability. For 
model identification, item thresholds and factor loadings were estimated freely, the latent 
factor means to 0 and factor variances to 1. To assess global fit, Table 14 presents the 
final model fit statistics for each factor by stem type and includes the obtained model χ2, 
the χ2 degrees of freedom, and associated significance test p-value for which non-
significance suggest good fit. Table 14 also includes the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) for 
which values higher than .95 suggest good fit as well as the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) point estimate and 90% confidence interval for which values 
lower than .06 suggest good fit (Byrne, 2001).  
Local fit is examined to see why the models may not have global fit or to examine 
whether there are more specific fit problems. To assess local fit, residual correlations 
were computed via Mplus’ RESIDUAL output option that provides the difference 
between the model-predicted and data-estimated polychoric correlations. Positive values 
indicate the two items are more related than predicted and negative values indicate the 
items are less related than predicted. Although there are not standard cut-off values that 
would indicate an item with local misfit, the values can be used to identify any problem 
items in conjunction with the modification indices. 
Next, I inspected the model parameters, such as the standardized factor loadings (for 
how items correlated with the factor), R2 values, and residual variances for both statistical 
and practical significance. Lastly, reliability and effect sizes were examined via test 
information function plots6 that describe how reliable the scale is over the range of Theta 
                                                          
6 Reliability is calculated as Reliability = Information/Information+1 
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(in IFA slopes relating Theta to the item response are non-linear). Any model 
comparisons for best fit were examined with a χ2 difference test using the DIFFTEST 
option for the WLSMV estimator, for which a significant χ2 indicates the smaller model 
fits worse than the larger model (and the larger model should be retained). 
Controllability. According to the global fit statistics, Controllability had good fit 
according to CFI for the obese stem (.98) and the fat stem (.99), but did not have good fit 
according to RMSEA for the obese stem (.13) and the fat stem (.10). In examining local 
fit, none of the residual correlations was large, suggesting there were no sources of local 
misfit. The factor loadings for each item were significantly related to the factor for both 
stem types (all p <.001). For the obese stem, standardized loadings ranged from .40 to 
.89; for the fat stem, standardized loadings ranged from .39 to .92, with most loadings 
greater than .80 (item 1c, which was reverse-coded, was the only item with lower 
correlations at .40 and .39, respectively). Similarly, R2 values were all significant and 
indicated the items were all related to the latent factor. Moreover, modification indices 
did not suggest any considerable changes needed to be made and there were no items that 
demonstrated a pattern of local misfit with respect to residual correlations (all were <.20). 
No changes were made to either Controllability factors because model fit appeared to be 
sufficient and the final sub-scale included all 10 items. The final fit statistics are 
presented in Table 14. Reliability function plots by stem type are presented in Figure 1. 
The Controllability scale has a reliability greater than .97 (information of 30 equals 
reliability of .97) and reliably measures theta (the factor) between −2 and 2. The fat stem 
appears to have slightly more reliability than the obese stem.  
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Responsibility. According to the global fit statistics, Responsibility did not reach 
good fit according to CFI for the obese stem (.93) and the fat stem (.91), and did not have 
good fit according to RMSEA for the obese stem (.22) and the fat stem (.21). The factor 
loadings for the fat stem were each significantly related to the factor (all p <.001); 
however, the standardized loading for obese stem item 10r with (a reverse coded item 
“people who are obese are forced by external pressures to act on behaviors that lead to 
gaining weight”) was not significant (p = .08). For the obese stem, significant 
standardized loadings ranged from .29 to .90; for the fat stem, standardized loadings 
ranged from .16 to .91, with most loadings greater than .80 (fat stem item 10r was only 
.16 and also may be one reason for poor fit). Similarly, all R2 values were significant and 
related to the latent factor, except for item 10r with both stems (obese stem p = .38, fat 
stem p =.08). For both stems, modification indices suggested that items 3r and 5r may 
covary and thus should be set to be correlated; the residual correlation between these 
items suggested they were more related than expected (.53 and .50 for the obese and fat 
stem, respectively). No additional items demonstrated a pattern of local misfit with 
respect to residual correlations (all were <.20). 
To improve global fit, therefore, I first removed item 10r from both stem groups. CFI 
for the obese stem (.95) and the fat stem (.93) improved, as did RMSEA for the obese 
stem (.17) and the fat stem (.18). Because CFI was still under .95 and RMSEA were still 
high, I allowed the residuals for items 3r (“understand how their behaviors contribute to 
their weight”) and 5r (“are aware of the consequences of poor eating and exercise”) to 
correlate in the model because the modification indices suggested as such, and they 
theoretically and practically do appear to be facially similar. By doing this, CFI for the 
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obese stem (.99) and the fat stem (.98) improved, as did RMSEA for the obese stem (.08) 
and the fat stem (.09). The final sub-scale, therefore, included 9 items and two items 
whose residuals were correlated. The final fit statistics are presented in Table 14. 
Reliability via test information function plots by stem type is presented in Figure 1. The 
Responsibility scale has a reliability greater than .80 (information of 4 equals reliability 
of .80) and reliably measures theta (the factor) between −5 and 5. The obese stem appears 
to have slightly more reliability than the fat stem. 
Dispositional blame. According to the global fit statistics, Dispositional Blame did 
not reach good fit according to CFI for the obese stem (.92) and the fat stem (.93), and 
did not have good fit according to RMSEA for the obese stem (.18) and the fat stem (.19). 
The factor loadings for each item were significantly related to the factor for both stem 
types (all p <.001). Standardized loadings for the obese stem ranged from .19 to .82; for 
the fat stem from .19 to .81—however, most standardized loadings were around .40 -.50 
for most items. Although the factor loading for item 1db (reverse coded “should be 
excused for their weight”) was statistically significant, the standardized loading was only 
.19 for both stem items. R2 values were all significant and indicated the items were all 
related to the latent factor. For both stems, modification indices suggested that items 7db 
and 8db may covary and thus the residuals should be correlated (especially for the obese 
stem). Also, modification indices suggested that items 2db and 3db may covary and thus 
the residuals should be set to be correlated (especially for the fat stem). No items 
demonstrated a pattern of local misfit with respect to residual correlations (all were <.20). 
To improve global model fit, I first removed item 1db from both stem type factors; 
however, when removing item 1db, the model still did not fit well so item 1db was 
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retained. Because CFI was still under .95 and RMSEA were still high, I set the residuals 
for items 7db (“are to blame even if they eat healthy foods”) and 8db (“are to blame even 
if they exercise regularly”) to correlate in the model as they theoretically and practically 
do appear to be facially similar. By doing this, CFI for the obese stem (.95) and the fat 
stem (.94) improved, as did RMSEA for the obese stem (.15) and the fat stem (.18). 
Again, because CFI was still under .95 for the fat stem and RMSEA was still high for 
both, I allowed the residuals for items 2db (“are at fault for their weight”) and 3db (“are 
to blame for their obesity”) to correlate in the model as suggested by the modification 
indices, and I agreed they appear to be facially similar. By doing this, CFI for the obese 
stem (.96) and the fat stem (.95) improved, as did RMSEA for the obese stem (.14) and 
the fat stem (.16). The final sub-scale, therefore, included 10 items, in which the residuals 
for two sets of items were correlated. The final fit statistics are presented in Reliability 
via test information function plots by stem type is presented in Figure 1. The 
Dispositional Blame scale has a reliability of about .97 (information of 30 equals 
reliability of .97) and reliably measures theta (the factor) between −3 and 3. The obese 
stem appears to have slightly more reliability than the fat stem. 
Situational blame. According to the global fit statistics, Situational Blame had good 
fit according to CFI for the obese stem (.95) and the fat stem (.96), but did not have good 
fit according to RMSEA for the obese stem (.24) and the fat stem (.22). The factor 
loadings for each item were significantly related to the factor for both stem types (all p 
<.001) and standardized loadings for the obese stem ranged from .78 to .92; for the fat 
stem from .76 to .93. Similarly, R2 values were all significant and indicated the items 
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were all related to the latent factor. No additional items demonstrated a pattern of local 
misfit with respect to residual correlations (all were <.20). 
Moreover, modification indices for both stem items suggested that if some of the item 
residuals were correlated, then model fit would improve. In examining the suggestions, it 
appears that the Situational Blame items actually measures two separate factors—one that 
measures attributions of blame to the food industry and restaurants, and one that 
measures attribution of blame toward the government. To empirically test this, I 
compared a two-factor situational blame model, in which the separate food industry and 
government blame factors were correlated, to the single factor model using a χ2 
DIFFTEST. The one-factor model fit worse than the two-factor model for both the obese 
stem χ2 (1) = 96.39, p <.001, and the fat stem χ2  (1) = 87.95, p <.001. According to the 
global fit statistics, CFI for the obese stem (.98) and the fat stem (.98) both improved, as 
did RMSEA for the obese stem (.17) and the fat stem (.17). RMSEA was still higher than 
desired and modification indices for the two-factor obese stem model indicated that two 
items’ residuals possibly covaried; therefore the residuals for sb1 (“The food industry 
should be ashamed that it promotes unhealthy foods”) and sb9 (“The food industry 
should be criticized for the public’s obesity”) were correlated in a subsequent model as 
they facially appeared to measure similar qualities. CFI for both stems remained (.98) and 
RMSEA for the obese stem (.14) and the fat stem (.15) improved. The two factors were 
also significantly correlated (obese stem: r = .78, p <.001; fat stem: r = .85, p <.001).  
The final sub-scale included two correlated factors (a Food Industry Dispositional 
Blame factor and a Government Policy Dispositional Blame factor), for which the 
residuals of two items on the Food Industry Dispositional Blame were correlated. The 
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final fit statistics are presented in Table 14. Reliability via test information function plots 
by stem type is presented in Figure 1. The Situational Blame Food Industry scale has a 
reliability greater than .80 (information of 4 equals reliability of .80) and reliably 
measures theta (the factor) between −3 and 3. The fat stem is more reliable than the obese 
stem. Reliability for the Government Policy Dispositional Blame factor, however, was 
poor for both stems and did not reach .80 (information of 4), most likely because the 
scale only included three items.  
Factor structure 
 After examining the fit of each of the factors individually, as described 
previously, a combined model was estimated. All alternative factor structures are 
displayed in  
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Figure 2. The original hypothesis was a higher-order Obesity Blame Attribution factor, 
with four lower-order factors that measured Controllability, Responsibility, Dispositional 
Blame, and Situational Blame (with Situational Blame being negatively correlated with 
the other three factors). Following the item fit analysis, however, Situational Blame was 
split into two factors that measured Food Industry Dispositional Blame and a 
Government Policy Dispositional Blame. As such, the hypothesis has adjusted to include 
five lower-order factors. The five factors were fit simultaneously (but separately by stem 
type) with covariances estimated freely among them. A total of 39 items were included 
because 1 item has been dropped from the Responsibility sub-scale. Each factor was 
identified by fixing the first item loading on each factor to 1, estimating the factor 
variance, and then fixing the factor mean to 0, while estimating all possible item 
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thresholds (six for each item given seven response options, except for item resp2 that 
only had six response options chosen) and remaining item loadings. As with the 
measurement models described previously, WLSMV estimation including a probit link 
and the THETA parameterization (such that all item residual variances were constrained 
to 1) was used to estimate all higher-order models (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). 
Model fit statistics describe the fit of the item factor model to the polychoric correlation 
matrix among the items. Nested model comparisons were conducted using the 
DIFFTEST procedure.  
As shown in Table 15, the fit of the obese stem model with five correlated factors 
was good, and when compared with a single-factor model (with all 39 items loaded onto 
a single factor), the single-factor model fit significantly worse than the five-factor model  
χ2  (14) = 1292.19, p <.001. Correlations of .8 or higher were found amongst three factors 
(Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame), providing evidence that the 
three factors may be part of a single higher-order factor. The Food Industry Dispositional 
Blame and a Government Policy Dispositional Blame factors did not significantly 
correlate with the Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame factors, but 
they were significantly correlated with each other, providing evidence that they may be 
part of a second higher-order factor. The fit of the fat stem model with five correlated 
factors was good and when compared with a single-factor model, the one-factor model fit 
significantly worse than the five-factor model χ2  (14) = 1227.71, p <.001. The pattern of 
correlations for the fat stem was the same as for the obese stem. 
Because the correlations were not significant between the Situational Blame 
factors and the other three factors, and the correlations were so high between 
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Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame, I compared the five-factor 
model to a three-factor model, whereby Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional 
Blame were on a single factor and Situational Blame were two correlated factors. The 
three-factor model fit significantly worse than the five-factor model for the obese stem χ2  
(11) = 319.87, p <.001, and fat stem χ2  (11) = 232.11, p <.001, again suggesting 
Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame may be separate factors that may 
be part of a higher-order factor. 
The higher-order factor structure was tested by removing the covariances among 
the Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame factors and estimating 
loadings for the three factors as a single higher-order factor (whose variance was fixed to 
1 and mean fixed to 0). Two higher-order factors were tested whereby Controllability, 
Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame were the first factor and Food Industry 
Dispositional Blame and a Government Policy Dispositional Blame were the second 
factor.  To identify this model, the factor loadings for the Food Industry and Government 
Policy were set to be equal so that the Dispositional Blame higher-order factor would 
estimate because factors with only two lower-order factors is not locally identified 
otherwise. The two higher-order factors were correlated. 
With respect to the obese stem, the fit of the higher-order factor model remained 
good, and a nested model comparison to the five-factor model (with all possible 
correlations estimated instead) via the DIFFTEST procedure revealed no change in fit, χ2 
(5) = 9.57, p = .09. In examining the variance accounted for by the higher-order factor for 
each lower-order factor, the higher-order factor accounted for a significant amount of 
variance for each factor. However, the two higher-order factors were not significantly 
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correlated with each other r = −.03, p = .65. Likewise, for the fat stem, a nested model 
comparison revealed a no change in fit, χ2 (5) = 6.00, p = .31; and the higher-order factor 
accounted for a significant amount of variance for each factor. However, the two higher-
order factors were not significantly correlated with each other r = − .08, p = .13. The final 
factor structure for the OBAS, therefore, included two higher-order factors: A) a 
Dispositional Blame factor that included Controllability, Responsibility, and 
Dispositional Blame; and B) a Situational Blame factor that included Food Industry 
Dispositional Blame and a Government Policy Dispositional Blame.  
 Histograms for displaying the distribution of factor scores across the sample for 
both higher-order factors are presented in Figure 3 and Figure 4. For both the obese and 
fat stem, theta for the Blame higher-order factor was normally distributed around the 
mean = 0 and variance = 1. This suggests that the three Controllability, Responsibility 
and Dispositional Blame factors measured the latent trait across varying levels of theta. 
On the other hand, because there is a floor effect in the factor scores for the Situational 
Blame higher-order factor for both stems, there is not good measurement at the low end 
of the factor.  
 
 
 
Invariance analysis 
Measurement invariance 
Measurement and structural invariance of the OBAS was tested to compare 
participants’ attributions when the question stems included “people who are obese” 
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versus “people who are fat.” Models were estimated in Mplus v. 6.12 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 1998-2010) with WLSMV estimation with a probit link and THETA 
parameterization. More specifically, the measurement invariance analysis examined 
whether the OBAS measured attributions of blame similarly with stems “people who are 
obese” and “people who are fat” to test whether item wording is inter-changeable and 
whether comparing mean values is meaningful with respect to the latent trait. The 
structural invariance analysis examined whether each stem type differed according to the 
factor variances, covariances, and factor means—which represent actual differences 
between stem type on the construct.  
In an invariance analysis, a series of increasingly strict constraints are placed on 
the model parameters (loadings, thresholds, residual variance, and residual covariance) to 
test the equivalence of the solution between the obese stem and fat stem. The model fit 
statistics for each of the models tested describe the fit of the item factor model to the 
polychoric correlation matrix among the 39 items for each stem type. When WLSMV is 
used, the difference in χ2 values for nested models in not distributed as a χ2; thus, nested 
model comparisons were conducted using Mplus’ DIFFTEST option and the 
SAVEDATA command was used to calculate differences in χ2. If the difference was 
significant when comparing the nested models, this suggested the models are not 
equivalent (not invariant) between stem types; thus non-significance suggests models are 
equivalent (invariant).  
First, the configural invariance model was identified where the factor structure 
(i.e., two higher-order factors) was estimated with each stem type to test whether they 
shared the same broad factor structure. Item loadings and thresholds were estimated by 
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fixing the factor variances to 1 and factor means to 0 in each group for identification. 
Because residual variances are not uniquely identified in the configural invariance model, 
they were fixed to 1 in both groups. Table 17 presents the model fit statistics for the 
configural invariance model, which had good model fit (CFI = .97; RMSEA = .06). 
Following the configural model estimation, analyses continued by applying parameter 
constraints in successive models to examine whether there is measurement or structural 
non-invariance between the obese stem and fat stem items. 
To test metric invariance (“weak” invariance), which examines whether stem type 
produces similar factor loadings, the baseline configural model was compared to a model 
that constrained all of the factor loadings (i.e., each item factor loading was set to be 
equal for each stem, but freely estimated). For model identification, the factor variances 
for the obese stem were fixed to 1 but freely estimated for the fat stem; factor means were 
fixed to 0 for both stem types; all residual variances were constrained to 1 across stem 
type; and all item thresholds were estimated. The metric invariance model (constrained 
loadings) fit significantly worse than the configural model (free loadings) DIFFTEST 
(34) = 65.91, p < .001. Modification indices suggested that control item 6 (6c: “people 
who are obese/fat can personally control their weight”) would produce better model fit if 
the obese stem and fat stem item loadings were not constrained to be equal (allowed to be 
different).  When letting the loading item 6c estimate freely, standardized factor loadings 
revealed that item 6c was more related to the factor with the obese stem (.76) than the fat 
stem (.66). This could indicate that participants are more likely to attribute control to 
people who are “obese” than people who are “fat.” This model still fit significantly worse 
than the configural model DIFFTEST (33) = 58.32, p < .001.  
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This process was repeated two more times with item 8r (responsibility item 8 
“people who are obese/fat can restrain themselves from overeating”) and then 
responsibility item 7 (7r: choose behaviors that lead to gaining weight”) until the model 
did not fit worse than the configural model (see Table 17). Similar to the non-constrained 
item in the controllability factor, items 8r and 7r demonstrated higher factor loadings on 
the obese stem (.49 and .32, respectively) than the fat stem (.90 and .80, respectively) 
when freely estimated—suggesting these two items are related more to the factor with the 
“obese” stem than the “fat” stem. The final metric model, therefore, resulted in three 
different item loadings for the obese and fat stem (items 6c, 8r and 7r).  
Next, scalar invariance (“strong” invariance), which tests whether at the same 
level of the trait participants from each group would select the same response option, was 
tested against the metric invariance model by constraining all of the item thresholds and 
setting the factor means to 0. The first scalar invariance model (scalar A) fit significantly 
worse than the metric invariance model, DIFFTEST (210) = 250.28, p =.02. Modification 
indices suggested that constraining responsibility item 3, threshold 5 (item 3r) between 
stem types was problematic (“people who are obese/fat understand how their behaviors 
contribute to their weight”); thus, that threshold was freely estimated between groups in 
the subsequent model (scalar B). Threshold 5 is the comparison between −3, −2, −1, 0, 1 
vs. 2, 3 or participants’ probability of selecting 2 (“moderately agree”) or 3 (“strongly 
agree”) over the lower values. When freely estimated, item 3r threshold 5 for the obese 
stem (.09) was lower than the fat stem (0.42), which means that participants required a 
higher level of the responsibility attribution trait to endorse more agreement on this item 
when given that fat stem, as compared to the obese stem. The scalar invariance model 
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(scalar B) did not fit significantly worse than the metric invariance model, DIFFTEST 
(209) = 240.76, p =.07. As such, scalar invariance was achieved for all items except for 
the three non-metric items (items 6c, 8r and 7r) and 1 threshold (3r threshold 5).  
Residual invariance (“strict” invariance) was tested against the final partial scalar 
invariance model (scalar B) by constraining the item residual variances, which tests 
whether the amount of item variance not related to the factor is equivalent across stem 
type. For this step, model estimation proceeds backwards so that a model was estimated 
with all the residual variances freely estimated for the fat stem, and compared to a model 
with all the residual variances fixed to 1. For identification, the residual variances for 
obese stem were fixed to 1 in both models and all other parameters were estimated as 
described in scalar invariance model B. The model was not able to converge, which is a 
common problem and some argue is not necessary for measurement invariance (because 
we do not really know what the factor is, so how do we know what the factor is not), so 
this step was skipped. The final lower-order model, therefore, has partial scalar 
invariance. 
Structural invariance 
Once partial measurement invariance was obtained, structural invariance was 
tested by examining invariance of the loadings for the five factors on their respective 
higher-order factor, factor loadings, five lower-order factor variances, the single higher-
order factor variance, higher-order factor covariances, and lower-order and higher-order 
factor means to test for true group differences. First, the equivalence of the higher-order 
factor loadings were tested between stem types—whether the five lower order factors 
contributed similarly to the higher order Dispositional Blame and Situational Blame 
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factors. Factor loadings were held equivalent between the two stem types and fit was 
compared to the previous scalar B model. To identify the model, the first item in each 
lower-order factor was set to 1 as a marker item, with the rest freely estimated, and the 
higher-order factor variances were set to 1 in the obese stem but freely estimated in the 
fat stem. Initial rounds of this model, however, would not estimate because of a non-
positive-definite solution resulting from the under-identified two-factor higher-order 
Situational Blame factor. As such, a 3-1-1 alternative factor structure was tested where 
Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame remained as part of the higher-
order blame factor, but the two Situational Blame factors were estimated as two separate 
factors for the remainder of the analysis (see  
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Figure 2). An alternative scalar model (scalar B2) was re-estimated using this 
factor structure for purposes of the DIFFTEST. The constrained higher-order factor 
loading model did not fit significantly worse than the scalar B2 model, DIFFTEST (2) = 
3.92, p =.14, demonstrating that the three lower-order factors loaded equivalently onto 
the higher-order Blame factor across stem type.  
To test the equivalence of the disturbances (lower-order factor variances), the 
factor variances for the fat stem, which had previously been estimated freely, was 
constrained to 1 similar to the factor variance for the obese stem. The DIFFTEST (3) = 
1.39, p = .71 revealed that the model with the constrained factor variances did not fit 
significantly worse than the previous model tested (Higher-Order Factor Loadings 
model). Therefore, the obese stem and fat stem showed similar variability with respect to 
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the three disturbances. The higher-order factor variance for the Blame factor was tested 
by setting the Blame factor variance to 1 in the fat stem group. The DIFFTEST (1) = 
0.10, p = .75 revealed that the model with the constrained factor variances did not fit 
significantly worse than the previous model tested (Factor Variance model). Therefore, 
the obese stem and fat stem showed similar variability with respects to the Blame higher-
order factor. The invariance of the factor covariances (Higher-order Dispositional Blame, 
Situational Blame Food Industry and Situational Blame Government) was tested by 
constraining the factor covariances between each stem type. The DIFFTEST (3) = 2.91, p 
= .41 revealed that the model with the constrained factor covariances did not fit 
significantly worse than the previous model tested (Higher-order Factor Variance model).  
In examining the factor intercepts for the five factors (from the last scalar B2 
model where factor means were freely estimated), the only factor for which the fat stem 
was significantly different from 0 (the factor mean for the obese stem) was the 
Dispositional Blame factor (difference = −0.40, SE = 0.19, p < .05), indicating that the fat 
stem produced more agreement with dispositional blame than the obese stem. Although 
only marginally significant, the Responsibility factor (difference = −0.50, SE = 0.29, p = 
.08) and the Situational Blame Food Industry factor (difference = −0.16, SE = 0.09, p = 
.08) also suggested that the fat stem produced more agreement with Responsibility and 
Situational Blame toward the food industry, than the obese stem. There were no 
significant differences for the Controllability factor (difference = −0.40, SE = 0.19, p = 
.34), nor Situational Blame toward the Government (difference = −0.09, SE = 0.29, p = 
.35).  
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To examine whether the higher-order factor mean for the Blame factor explains 
intercept differences in the higher-order factor, a final model was estimated where all 
lower-order factor intercepts were set to 0 in both groups, the higher-order factor mean 
was set to 0 in the obese stem group, but was set to be freed in the fat stem group. The 
DIFFTEST (4) = 7.93, p = .09 revealed that the model with the constrained factor 
intercepts did not fit significantly worse than the previous model tested (Factor 
Covariance model). As such, mean differences between the Higher-order Blame factor 
were not significantly different (difference = −0.14, SE = 0.09, p = .10) demonstrating 
that item stems produced similar levels of agreement for blaming people who are “obese” 
and people who are “fat.” See Table 17 for a complete presentation of the goodness of fit, 
DIFFTEST estimates, and parameters that were freed during the successive model 
comparisons. 
Convergent and discriminant validity  
 Evidence of convergent validity is demonstrated by high correlations with similar 
measures, whereas discriminant validity is demonstrated by low correlations with 
dissimilar measures (Messick, 1989). For convergent and discriminant validity, therefore, 
interscale correlations were examined between the Obesity Blame Attribution Scale 
(OBAS) factors and other subscales hypothesized to be related to the OBAS. Because the 
invariance analysis demonstrated that the fat stem and obese stem had some differences, 
the interscale correlations were examined separately. At first, interscale correlations were 
analyzed in Mplus v. 6.12 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010) with WLSMV estimation 
with a probit link and THETA parameterization; however, including all the scales at once 
was problematic because the program needed too many iterations to estimate. To reduce 
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the number of iterations, instead, two scales at a time were estimated. Although most 
interscale correlations could estimate using this process, Mplus was still unable to 
process all of the interscale correlations. To address this, factor scores for each scale were 
estimated separately and saved. Factor scores from all scales were merged to a single 
dataset and interscale correlations were analyzed in SPSS (see Table 18 in separate excel 
file). 7 
Contrary to the convergent and divergent validity hypothesis (see Table 1), the 
OBAS factors were not positively or negatively correlated with many of the other 
subscales and the pattern of correlations was different for each stem type.  For the obese 
stem, Situational Blame toward the Food Industry was positively correlated to all four of 
the Belief about Justice for Self and Others Scale: Distributive Justice Beliefs for Others 
r(301) = .19, p<.01 , Distributive Justice Beliefs for Self r(301) = .18, p<.01, Procedural 
Justice Beliefs for Others r(301) = .16, p<.01, and Procedural Justice Beliefs for Self 
r(301) = .15, p<.01. Situational blame toward the government was positively correlated 
to three of the Belief about Justice for Self and Others Scale:  Distributive Justice Beliefs 
for Others r(301) = .16, p<.01, Distributive Justice Beliefs for Self r(301) = .16, p<.01, 
and Procedural Justice Beliefs for Others r(301) = .12, p<.05. The BJSOS measures 
beliefs in justice for self and others, with higher scores indicate stronger beliefs. Thus, the 
small positive correlation with the Situational Blame Food Industry and Government 
factors suggests there is a small relationship between situational blame attributions for 
obesity and beliefs in justice.  
                                                          
7 In comparing the interscale correlations that were able to estimate in Mplus (estimates 
relationships directly across the factors) to the correlations estimated using factor scores, 
significance tests did not differ and parameter estimates appeared to be similar. 
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On the other hand, for the fat stem, both Situational Blame factors were related to 
two of the Anti-fat Attitudes Questionnaire subscales: a) Dislike, and b) Fear of Fat. Both 
Situational Blame factors had a small positive relationship with the Dislike subscale, 
suggesting that as dislike for fat people increases, the Situational Blame Food Industry 
r(299) = .14, p<.05 and Government increases r(299) = .13, p<.05. Both Situational 
Blame factors had a small negative relationship with the Fear of Fat subscale, suggesting 
that as self-relevant concerns about fatness increases, Situational Blame Food Industry 
r(299) = −.12, p<.05 and Government decreases r(299) = −.15, p<.01. In addition, with 
the fat stem the Obesity Stereotypes Positive subscale had a small positive relationship 
with the Situational Blame Food Industry factor r(299) = .13, p<.05; participants who 
endorsed positive traits toward people who are obese were more likely to blame the food 
industry for obesity. 
Discussion Study 1 
The aim of Study 1 was to validly and reliably measure blame attributions and 
constructs hypothesized to be required for blame attributions, in preparation for 
predicting blame attributions and support for obesity-targeted policies in Study 2. As 
previous work on blame theoretical models have proposed, blame is a complex construct 
(Alicke, 2000; Shaver 1985), but few studies have empirically examined the separate 
constructs theorized as necessary prerequisites to blame (Mantler et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, many studies use the constructs interchangeably (e.g., Crandall, 1994; 
Weiner, 1994; see Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014), contrary to blame theories noting 
their difference (Malle, et al., 2014; Shaver, 1985; 1996). 
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Shaver (1985/1996) notes that the differences between causality (which has also 
been termed controllability or controllable causality) and responsibility are traced back to 
their origins in philosophy. Whereas controllability emerges from epistemology (i.e., the 
theory of discovering the meaning of knowledge) with the central task of understanding 
an event, responsibility emerges from moral philosophy (i.e., ethics or systemizing 
concepts around right and wrong behavior) with the central task of “answerability for 
conduct” (Shaver, 1996, p. 245). In other words, as Shaver identifies, causality asks 
“how” or “what” and responsibility shifts the focus to ask “whom.” Most agree that 
causality is a necessary prerequisite for responsibility (Weiner, 1994, Shaver, 1996). 
Blame, as Shaver (1996) further explains, extends beyond responsibility to incorporate 
whether the target has an excuse or justification for the wrong behavior; and whereas 
responsibility is a cognitive decision, blame is an affective decision. Although using 
terms interchangeably has created quite a kerfuffle for operationalizing variables in 
research, it could be argued that laypeople, such as these research participants, are not 
able to distinguish these terms in practice. As such, arguments over the semantics of 
controllability, responsibility and blame may be interesting within the ivory tower, but 
may be less relevant for everyday attributions made by the “naïve psychologists” 
expressed by Heider. 
To address this lack of measurement and to examine whether participants 
perceived them as separable constructs within the context of blaming people who are 
obese, a 40-item Obesity Blame Attribution Scale (OBAS) was created. The OBAS 
included four factors (i.e., controllability, responsibility, dispositional blame, and 
situational blame each consisting of 10 items), for which the factor structure was 
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empirically tested with latent trait procedures. Because blame attributions may differ 
according to the language used (Puhl, Peterson, & Luedicke, 2006), participants were 
randomly assigned to either complete the scale that included the language “People who 
are obese…” or the language “People who are fat….” To measure validity, the OBAS 
obese stem and OBAS fat stem were correlated with several additional scales 
hypothesized to be positively, negatively or not at all related to the OBAS. 
The findings revealed mixed support for the hypothesized factor structure. 
Contrary to the hypothesis of a single higher order factor structure, the final scale 
included 39 items that measured five factors, which composed of two uncorrelated 
higher-order blame factors. The OBAS Dispositional Blame higher-order factor included 
Controllability, Responsibility, and Dispositional Blame. The OBAS Situational Blame 
factor included Food Industry Situational Blame and a Government Policy Situational 
Blame. As hypothesized and consistent with attribution theories and blame theories, 
Controllability, Responsibility and Dispositional Blame were separate but related 
constructs that composed a higher-order Dispositional Blame factor, which essentially 
means that there is a common trait that accounts for the covariance amongst these three 
factors. We know that they are separate constructs, because the single factor model 
(where all 40 items loaded onto a single “blame” factor) fit worse than the five-factor 
model. The three factors that made up the higher-order Dispositional Blame factor were 
highly correlated (ranging from .84 to .94 in both the fat and obese stem) suggesting that 
from a practical perspective, people may have a hard time distinguishing between the 
constructs even if they are theoretically distinguishable—at least within this context.  
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I hypothesized that the Dispositional Blame and Situational Blame factors were 
negatively correlated, but part of the same high-order factor, based on Hedier’s (1958) 
Hydraulic Function—the more one attributes to dispositional factors, the less one will 
attribute to situational factors. Instead, the results suggested that the two higher-order 
blame factors were not related. One reason there may not have been support for the 
Hydraulic Function is that the OBAS measured dispositional and situational blame 
separately instead of using single items in which response options were measured on an 
internal-external or dispositional-situational continuum. Although most work on 
attribution theory has operated under the assumption that the cause of behavior fits within 
one of these two classifications, however, studies that have measured attributions with 
internal-external or dispositional-situational response options have also not found support 
for the Hydraulic Function (e.g., Johnson, et al., 2002). Future research should continue 
to refine items and investigate additional contexts to test whether the Hydraulic Function 
is a meaningful part of Attribution Theory.  
Another issue is that situational blame may not have been measured well with this 
scale. According to the means for each item, as well as the distribution of factor scores, 
the items appear to have a floor effect and did not measure higher levels of situational 
blame. This could be due to poor item development (i.e., not creating items that 
adequately capture the trait). Another possibility, however, may be that people do not 
endorse high levels of blaming the food industry and government policies for obesity. 
The latter point is consistent with research that has identified that people have strong 
dispositional attributions for obesity (e.g., Brownell et al., 2010; Holub et al., 2011; Puhl 
& Heuer, 2010; Weiner, 1993) and the Culpable Control model that states people tend to 
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hold agents blameworthy over environmental factors (Alicke, 2000). In other words, 
perhaps the scale was unable to capture the trait because the trait does not exist (or does 
not exist in this sample). Yet another limitation may be that the Situational Blame factor 
was split into two factors (food industry and governmental policy) and therefore did not 
measure general situational blame, but rather specific blame toward these agencies. 
Future research should examine whether there are differences in blame by agency type or 
if blame toward all “food environment” agencies is similar; and if there is some way to 
measure situational blame toward environmental factors generally without pointing to 
specific agencies.  
Research has found that weight-based language can either be stigmatizing or 
motivating. For instance, in 2010 the British Public Health Minister urged health-care 
providers to use the term “fat” instead of “obese” because it would be more motivating 
for patients to lose weight because of the negative emotional reaction to being called 
“fat” versus “obese” (Martin, 2010). To test whether there were practical differences 
based on the language used in the scale, participants either responded to the OBAS with 
either the term fat or obese. The results of the invariance analysis revealed that the 
measurement model and structural model for the OBAS obese stem and OBAS fat stem 
were mostly similar. The measurement model only demonstrated non-invariance on three 
items (one from the Controllability factor and two from the Responsibility factor) and 
one threshold. All three items were more related to the factor with the obese stem than 
the fat stem. This pattern may suggest that participants perceived these items as being 
more relevant to Controllability and Responsibility for people who are “obese” than 
people who are “fat.” For the most part, the factor structure between the two stems was 
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similar. The only difference was that the fat stem produced more agreement with 
Dispositional Blame than the obese stem as indicated by a significant difference between 
the factor means (difference = −0.40, SE = 0.19, p < .05). This supports previous research 
that finds both terms may be equally blaming and stigmatizing. Although not within the 
context of trait measurement, a previous study in the context of language used by health-
providers demonstrated that participants viewed “obese” and “fat” as similarly 
stigmatizing, undesirable, and blaming when compared to eight additional terms 
including “chubby,” “heavy,” “overweight,” “high BMI,” “weight,” “morbidly obese,” 
“unhealthy weight,” and “weight problem” (Puhl & Peterson, 2006). Only “morbidly 
obese” was perceived as more blaming than “fat” or “obese.” The authors noted that 
despite the range of responses, mean ratings for all terms were relatively high for blaming 
and stigmatizing and no term was perceived as void of blame and stigma (all means were 
greater than 2 on a 1 to 5 scale). Future research may include these other terms to test 
whether blame attributions shift based on language used.   
With respect to the validity comparisons with other scales thought to be related to 
the OBAS, most of the hypotheses were not supported. Intra-scale correlations 
demonstrated that the OBAS fat stem and obese stem were correlated with very few 
scales, and that the stem type contributed to different correlations. The OBAS obese stem 
Situational Blame factors (food industry and government policy) were positively 
correlated with almost all of the Belief about Justice for Self and Others Scales (BJSOS; 
Lucas et al., 2011). According to Lerner’s Just World Theory (1980), people strive to 
believe the world is just and fair, which helps produce feelings of control. Although 
beliefs in a just world are often associated with feelings of enhanced well-being (Dalbert, 
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2001), people with high just world beliefs may also have harsh social attitudes toward 
disadvantaged individuals (Crandal, 1994; Hafer & Begue, 2005), such as those with 
stigmatizing illnesses like AIDS (Connors & Heaven, 1990). When people have the 
inability to resolve an injustice through prosocial means, they are more likely to blame 
the target for the injustice to preserve the belief in the just world (Hafer & Begue, 2005).  
In this case, participants with higher just world beliefs on the BJSOS were more 
likely to blame the food industry and governmental policies, but were not more likely to 
blame the person who is obese—as I hypothesized and as would be expected by previous 
research. One explanation may stem from the notion that negative attitudes, such as 
blame, emerge when people cannot remedy the situation positively. In the case of the 
food industry and government policies—two agencies presumably outside the control of 
most people—participants may not see a positive remedy and blame the agencies to 
preserve their beliefs in a just world. Alternatively, blaming the government could be 
perceived as the positive remedy in and of itself. Although the Situational Blame OBAS 
factors were correlated with the BJSOS, they were not correlated with the Global Beliefs 
in a Just World Scale (GBJWS), which also measures just world beliefs. In examining 
each scale, the biggest difference between the BJSOS and GBJWS is that the BJSOS 
measures both beliefs about others and the self, and the GBJWS only measures just world 
beliefs about the self. Closely examining the correlations for the BJSOS, the Situational 
Blame OBAS was more positively related to the other-based scales than the self-based 
scales. Because the Situational Blame OBAS factors measure external attributions of 
blame, it may be that just world beliefs toward others is more relevant than just world 
beliefs for the self. 
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One surprising finding was that the OBAS fat stem Situational Blame factors 
were correlated with different subscales than the OBAS obese stem. Contrary to the 
hypotheses, Antifat Attitudes Dislike scale was positively correlated to the Situational 
Blame factors and the Antifat Attitudes Fear of Fat scale was negatively correlated to the 
Situational Blame factors. The hypothesized expectation was that scales that measured 
negative traits toward people who are obese would not be related to Situational Blame. 
The Situational Blame food industry factor was also positively correlated with the 
Obesity Stereotype Scale-Positive. As such, people who ascribe positive associations 
with people who are obese are more likely to blame the food industry for the rise in 
obesity. This finding is congruent with Heider’s Hydraulic Function (1958). If a person 
who is obese is perceived positively with words such as “brave” or “strong sense of 
morality,” then perhaps they are perceived as less responsible for their weight and the 
food industry is instead perceived as more responsible.  
The OBAS Controllability, Responsibility and Dispositional Blame factors were 
not correlated with any other scales. Many of the scales measured negative attitudes 
toward people who are obese (i.e., social distance, negative stereotypes, anti-fat 
attitudes). This suggests that blaming people who are obese may not be related to 
negative attitudes about obesity, but rather are more related to blame factors related to 
causal controllability and responsibility. This is incongruent with Crandall’s (1994) 
position that holding anti-fat attitudes may contribute to chronically attributing causal 
controllability and blame to people who are obese for their weight. One explanation for 
the findings that Dispositional Blame attributions were not related to any measures of 
negative attitudes may be due to the prevalence of obesity and research that has found 
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that attitudes are more punitive for global attributions than specific attributions (Brank, 
Hayes, & Weisz, 2006; Johnson, et al., 2002). Prevalence rates of obesity would suggest 
that participants may have intimate knowledge about a close family member/friend who 
is obese. Intimately knowing someone who is obese may mean that participants are 
thinking about things such as mitigating information about that person’s lifestyle. When 
answering the OBAS, therefore, participants may have made specific attributions with 
this exemplar in mind, instead of making global attributions as was hypothesized to be 
measured with the OBAS. One of the goals for Study 2, therefore, is to more closely 
examine the OBAS and its predictive ability for specific versus global blame attributions, 
as well as its utility in predicting support for obesity-targeted law and policy. 
Furthermore, Study 2 sought to examine whether negative perceptions of people who are 
obese are related to specific attributions of blame toward a target because they were not 
related to general attributions measured with the OBAS. 
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Table 1. Hypothesized and actual validity for scales and the OBAS obese stem items 
 Obesity Blame Attribution Scale 
Scale Control Resp. Disp. Blame Sit. Blame 
Food 
Sit. Blame 
Gov’t 
 Hyp. Act. Hyp. Act. Hyp. Act. Hyp. Act. Hyp. Act. 
COS: 
Internal  
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
BJSOS:  
Dis Other 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − + − + 
BJSOS: 
Proc Other 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − + − + 
BJSOS:  
Dis Self 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − + − + 
BJSOS: 
Proc Self 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − + − 0 
GBJW + 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
AFA: 
Willpower  
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
OSS: 
Negative 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
AFA: 
Dislike  
+ 0 + 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
SDS 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
AFA: Fear 
of Fat  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
COS: 
Physical 
subscale 
− 0 − 0 − 0 0 0 0 0 
COS: 
Social  
− 0 − 0 − 0 + 0 + 0 
OSS: 
Positive 
− 0 − 0 − 0 + 0 + 0 
Note. + indicates positively correlated; − indicates negative correlation; 0 equals 
divergent validity or null relationship. Bold cells display where the hypothesized 
relationship matched the actual relationship. Hyp = hypothesized; Act.=Actual 
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Hypothesized and actual validity for scales and the OBAS fat stem items 
 Obesity Blame Attribution Scale 
Scale Control Resp. Disp. Blame Sit. Blame 
Food 
Sit. Blame 
Gov’t 
 Hyp. Act. Hyp. Act. Hyp. Act. Hyp. Act. Hyp. Act. 
COS: 
Internal  
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
BJSOS:  
Dis Other 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
BJSOS: 
Proc Other 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
BJSOS:  
Dis Self 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
BJSOS: 
Proc Self 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
GBJW + 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
AFA: 
Willpower  
+ 0 + 0 + 0 − 0 − 0 
OSS: 
Negative 
+ 0 + 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
AFA: 
Dislike  
+ 0 + 0 + 0 + + + + 
SDS 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 − 0 − 
AFA: Fear 
of Fat  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 0 − 
COS: 
Physical 
subscale 
− 0 − 0 − 0 0 0 0 0 
COS: 
Social  
− 0 − 0 − 0 + 0 + 0 
OSS: 
Positive 
− 0 − 0 − 0 + + + 0 
Note. + indicates positively correlated; − indicates negative correlation; 0 equals 
divergent validity or null relationship. Bold cells display where the hypothesized 
relationship matched the actual relationship. Hyp. = Hypotheszied, Act. = Actual 
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Table 2. Item Descriptives for OBAS Controllability Factor by Item Language (“Obese” 
and “Fat”) 
 
 
N M SD Min Max 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach’s 
α if Deleted 
Item 1c Obese 302 −0.52 1.47 −3.00 3.00 .37 .93 
Fat 299 −0.52 1.61 −3.00 3.00 .38 .93 
Item 2c Obese 302 1.85 1.07 −3.00 3.00 .74 .92 
Fat 299 1.71 1.15 −3.00 3.00 .80 .91 
Item 3c Obese 302 1.71 1.13 −3.00 3.00 .81 .91 
Fat 299 1.59 1.18 −3.00 3.00 .84 .91 
Item 4c Obese 302 1.46 1.39 −3.00 3.00 .72 .92 
Fat 299 1.33 1.39 −3.00 3.00 .70 .92 
Item 5c Obese 302 1.58 1.30 −3.00 3.00 .77 .91 
Fat 299 1.54 1.26 −3.00 3.00 .77 .91 
Item 6c Obese 302 1.19 1.46 −3.00 3.00 .65 .92 
Fat 299 1.17 1.50 −3.00 3.00 .58 .93 
Item 7c Obese 302 1.33 1.43 −3.00 3.00 .79 .91 
Fat 299 1.28 1.35 −3.00 3.00 .75 .92 
Item 8c Obese 302 0.96 1.66 −3.00 3.00 .78 .91 
Fat 299 0.83 1.56 −3.00 3.00 .78 .91 
Item 9c Obese 302 0.95 1.52 −3.00 3.00 .74 .91 
Fat 299 0.92 1.53 −3.00 3.00 .84 .91 
Item 10c Obese 302 1.27 1.35 −3.00 3.00 .82 .91 
Fat 299 1.14 1.40 −3.00 3.00 .84 .91 
Note. Obese α = .92; Fat α = .92 
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Table 3. Item Descriptives for OBAS Responsibility Factor by Item Language (“Obese” 
and “Fat”) 
 
 
N M SD Min Max 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach’s 
α if Deleted 
Item 1r Obese 302 1.48 1.36 −3.00 3.00 .70 .76 
Fat 299 1.20 1.32 −3.00 3.00 .63 .75 
Item 2r Obese 302 1.59 1.22 −2.00 3.00 .76 .76 
Fat 299 1.35 1.20 −3.00 3.00 .76 .74 
Item 3r Obese 302 1.10 1.41 −3.00 3.00 .24 .82 
Fat 299 0.76 1.45 −3.00 3.00 .26 .80 
Item 4r Obese 302 1.42 1.30 −3.00 3.00 .74 .76 
Fat 299 1.30 1.24 −3.00 3.00 .72 .75 
Item 5r Obese 302 1.55 1.24 −3.00 3.00 .22 .81 
Fat 299 1.40 1.27 −3.00 3.00 .24 .80 
Item 6r Obese 302 0.55 1.64 −3.00 3.00 .52 .78 
Fat 299 0.47 1.66 −3.00 3.00 .55 .76 
Item 7r Obese 302 1.58 1.18 −3.00 3.00 .73 .77 
Fat 299 1.47 1.20 −3.00 3.00 .66 .75 
Item 8r Obese 302 0.77 1.65 −3.00 3.00 .42 .80 
Fat 299 0.46 1.57 −3.00 3.00 .32 .79 
Item 9r Obese 302 1.36 1.44 −3.00 3.00 .64 .77 
Fat 299 1.40 1.39 −3.00 3.00 .56 .76 
Item 10r Obese 302 −.01 1.53 −3.00 3.00 .07 .84 
Fat 299 0.11 1.53 −3.00 3.00 .13 .82 
Note. Obese α = .81; Fat α = .79 
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Table 4. Item Descriptives for OBAS Dispositional Blame Factor by Item Language 
(“Obese” and “Fat”) 
 
 
N M SD Min Max 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach’s 
α if Deleted 
Item 1db Obese 302 0.92 1.50 −3.00 3.00 .36 .88 
Fat 299 0.79 1.53 −3.00 3.00 .23 .89 
Item 2db Obese 302 0.75 1.61 −2.00 3.00 .74 .78 
Fat 299 0.56 1.59 −3.00 3.00 .70 .80 
Item 3db Obese 302 0.75 1.66 −3.00 3.00 .72 .78 
Fat 299 0.41 1.64 −3.00 3.00 .72 .80 
Item 4db Obese 302 1.57 1.24 −3.00 3.00 .45 .81 
Fat 299 1.54 1.30 −3.00 3.00 .44 .82 
Item 5db Obese 302 −0.20 1.70 −3.00 3.00 .55 .80 
Fat 299 −0.50 1.66 −3.00 3.00 .67 .80 
Item 6db Obese 302 −0.48 1.80 −3.00 3.00 .62 .79 
Fat 299 −0.74 1.81 −3.00 3.00 .65 .80 
Item 7db Obese 302 −0.74 1.70 −3.00 3.00 .61 .79 
Fat 299 −0.85 1.65 −3.00 3.00 .69 .80 
Item 8db Obese 302 −0.68 1.68 −3.00 3.00 .66 .79 
Fat 299 −0.97 1.60 −3.00 3.00 .74 .80 
Item 9db Obese 302 −1.11 1.69 −3.00 3.00 .56 .80 
Fat 299 −1.33 1.60 −3.00 3.00 .56 .81 
Item 10db Obese 302 −1.50 1.63 −3.00 3.00 .57 .80 
Fat 299 −1.61 1.61 −3.00 3.00 .53 .82 
Note. Obese α = .88; Fat α = .89 
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Table 5. Item Descriptives for OBAS Situational Blame Factor by Item Language 
(“Obese” and “Fat”) 
 
 
N M SD Min Max 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach’s 
α if Deleted 
Item 
1sb 
Obese 302 0.67 2.01 −3.00 3.00 .70 .94 
Fat 299 0.48 2.16 −3.00 3.00 .67 .95 
Item 
2sb 
Obese 302 −0.41 1.91 −2.00 3.00 .84 .94 
Fat 299 −0.54 1.98 −3.00 3.00 .85 .94 
Item 
3sb 
Obese 302 −0.28 1.93 −3.00 3.00 .79 .94 
Fat 299 −0.60 2.00 −3.00 3.00 .86 .94 
Item 
4sb 
Obese 302 −0.61 1.90 −3.00 3.00 .73 .94 
Fat 299 −0.70 1.96 −3.00 3.00 .79 .94 
Item 
5sb 
Obese 302 0.18 1.87 −3.00 3.00 .81 .94 
Fat 299 −0.18 1.99 −3.00 3.00 .82 .94 
Item 
6sb 
Obese 302 −0.67 1.90 −3.00 3.00 .72 .94 
Fat 299 −0.89 1.94 −3.00 3.00 .75 .94 
Item 
7sb 
Obese 302 0.01 2.09 −3.00 3.00 .80 .94 
Fat 299 −0.11 2.01 −3.00 3.00 .71 .95 
Item 
8sb 
Obese 302 −1.06 1.91 −3.00 3.00 .80 .94 
Fat 299 −1.17 1.89 −3.00 3.00 .77 .94 
Item 
9sb 
Obese 301 0.19 1.99 −3.00 3.00 .80 .94 
Fat 299 −0.13 2.15 −3.00 3.00 .81 .94 
Item 
10sb 
Obese 302 −1.03 1.85 −3.00 3.00 .81 .94 
Fat 299 −1.27 1.89 −3.00 3.00 .81 .94 
Note. Obese α = .95; Fat α = .95 
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Table 6. Inter-item correlations for Controllability (“obesity”) 
 
Item 
1c 
Item 
2c 
Item 
3c 
Item 
4c 
Item 
5c 
Item 
6c 
Item 
7c 
Item 
8c 
Item 
9c 
Item 
10c 
Item 
1c 
1.00 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.40 
Item 
2c 
0.28 1.00 0.72 0.58 0.73 0.50 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.64 
Item 
3c 
0.30 0.72 1.00 0.60 0.71 0.60 0.69 0.68 0.64 0.72 
Item 
4c 
0.27 0.58 0.60 1.00 0.67 0.45 0.58 0.67 0.57 0.67 
Item 
5c 
0.32 0.73 0.71 0.67 1.00 0.46 0.60 0.68 0.57 0.69 
Item 
6c 
0.26 0.50 0.60 0.45 0.46 1.00 0.71 0.52 0.56 0.58 
Item 
7c 
0.32 0.61 0.69 0.58 0.60 0.71 1.00 0.62 0.66 0.70 
Item 
8c 
0.31 0.60 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.52 0.62 1.00 0.66 0.68 
Item 
9c 
0.28 0.57 0.64 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.66 0.66 1.00 0.63 
Item 
10c 
0.40 0.64 0.72 0.67 0.69 0.58 0.70 0.68 0.63 1.00 
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Table 7. Inter-item correlations for Responsibility (“obesity”) 
 
Item 
1c 
Item 
2c 
Item 
3c 
Item 
4c 
Item 
5c 
Item 
6c 
Item 
7c 
Item 
8c 
Item 
9c 
Item 
10c 
Item 
1c 
1.00 0.31 0.35 0.16 0.29 0.34 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.37 
Item 
2c 
0.31 1.00 0.78 0.61 0.67 0.52 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.75 
Item 
3c 
0.35 0.78 1.00 0.67 0.70 0.52 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.77 
Item 
4c 
0.16 0.61 0.67 1.00 0.65 0.42 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.62 
Item 
5c 
0.29 0.67 0.70 0.65 1.00 0.41 0.64 0.67 0.67 0.66 
Item 
6c 
0.34 0.52 0.52 0.42 0.41 1.00 0.52 0.40 0.52 0.49 
Item 
7c 
0.36 0.68 0.71 0.60 0.64 0.52 1.00 0.63 0.62 0.73 
Item 
8c 
0.26 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.67 0.40 0.63 1.00 0.65 0.69 
Item 
9c 
0.33 0.60 0.69 0.60 0.67 0.52 0.62 0.65 1.00 0.72 
Item 
10c 
0.37 0.75 0.77 0.62 0.66 0.49 0.73 0.69 0.72 1.00 
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Table 8. Inter-item correlations for Dispositional Blame (“obesity”) 
 
Item 
1r 
Item 
2r 
Item 
3r 
Item 
4r 
Item 
5r 
Item 
6r 
Item 
7r 
Item 
8r 
Item 
9r 
Item 
10r 
Item 
1r 
1.00 0.73 0.12 0.64 0.16 0.48 0.64 0.36 0.63 0.08 
Item 
2r 
0.73 1.00 0.14 0.70 0.14 0.52 0.71 0.34 0.71 0.11 
Item 
3r 
0.12 0.14 1.00 0.13 0.53 0.10 0.12 0.22 0.04 0.01 
Item 
4r 
0.64 0.70 0.13 1.00 0.17 0.60 0.77 0.35 0.60 0.07 
Item 
5r 
0.16 0.14 0.53 0.17 1.00 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.03 -0.05 
Item 
6r 
0.48 0.52 0.10 0.60 0.05 1.00 0.61 0.18 0.44 0.01 
Item 
7r 
0.64 0.71 0.12 0.77 0.11 0.61 1.00 0.31 0.66 0.00 
Item 
8r 
0.36 0.34 0.22 0.35 0.19 0.18 0.31 1.00 0.37 0.10 
Item 
9r 
0.63 0.71 0.04 0.60 0.03 0.44 0.66 0.37 1.00 0.06 
Item 
10r 
0.08 0.11 0.01 0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.06 1.00 
 
  
99 
 
Table 9. Inter-item correlations for Situational Blame (“obesity”)  
 
Item 
1r 
Item 
2r 
Item 
3r 
Item 
4r 
Item 
5r 
Item 
6r 
Item 
7r 
Item 
8r 
Item 
9r 
Item 
10r 
Item 
1r 
1.00 0.67 0.10 0.57 0.10 0.46 0.52 0.29 0.57 0.13 
Item 
2r 
0.67 1.00 0.19 0.75 0.09 0.56 0.64 0.28 0.62 0.21 
Item 
3r 
0.10 0.19 1.00 0.16 0.54 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.02 
Item 
4r 
0.57 0.75 0.16 1.00 0.17 0.58 0.67 0.24 0.56 0.13 
Item 
5r 
0.10 0.09 0.54 0.17 1.00 0.14 0.15 0.13 -0.01 0.02 
Item 
6r 
0.46 0.56 0.16 0.58 0.14 1.00 0.54 0.23 0.42 -0.02 
Item 
7r 
0.52 0.64 0.14 0.67 0.15 0.54 1.00 0.22 0.55 0.13 
Item 
8r 
0.29 0.28 0.15 0.24 0.13 0.23 0.22 1.00 0.19 0.08 
Item 
9r 
0.57 0.62 0.06 0.56 -0.01 0.42 0.55 0.19 1.00 0.12 
Item 
10r 
0.13 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.08 0.12 1.00 
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Table 10. Inter-item correlations for Controllability for “fat” 
 
Item 
1db 
Item 
2db 
Item 
3db 
Item 
4db 
Item 
5db 
Item 
6db 
Item 
7db 
Item 
8db 
Item 
9db 
Item 
10db 
Item 
1db 
1.00 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.28 
Item 
2db 
0.32 1.00 0.80 0.53 0.49 0.58 0.50 0.51 0.43 0.46 
Item 
3db 
0.35 0.80 1.00 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.43 
Item 
4db 
0.29 0.53 0.53 1.00 0.34 0.38 0.26 0.33 0.21 0.23 
Item 
5db 
0.29 0.49 0.50 0.34 1.00 0.50 0.30 0.37 0.35 0.46 
Item 
6db 
0.37 0.58 0.56 0.38 0.50 1.00 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.60 
Item 
7db 
0.13 0.50 0.47 0.26 0.30 0.37 1.00 0.67 0.51 0.36 
Item 
8db 
0.14 0.51 0.50 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.67 1.00 0.52 0.43 
Item 
9db 
0.18 0.43 0.43 0.21 0.35 0.38 0.51 0.52 1.00 0.41 
Item 
10db 
0.28 0.46 0.43 0.23 0.46 0.60 0.36 0.43 0.41 1.00 
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Table 11. Inter-item correlations for Responsibility (“fat”) 
 
Item 
1db 
Item 
2db 
Item 
3db 
Item 
4db 
Item 
5db 
Item 
6db 
Item 
7db 
Item 
8db 
Item 
9db 
Item 
10db 
Item 
1db 
1.00 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.28 
Item 
2db 
0.41 1.00 0.81 0.46 0.61 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.36 0.41 
Item 
3db 
0.36 0.81 1.00 0.48 0.60 0.53 0.52 0.60 0.40 0.39 
Item 
4db 
0.30 0.46 0.48 1.00 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.18 0.20 
Item 
5db 
0.29 0.61 0.60 0.40 1.00 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.39 0.44 
Item 
6db 
0.36 0.52 0.53 0.38 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.62 
Item 
7db 
0.24 0.52 0.52 0.34 0.52 0.50 1.00 0.69 0.57 0.41 
Item 
8db 
0.16 0.53 0.60 0.37 0.54 0.50 0.69 1.00 0.59 0.40 
Item 
9db 
0.16 0.36 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.41 0.57 0.59 1.00 0.38 
Item 
10db 
0.28 0.41 0.39 0.20 0.44 0.62 0.41 0.40 0.38 1.00 
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Table 12. Inter-item correlations for Dispositional Blame (“fat”) 
 
Item 
1sb 
Item 
2sb 
Item 
3sb 
Item 
4sb 
Item 
5sb 
Item 
6sb 
Item 
7sb 
Item 
8sb 
Item 
9sb 
Item 
10sb 
Item 
1sb 
1.00 0.62 0.63 0.50 0.66 0.45 0.53 0.54 0.74 0.57 
Item 
2sb 
0.62 1.00 0.84 0.56 0.77 0.57 0.55 0.74 0.73 0.78 
Item 
3sb 
0.63 0.84 1.00 0.53 0.74 0.51 0.52 0.70 0.67 0.72 
Item 
4sb 
0.50 0.56 0.53 1.00 0.58 0.78 0.75 0.57 0.58 0.58 
Item 
5sb 
0.66 0.77 0.74 0.58 1.00 0.55 0.60 0.66 0.74 0.67 
Item 
6sb 
0.45 0.57 0.51 0.78 0.55 1.00 0.72 0.62 0.52 0.61 
Item 
7sb 
0.53 0.55 0.52 0.75 0.60 0.72 1.00 0.58 0.57 0.53 
Item 
8sb 
0.54 0.74 0.70 0.57 0.66 0.62 0.58 1.00 0.66 0.83 
Item 
9sb 
0.74 0.73 0.67 0.58 0.74 0.52 0.57 0.66 1.00 0.65 
Item 
10sb 
0.57 0.78 0.72 0.58 0.67 0.61 0.53 0.83 0.65 1.00 
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Table 13. Inter-item correlations for Situational Blame (“fat”) 
 
Item 
1sb 
Item 
2sb 
Item 
3sb 
Item 
4sb 
Item 
5sb 
Item 
6sb 
Item 
7sb 
Item 
8sb 
Item 
9sb 
Item 
10sb 
Item 
1sb 
1.00 0.61 0.64 0.48 0.67 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.71 0.52 
Item 
2sb 
0.61 1.00 0.85 0.67 0.82 0.59 0.54 0.70 0.76 0.73 
Item 
3sb 
0.64 0.85 1.00 0.69 0.81 0.60 0.57 0.71 0.76 0.74 
Item 
4sb 
0.48 0.67 0.69 1.00 0.62 0.78 0.76 0.64 0.61 0.67 
Item 
5sb 
0.67 0.82 0.81 0.62 1.00 0.57 0.54 0.62 0.77 0.66 
Item 
6sb 
0.43 0.59 0.60 0.78 0.57 1.00 0.75 0.66 0.57 0.72 
Item 
7sb 
0.49 0.54 0.57 0.76 0.54 0.75 1.00 0.52 0.59 0.57 
Item 
8sb 
0.51 0.70 0.71 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.52 1.00 0.61 0.79 
Item 
9sb 
0.71 0.76 0.76 0.61 0.77 0.57 0.59 0.61 1.00 0.64 
Item 
10sb 
0.52 0.73 0.74 0.67 0.66 0.72 0.57 0.79 0.64 1.00 
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Table 14. Model Fit Statistics for each factor by stem type 
 
 
 
 
 
Model # 
items 
# est. 
parameters 
Chi-
Square 
Value 
Chi-
Square 
DF 
Chi-
Square 
p-
value 
CFI RMSEA 
Estimate 
RMSEA 
Lower 
CI 
RMSEA 
Higher 
CI 
RMSEA 
p-value 
“Obese” stem          
Control. 10 70 203.03 35 .001 .98 .13 .11 .14 .001 
Resp.  9 63 125.34 26 .001 .99 .11 .09 .13 .001 
Disp. 
Blame 
10 72 221.61 33 .001 .96 .14 .12 .16 .001 
Sit. 
Blame 
10 72 231.84 33 .001 .98 .14 .12 .16 .001 
“Fat” stem          
Control. 10 70 137.58 35 .001 .99 .10 .08 .12 .001 
Resp.  10 63 79.73 26 .001 .99 .08 .06 .10 .001 
Disp. 
Blame 
10 72 271.85 33 .001 .95 .16 .14 .17 .001 
Sit. 
Blame 
10 72 251.18 33 .001 .98 .15 .13 .17 .001 
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Table 15. Structural model fit Statistics for each factor by stem type 
 
 
  
Model # 
items 
# est. 
parameters 
Chi-
Square 
Value 
Chi-
Square 
DF 
Chi-
Square 
p-
value 
CFI RMSEA 
Estimate 
RMSEA 
Lower 
CI 
RMSEA 
Higher 
CI 
RMSEA 
p-value 
“Obese” stem          
5 factor 39 286 1151.92 688 .001 .97 .06 .06 .07 .001 
1 factor 39 272 8749.33 702 .001 .70 .20 .19 .20 .001 
3 factor 39 275 2088.35 699 .001 .95 .08 .08 .09 .001 
Higher-
order 2 
Factor 
39 282 1421.52 693 .001 .96 .06 .06 .06 .001 
“Fat” stem          
5 factor 39 286 1441.29 688 .001 .97 .06 .06 .07 .001 
1 factor  39 272 8131.63 702 .001 .72 .19 .18 .19 .001 
3 factor 39 275 1853.26 699 .001 .96 .07 .07 .08 .001 
Higher-
order 2 
Factor 
39 282 1387.29 693 .001 .97 .06 .05 .06 .001 
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Table 16. Factor correlations by stem type for five-factor model 
 
 Controllability Responsibility Disp. 
Blame 
Sit. 
Blame 
Food 
Sit. Blame 
Govern. 
Controllability 1.00 .94** .87** .01 .05 
Responsibility .94** 1.00 .84** −.05 −.01 
Disp. Blame .86** .86** 1.00 −.07 −.05 
Sit. Blame Food −.07 −.11* −.09 1.00 .78** 
Sit. Blame 
Govern. 
−.04 −.06 −.01 .85** 1.00 
Note. Above the diagonal is “obese” stem and below the diagonal is “fat” stem; ** 
p<.001 
 
 
Predicted factor correlations by stem type for two-factor higher-order model 
 
 Controllability Responsibility Disp. 
Blame 
Sit. Blame 
Food 
Sit. Blame 
Govern. 
Controllability 1.00 .94 .87 −.02 −.02 
Responsibility .97 1.00 .84 −.02 −.02 
Disp. Blame .91 .91 1.00 −.02 −.02 
Sit. Blame Food −.07 −.09 −.10 1.00 .78 
Sit. Blame 
Govern. 
−.06 −.08 −.07 .89 1.00 
Note. Above the diagonal is “obese” stem and below the diagonal is “fat” stem; 
significance tests are not available in predicted factor correlations 
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Table 17. Measurement invariance model fit statistics for obese and fat stem groups 
 
  Overall Fit Indices DIFFTEST 
 Invariance 
Test 
χ2 df CFI RMSEA RMSEA 
CI 
p Models χ2 df p 
1 Configural 2805.53* 1386 .97 .06 .06, .06 <.01     
2 MetricA  2696.42* 1420 .98 .06 .06, .06 <.01 2 vs. 1 65.91 34 <.0
1 
3 MetricB  
(item 6c) 
2684.68* 1419 .98 .05 .05, .06 <.05 3 vs. 1 58.32 33 <.0
1 
4 MetricC 
(item 8r)  
2673.88* 1418 .98 .05 .05, .06 <.05 4 vs. 1 48.98 32 <.0
5 
5 MetricD  
(item 7r) 
2659.17* 1417 .98 .05 .05, .06 <.05 5 vs. 1 41.98 31 .09 
6 ScalarA 2886.93* 1627 .98 .05 .05, .05 .34 6 vs. 5 250.28 210 .02 
7a ScalarB  
(item 3r, T5) 
2881.66* 1626 .98 .05 .05, .05 .35 7 vs. 5 240.76 209 .07 
7b ScalarB  
(3 factor 
model item 
3r, T5) 
2920.38* 1624 .98 .05 .05, .06 .20     
8 Higher-
Order Factor 
Loadings 
2894.16* 1626 .98 .05 .05, .05 .30 8 vs. 7b 3.92 2 .14 
9 Factor 
Disturbances 
2844.45* 1631 .98 .05 .05, .05 .55 9 vs. 8 1.40 3 .71 
10 Higher-order 
Variances 
2470.75* 1632 .98 .04 .04, .05 1.00 10 vs. 9 0.10 1 .75 
11 Factor 
Covariances 
2272.99* 1635 .98 .04 .03, .04 1.00 11 vs. 10 2.91 3 .41 
12 Factor 
Means 
2278.02* 1639 .98 .04 .03, .04 1.00 12 vs. 11  7.93 4 .09 
Note. * indicates significant goodness of fit χ2 (p <.001). Metric invariance tests invariance of 
factor loadings; Scalar invariance tests invariance of thresholds; Residual invariance tests 
invariance of the item residuals; Factor Covariance tests invariance between the factor 
covariances; Factor Variance tests invariance between the factor variances. 
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Table 18. Interscale correlations 
  
Control Resp Disp 
Blame 
Sit 
Blame 
Food 
Industry 
Sit 
Blame 
Gov't 
COS: 
Internal 
BJSOS: 
Dist. 
Other 
BJSOS: 
Proc. 
Other 
BJSOS: 
Dist. 
Self 
BJSOS: 
Proc. 
Self 
GBLW AFA: 
Willpower 
OSS: 
Negative 
AFA: 
Dislike 
SDS AFA: 
Fear 
of 
Fat 
COS: 
Physical 
COS: 
Social 
OSS: 
Positive 
Control 1.00 .97 .90 .00 .03 -.10 .02 .05 .02 .05 .00 .04 .01 .03 -.05 -.01 .01 -.08 .02 
Resp .97 1.00 .89 -.05 -.01 -.08 .03 .05 .04 .06 .00 .06 .03 .02 -.04 .01 -.01 -.07 .01 
Disp 
Blame 
.91 .90 1.00 -.07 -.05 -.06 .03 .06 .04 .06 .03 .04 .01 .00 -.07 -.07 -.01 -.04 .04 
Sit Blame 
Food 
Industry 
-.06 -.10 -.11 1.00 .84 .00 .19 .18 .16 .15 .09 -.05 -.03 .01 .06 -.02 .06 .00 .00 
Sit Blame 
Gov't 
-.03 -.07 -.06 .88 1.00 .00 .16 .16 .12 .11 .05 -.03 .00 .02 .04 .01 .03 -.02 -.01 
COS: 
Internal 
.04 .02 .04 -.05 -.03 1.00 .31 .31 .25 .25 .24 .31 .52 .20 -.35 .13 -.56 .79 -.30 
BJSOS: 
Dist. 
Other 
.05 .05 .05 -.02 .01 .40 1.00 .95 .89 .83 .73 .15 .25 .06 -.09 .10 -.26 .13 -.02 
BJSOS: 
Proc. 
Other 
.03 .03 .04 .01 .04 .35 .95 1.00 .86 .90 .74 .13 .21 .06 -.08 .10 -.26 .13 -.01 
BJSOS: 
Dist. Self 
.11 .09 .10 -.03 .03 .38 .89 .83 1.00 .95 .86 .12 .15 .00 .00 .05 -.24 .09 .04 
BJSOS: 
Proc. Self 
.08 .07 .08 -.01 .05 .35 .85 .89 .95 1.00 .85 .11 .12 .00 .00 .06 -.24 .10 .05 
GBLW .07 .07 .07 -.05 .01 .39 .77 .77 .89 .89 1.00 .13 .07 .00 .00 .00 -.24 .07 .06 
AFA: 
Willpower 
-.03 -.02 -.07 .09 .05 -.02 -.06 -.05 -.08 -.05 -.07 1.00 .18 .59 -.20 .31 -.22 .23 -.06 
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OSS: 
Negative 
.08 .07 .11 -.10 -.05 .37 .09 .07 .05 .05 .09 -.07 1.00 .36 -.43 .08 -.26 .44 -.33 
AFA: 
Dislike 
-.06 -.05 -.08 .14 .13 .01 -.05 -.07 .00 -.02 .01 .44 -.04 1.00 -.42 .24 -.03 .23 -.16 
SDS -.05 -.02 -.05 -.01 -.02 -.25 -.04 -.02 -.01 .01 -.04 .03 -.50 -.02 1.00 -.11 .19 -.30 .37 
AFA: 
Fear of 
Fat 
-.05 -.03 -.08 -.12 -.15 .02 -.01 .02 -.05 .00 .00 .32 -.03 .18 -.03 1.00 -.04 .16 -.06 
COS: 
Physical 
-.06 -.05 -.06 -.02 -.03 -.49 -.20 -.20 -.19 -.19 -.17 .00 -.13 -.10 .08 .01 1.00 -.10 .26 
COS: 
Social 
.04 .02 .03 -.08 -.07 .76 .25 .19 .23 .19 .23 -.04 .37 -.03 -.23 .02 .01 1.00 -.19 
OSS: 
Positive 
-.10 -.09 -.09 .13 .10 -.28 .01 .02 .04 .06 .02 .08 -.41 -.01 .41 .02 .24 -.21 1.00 
Note. Bold cells are significant at p<.01; Obese stem correlations are above the diagonal and fat stem items are below the diagonal. Lightest gray indicates hypothesized positive 
relationship with OBAS factors, medium gray indicates no relationship with OBAS factors, and dark gray indicates negative relationship with OBAS factors. 
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Figure 1. Test information for each lower-order factor by stem type 
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Figure 2. Alternative factor structures. Item 20 (Responsibility factor item 10) was 
removed and not reflected in the higher-order factor models. Higher order factors are in 
dotted circles. Lower-order factors are solid circles.   
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Figure 3.Theta for higher-order dispositional blame factor by stem type 
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Figure 4. Theta for higher-order situational blame factor by stem type 
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CHAPTER 3  
STUDY 2: ANTECEDENTS AND SUPPORT FOR OBESITY LAW AND POLICY 
  
The current study examined several predictors thought to be related to attributions 
of blame toward people who are obese and support for obesity-related law and policy. 
Using both Shaver’s (1985) Theory of Blame model and Alicke’s Culpable Control 
model (2000) as frameworks for modeling blame attributions, several predictors were 
examined, including the blame-related judgments causality (or controllability as it is also 
termed) and responsibility, which are central to Shaver’s model and termed “structural 
linkages” in Alicke’s model. Because Alicke’s model proposes that affective and 
attitudinal reactions to the event and the people involved in the event (termed 
“spontaneous evaluations”) predicts blame, I measured general obesity blame 
attributions, anti-fat attitudes, stereotype content, and emotional reactions.  Although 
previous research utilizing the theory has manipulated target characteristics with the goal 
of eliciting spontaneous evaluations (e.g., Alicke & Zell, 2009), I chose to measure 
affective and attitudinal reactions to examine whether measured responses toward a target 
could satisfy the spontaneous response criteria. Furthermore, because previous research 
has found that  beliefs about the causes of obesity affect support for various public health 
approaches aimed at reducing obesity (Barry et al., 2009), the current research extended 
this by examining how blame attributions contribute to support for a law and policy that 
is framed with either dispositional or situational blame.  
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Method 
Participants  
Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (M-Turk), an 
Internet service that allows access to over 500,000 members who are available to 
participate in online research (Buhrmester, et al., 2011; Paolacci, et al., 2010). 
Participants were recruited if they completed Study 1. Once data collection from Study 1 
was completed and participants were removed for not completing the study or answering 
attention questions incorrectly, a random sample of 335 participants (of N = 601 from 
Study 1) were emailed to participate in Study 2. One reminder email was sent to 
participants who did not complete Study 2 within four days after receiving the first email. 
The sample included 244 participants, which is a response rate of 73%. Six participants 
were removed because their data from Study 1 could not be matched to Study 2 and two 
additional participants were removed because they indicated they did not read the 
description about the target during manipulation checks.  
The final sample included 236 participants (Mage = 38.7, SD = 12.56). Sixty 
percent were female. Eighty-four percent identified as White, 7% identified as Black, 3% 
Hispanic/Latino, 7% Asian, 2% Native American, and less than 1% identified as 
something other than the options provided. When asked to select what weight group they 
identified with, 12% identified as obese, 29% as overweight, 44% as average weight, 
13% as somewhat thin, and 2% as extremely thin.  Of the sample, 36% identified as 
Democrat, 20% as Republican, 27% as Independent, and 17% identified as other or not 
belonging to a political party. Political ideology was measured with a five-point scale in 
which most participants identified as very liberal or liberal (46%), then moderate (31%), 
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and conservative or very conservative (23%). Most participants in the sample had not 
heard of healthy vending machine policies before taking the study (82%). 
Procedures 
The design was a 2 (Attribution Type: global or specific) x 2 (Weight: average or 
obese) x 2 (Health Choice: unhealthy or healthy) design, modeled after a previous study 
that manipulated social attractiveness and mitigating information in criminal blame 
attributions (Alicke & Zell, 2009). Data were collected online at two time points. To 
disguise the purpose of the study, participants completed the Obesity Blame Attribution 
Scale (OBAS) created in Study 1 and Anti-fat Attitudes (AFA) at time 1. At time 2, 
participants were given the cover story that the objective of the study was to understand 
community sentiment for proposed vending machine laws. To provide context for the 
study and to increase the believability of the cover story, participants viewed a neutral 
news clip about new vending machine laws. Participants also rated (e.g., healthiness, 
tastiness, likeliness of purchasing) several snacks pictorially displayed on the computer 
ostensibly to measure what people would purchase if the new vending machine law was 
implemented (these ratings were not included in the study but were used for selecting the 
snacks in Study 3 and are presented in Appendix G). Next, participants were informed the 
researchers surveyed community members about the vending machine laws. Within the 
survey results, the manipulations were presented (Attribution Type, Weight Group, and 
Health Choice). For the dependent measures, participants made several attributions about 
the person/group “surveyed.” Finally, each participant indicated support for one of two 
vending machine laws that included dispositional or situational blame language in the 
legislative findings section, as well as likeliness of support on a 7-point scale. 
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Materials 
Pre-screening dependent measures 
 Blame attributions. The Obesity Blame Attribution Scale (OBAS) created and 
subjected to latent trait procedures in Study 1 was used to measure general blame 
attributions toward people who are obese/fat. As described in Study 1, the original OBAS 
included 40 items that included four hypothesized lower-order factors and one higher-
order Blame factor. Analysis of the structure and measurement of the OBAS, however, 
revealed a 39-item scale that consisted of five factors and two higher-order Dispositional 
and Situational Blame factors. The Dispositional Blame higher-order factor included: 
Controllability (10 items), Responsibility (9 items), and Dispositional Blame (10 items). 
The Situational Blame higher-order factor included: Situational Food Industry Blame (7 
items) and Situational Government Blame (3 items). Higher scores on each subscale 
indicate stronger attributions. Participants in Study 1 were randomly assigned to either 
the fat stem or obese stem condition.  Items were presented in Study 1. 
Attitudes toward people who are obese. The Anti-fat Attitudes Questionnaire 
(AFA; Crandall, 1994) is a 13-item scale that measures negative attitudes toward people 
who are obese with three subscales. The Dislike subscale (7 items) measures prejudice 
toward fat people. The Dislike subscale includes items such as: “I really don’t like fat 
people much.” The Fear of Fat subscale (3 items) measures one’s self-relevant concerns 
about fatness. The Fear of Fat subscale includes items such as: “I feel disgusted with 
myself when I gain weight.”  The Willpower subscale (3 items) measures belief about 
controllability. The Willpower subscale includes items such as: “Some people are fat 
because they have no willpower.” Each subscale is measured using a Likert-type 
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response format (0 = very strongly disagree; 9 = very strongly agree) and is scored by 
averaging the responses for that subscale. Higher scores on each subscale indicate 
stronger anti-fat attitudes. Items are presented in Appendix B. 
Independent measures 
Type of attribution. According to Johnson and colleagues (2002), global and 
specific blaming are theoretically significant to determine whether blame attributions are 
specific to the person (a person who is obese) or global to the person’s group (people who 
are obese). To assess global versus specific attributions toward the target, participants 
either received survey results from a “person” (specific) or a “group” (global) randomly 
selected to provide her/their sentiment about the laws. In the specific attribution 
condition, participants received a photograph of either an obese or average weight 
woman (same woman before and after weight loss matched on all other characteristics) to 
bolster the specific attribution manipulation. A photograph was not provided for the 
target group. 
Weight group. The ostensible survey results provided demographic information 
(including weight described as either “average” or “obese” based on the CDC’s height 
and weight calculation for BMI; height and weight were also provided). The photograph 
of the target was manipulated and depicted the same woman before and after weight loss 
(see below). The photograph was taken from the Internet and was selected because the 
angle was the same and all of the characteristics were the same (except weight). Using 
before and after weight loss photographs is preferable to manipulating the same 
photograph because it was thought to be more realistic. 
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 Health Choice. In general, people are judged negatively for eating poorly (Stein 
& Nemeroff, 1995) and previous research has found that when people who are obese are 
depicted in stereotypical ways, they are perceived more poorly than when depicted in 
non-stereotypical ways (McClure, Puhl, & Heuer, 2011); and when presented as making 
unhealthy choices, this could aggravate negative biases. Furthermore, dual process 
models suggest that when an event is unexpected, perceivers may switch from automatic 
processing to a more controlled processing and may rely less on heuristics such as affect 
and biases. To examine the effects of aggravating or mitigating information, the current 
study manipulated whether the target person or group stated she/they “likes junk food in 
vending machines” (aggravating) or “likes nutritious foods in vending machines” 
(mitigating). Depending on the manipulated weight of the target, the unhealthy and 
healthy feedback will either be stereotype consistent or stereotype inconsistent. 
Dependent measures 
Stereotype content. Alicke’s Culpable Control model (2000) proposes that blame 
attributions are related to spontaneous evaluations that include reactions to the target. As 
such, stereotypes toward the target were measured with The Stereotype Content Model 
(SCM) because the SCM has been well-researched and is hypothesized to be predictive 
of corresponding affective reactions. The SCM predicts that stereotyped groups elicit 
specific warmth and competence stereotypes that correspond to four clusters (Glick & 
Fiske, 2001; Fiske et al., 2002): (a) Those perceived as low-competence and high-warmth 
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elicit pity and sympathy because they are perceived as not causing their negative outcome 
and are likable; (b) those who are low-warmth but high-competence elicit envy because 
they are perceived as causing their positive outcome but in a hostile manner; (c) those 
who are low on both warmth and competence elicit anger, disgust, and contempt because 
they are perceived as being “free-loaders” and perceived as being able to avoid their 
negative outcome; (d) and those who are high on both, elicit positive emotions such as 
admiration because they are perceived as being in control of their positive outcomes 
(Fiske et al., 2002). Warmth and Competence were measured with 6 items each with 
response options on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” (0) to “extremely” 
(4). Items are presented in Appendix H. 
Other-based social emotions. Following Alicke’s Culpable Control model—
which predicts that emotional evaluations of others influence attributions of blame—the 
study measured emotional appraisals toward the target. Social emotions are based on the 
social appraisals we use to process social information (Harelli & Parkinson, 2008), such 
as attitudes towards other groups (Fiske et al., 2002). According to Harelli and Pakinson 
(2008), emotions are considered social if they are relevant to a social context and include 
appraisals that take into account social rules, conventions or norms, or aspects of agency 
(e.g., responsibility and blame). The other-based social emotions measured included pity, 
sympathy, disgust, anger, contempt, envy, distrust, empathy, and disappointment. 
Participants indicated how much they felt that emotion toward the woman/group of 
women (depending on the Type of Attribution manipulation) on a 5-point scale that 
ranged from “very slightly or not at all,” “a little,” “moderately,” “quite a bit,” and 
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“extremely.” Higher scores indicate experiencing a stronger emotional reaction. Items are 
presented in Appendix I. 
Controllability, responsibility, and blame. According to Alicke (2000), the 
psychology of blame includes graded control and responsibility judgments in which 
observers estimate the degree to which the target has control over or is responsible for the 
event, rather than dichotomously deciding either presence or absence.  As such, 
attributions toward the target were measured using three items from a previous study on 
blame attributions toward people with serious illness (Mantler et al., 2003), but modified 
from “serious illness” to “obesity.” Each was measured with a single item: “It was 
something that this individual/group did that caused her weight;” “This individual/group 
is responsible for her/their weight;” and “This individual/group is to blame for her/their 
weight.” Response options were on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly 
disagree” (0) to “strongly agree” (6).  
Support for public policy. Participants were provided with two proposed vending 
machine policies that varied by the type of blame. The manipulated language for each 
policy was embedded in the legislative findings (the rationale for the policy) and included 
elements of blame, responsibility, and controllability. In the dispositional blame 
condition, the policy stated that individual factors were to blame for the obesity problem 
followed by several factors that caused obesity. It concluded by stating the obesity 
problem can be improved by holding people who are obese responsible for changing their 
behavior when they make choices at the vending machines. In the situational blame 
condition, the policy stated that environmental factors are to blame for the obesity 
problem followed by several situational factors that cause obesity. The statement 
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concluded by stating the obesity problem can be improved by holding the food industry 
responsible for changing the food options available in vending machines. Participants 
were asked to select the policy they would support (a forced choice) and also how likely 
they would be to support it on a 7-point scale ranging from “very unlikely” (0) to “very 
likely” (6). Both policies are presented in Appendix J. 
Hypotheses 
(1) Hypothesis 1: According to the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002), previous research on the 
perceived controllability of being obese (Weiner, 1998, 1993), anti-fat attitudes 
(Crandall, 1994), and previous research on other-based emotion reactions toward 
people who are obese (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), it is hypothesized that the 
obese target will be perceived in the SCM low-competence and low-warmth 
cluster and will elicit the emotional appraisals anger, disgust, and contempt. There 
are no specific hypotheses about the average weight target with respect to these 
variables because an average weight person does not fit within the framework for 
examining stereotype content. 
(2) Hypothesis 2: It is hypothesized that attributions of controllability, responsibility, 
and blame toward the target person/group will differ based on the manipulated 
variables. Specifically, there will be a main effect for the Weight Group cue such 
that the average weight person/group is perceived more favorably than the obese 
person/group. It is expected that the Health Choice cue will moderate this effect 
such that the obese person/group who likes junk food will be judged more harshly 
than the average weight person/group who likes junk food because previous 
research has shown that people are judged negatively for eating poorly (Stein & 
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Nemeroff, 1995). Moreover, the Type of Attribution will also moderate 
attribution based on the Weight Group cue. Specifically, controllability, 
responsibility, and blame will be greater for the obese group than the obese 
individual because attitudes are more punitive for global than specific attributions 
(Brank et al., 2006).  
(3) Hypothesis 3: Theorists have posited that blame attributions are predicted by a 
decision-stage model whereby controllability and responsibility sequentially 
contribute to blame (Shaver, 1985). Conversely, dual process models like the 
Culpable Control model suggest that blame attributions will also be predicted by 
affective and attitudinal responses to targets and events. It is hypothesized that, as 
outlined in the Culpable Control model (Alicke, 2000), controllability and 
responsibility would predict blame, but that responses such as general obesity 
blame attributions, anti-fat attitudes, stereotype content, and other-based social 
emotions (as proxy measures for spontaneous evaluations) would also predict 
blame attributions either directly or indirectly. Affective and attitudinal responses 
have a direct effect when they influence blame attributions independent of 
structural linkage information (controllability and responsibility) or simultaneous 
to linkage information. Affective and attitudinal responses have an indirect effect 
when they influence structural linkage information, thereby increasing or 
decreasing blame attributions.  
(4) Hypothesis 4: In turn, it is hypothesized that blame attributions will predict 
support for participants’ chosen vending machine law. Specifically, participants 
with high blame attributions toward the target will choose the law with 
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dispositional blame language, whereas participants with low blame attributions 
toward the target will choose the law with situational blame language. Moreover, 
participants who have high blame attributions toward the target will be more 
likely to support their chosen policy, regardless of what policy they chose, than 
those with lower blame attributions toward the target because people with 
stronger blame attitudes will have stronger attitudes toward supporting such 
policies. 
Analytic strategy 
Prior to examining the multivariate relationship between all the variables in a path 
model, preliminary analyses were conducted to examine where people who are obese fit 
within the four clusters of the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) according to hypothesis 
1. Previous SCM research has not included people who are obese and a descriptive 
understanding of where they lie within the context of the four clusters will better inform 
the selection of other-based emotions that should be included in the path model. The 
theoretical model (Hypotheses 2 through 4) was tested in which the manipulated 
variables and other individual difference independent variables were analyzed 
simultaneously, creating a multivariate regression within a path model. Because of the 
sample size and the number of estimated parameters (loadings, intercepts, residual 
variances, and paths), it was not possible to estimate a Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
with latent variables, nor with plausible values (which creates multiple datasets of factor 
scores for each person that represents multiple imputations drawn from the predictive 
distribution of the latent variable) because of the invariance constraints. Instead, factor 
scores were included as observed variables within the subsequent path analyses to 
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represent each latent variable previously estimated within measurement models. This use 
of factor scores is better than averaging items to create an observed score because the 
factor scores are based on the tested factor structure, all of which had acceptable to good 
fit according to global fit statistics (see Table 19).  
Results 
Hypothesis 1a: Where do people who are obese map onto the four-cluster 
warmth–competence structure as compared to previous research? The SCM (Fiske et al., 
2002) predicts that stereotyped groups will be perceived along one of four clusters. To 
test this, group differences on the SCM warmth and competence factors were examined 
by averaging the six items for each subscale together. The items were averaged together 
for this analysis only, similar to the authors’ recommendations and previous research 
with the factors (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002), so that comparisons could be made to the four-
cluster structure of the Stereotype Content Model. To do so, a one-way ANOVA was 
estimated for just the main effects of Weight Group on warmth and competence ratings. 
Figure 5 includes the mean competence and warmth values for the obese and average 
weight group with the four-cluster structure that includes the means for the stereotyped 
groups from the original published article (Fiske et al., 2002, Study 1 Figure 2, non-
student sample). In support of the hypothesis, the obese group mapped onto the low 
competence and low warmth cluster that included welfare recipients, poor Blacks, and 
poor Whites. The average weight group was near the mean for each factor (the center of 
the four clusters). 
 Hypothesis 1b: What emotional appraisals does Weight Group elicit? Emotional 
appraisals are predicted to vary according to the four clusters of the SCM (Fiske et al., 
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2002) and other research on emotional appraisals (Harelli & Parkinson, 2008). The main 
effects of Weight Group on other-based emotional reactions were examined in a one-way 
ANOVA. According to the means in Table 20, there is partial support for the hypotheses 
that people who are obese would elicit disgust, contempt, and anger. People who are 
obese elicited more disgust than people who are average weight, however, there were no 
significant differences for anger or contempt. Although the alternative hypothesis—that 
people who are obese might be perceived along the low-competence and high-warmth 
cluster of stereotyped groups—was not supported, there were significant differences for 
the emotions associated with that cluster. Participants indicated more pity for people who 
are obese than average weight and sympathy for people who are obese than people who 
are average weight.  
Path models 
Hypothesis 2: Are blame attributions best predicted by a prescriptive decision-
stage model (Shaver, 1985) or a descriptive dual-process model of blame (Alicke, 2000)? 
According to attribution and blame theories (Alicke, 2000; Heider, 1958; Shaver, 1985; 
Heider, 1958), attributions are the cognitive processes laypeople use for making blame 
judgments to explain behaviors and outcomes when encountering a target and may vary 
according to characteristics of that target. According to Shaver’s Theory of Blame, blame 
attributions are explained by controllability and responsibility in sequential stages, such 
that each is a necessary precursor for the next. As such, causal controllability predicts 
responsibility, responsibility predicts blame and responsibility mediates the relationship 
between causal controllability and blame. On the other hand, Alicke’s Culpable Control 
model is a dual-process model of blame in which controllability and responsibility still 
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predict blame, in addition to affective and attitudinal responses also predicting blame 
attributions. The largest difference, therefore, is that Shaver’s model assumes only the 
criteria a rational actor would consider, whereas Alicke’s model accounts for 
psychological processes that deviate from rational expectations.  
To test the remaining hypotheses, two path models were estimated using Mplus v. 
6.11 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010) weighted-least-square-mean variance (WLSMV) 
estimation and THETA parameterization. The first Prescriptive Blame model (Model 1) 
included the target characteristics manipulated variables (Type of Attribution, Weight 
Group, and Health Choice) and their interactions predicting only the blame judgement-
related variables (i.e., direct attributions of controllability, responsibility and blame 
toward the target), and then Blame predicting Support for the Obesity-targeted Policies 
and Likelihood of Support (see Figure 6). This model aimed to examine Shaver’s 
decision-stage model in which the target characteristics predict blame-related judgments 
irrespective of other external influences.  
The Descriptive Blame model (Model 2) aimed to examine Alicke’s Culpable 
Control model in which affective and attitudinal responses also predict blame-related 
judgments. The Descriptive Blame model included the target characteristics manipulated 
variables (Type of Attribution, Weight Group, and Health Choice) and their interactions, 
and all of the hypothesized variables including blame judgement-related variables (i.e., 
direct attributions of controllability, responsibility and blame toward the target), affective 
and attitudinal response variables, and then Blame predicting Support for the Obesity-
targeted Policies and Likelihood of Support (see Figure 7).  
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The affective and attitudinal responses selected for this study included general 
obesity Dispositional and Situational Blame attributions measured with the two OBAS 
higher-order factors, anti-fat attitudes measured with the AFA, stereotype content 
Warmth and Competence, and the emotional appraisal Disgust. Following the 
preliminary SCM warmth–competence and emotional appraisal analyses, it was decided 
that Disgust would be included in Model 2 because it was the only low-warmth and low-
competence cluster emotional appraisal found to differ by Weight Group (i.e., anger and 
contempt did not elicit group differences and the other emotional appraisals are not 
theoretically predictive of low-warmth and low-competence groups).  
Table 21presents the bivariate correlations for all potential predictors in the 
model, which helped to inform variable selection for the path models. Due to some higher 
correlations between affective and attitudinal response predictors, there was concern of 
multicollinearity. To address this concern, a variance inflation factor (VIF) was 
calculated for each of the predictors by doing a linear regression of that predictor on all 
the other predictors, and then obtaining the R2 from that regression and computing1/(1-
R2). The VIF indicates how much variance of the coefficient is inflated because of its 
linear relationship to the other predictors. A VIF greater than 2.5 is considered 
problematic (Allison, 2012). Both warmth and competence were collinear with each other 
and thus, a higher-order factor score was estimated in Mplus. Second, the two higher 
order OBAS factor scores were included, rather than the lower-order factor scores, 
because the lower-order factors within each high-order factor were highly correlated with 
each other.  Moreover, the majority of the five separate factor scores were not correlated 
with any of the outcome variables differently than the higher-order factors—giving 
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support for including the higher-order factors in the model for parsimony. The only 
significant correlation was between the competence factor score and the OBAS 
Dispositional Blame factor score; however, the correlation was small, and the 
competence and warmth variables were combined to create a single warmth-competence 
factor score because of their multicollinearity.  
Model 1: Prescriptive Blame model 
The Prescriptive Blame model had good fit (χ2 (20) = 33.06, p = .03; CFI = 0.98; 
RMSEA = .05, CI 90%: .02 - .08, p = .41) according to the recommendations by Byrne 
(2001) and as outlined in Study 1. Contrary to hypotheses, there was only one significant 
interaction for Weight Group x Health Choice, but the other two interactions were not 
significant. As we were interested in testing the theoretical blame model and not 
necessarily simple effects for each independent variable, we removed the non-significant 
interactions. The final estimated path model with the non-significant interactions 
removed also had good fit (χ2 (16) = 31.85, p = .01; CFI = 0.97; RMSEA = .03, CI 90%: 
.03 - .10, p = .21) and there were no modification indices suggestions for improving 
model fit. Figure 6 presents the path model structure with all paths included in the model. 
Table 22 presents standardized parameter estimates.  
The Prescriptive Blame model revealed significant main effects for Weight group 
for each independent variable. Participants attributed significantly more Controllability, 
Responsibility and Blame to the obese target (coded as −0.5) compared to the average 
weight target (coded as 0.5). There were no significant main effects for Health Choice or 
Type of Attribution on any of the blame-related judgments. There was a significant 
interaction between Weight Group and Health Choice suggesting that the simple effect of 
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Health Choice was stronger for the obese target as compared to the average weight target 
for attributions of blame toward the target. As such, participants perceived the obese 
target as significantly more blameworthy when making unhealthy choices, than the 
average weight person making unhealthy choices. Supporting Shaver’s prescriptive stage-
model Theory of Blame, Controllability significantly predicted Responsibility; and 
Controllability and Responsibility both significantly predicted Blame. The model 
predicted 45% of the variance for specific Blame attributions toward the target.  
Part of the hypotheses for the Prescriptive Model is that Controllability mediates 
the relationship between the target characteristics and Responsibility and Blame, and that 
Responsibility mediates the relationship between Controllability and Blame. Although 
mediation is not specifically outlined in Shaver’s model, the decision-stage model 
implicitly suggests this relationship as Controllability is described as a necessary prequel 
for Responsibility and Responsibility is described as a necessary prequel to Blame. To 
statistically test this hypothesis, the following mediating relationships (XMY) were 
estimated using MODEL INDIRECT available in Mplus: (a) 
WeightControllabilityBlame, (b) WeightResponsibilityBlame, (c) 
ControllabilityResponsibilityBlame. As Weight was only independent variable that 
significantly predicted blame-related judgments, mediation was only estimated for 
Weight Group. In support of Shaver’s Theory of Blame, both Controllability and 
Responsibility mediated the relationship between Weight Group and Blame; and 
Responsibility mediated the relationship between Controllability and Responsibility. 
Table 24 displays the indirect effects for each of the mediation analysis. 
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Model 2: Descriptive Blame model 
For the Descriptive Blame model, a multiple-group model with all parameters 
constrained as equal was estimated to compare model fit and estimate parameters for 
participants who received the OBAS fat stem compared to participants who received the 
OBAS obese stem. This model fit was acceptable CFI (χ2 (52) = 94.77, p < .001; CFI = 
0.89; RMSEA = .08, CI 90%: .06 - .11, p = .03); however, fit issues were not addressed 
because comparing groups in this manner resulted in a small sample per cell because of 
the 2 (Attribution Type) x 2 (Weight Group) x 2 (Choice) x 2 (OBAS stem) design. As 
such, stem type was included in the path model as a binary predictor variable, which is an 
alternative method for comparing the effects of stem type, while retaining all participants 
in a single model. This single-group model had acceptable fit (χ2 (32) = 50.92, p = .02; 
CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = .05, CI 90%: .02 - .08, p = .47), but stem type was not a 
significant predictor for any of the regression paths and thus, stem type was removed 
from analyses for parsimony (and improving fit was not addressed)—essentially 
collapsing the people who received the fat stem and obese stem items into a single group. 
The collapsed stem model did not have good fit (χ2 (26) = 72.53, p <.001; CFI = 0.91; 
RMSEA = .09, CI 90%: .06 - .11, p < .001). The largest source of misfit according to the 
modification indices was that the OBAS Dispositional Blame and Situational Blame 
factors were related to Support for the Policy and Likelihood of Support for the policy. 
The model adding the OBAS factors to predicting the Support for Policy variables had 
good fit (χ2 (22) = 26.52, p =.23; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = .03, CI 90%: .01 - .07, p = .80). 
Contrary to hypotheses, there were no significant interactions, including the Weight x 
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Health Choice interaction that was predictive in the Prescriptive Model. All of the 
interactions were removed due to non-significance and the model was re-estimated. 
The final estimated path model without the non-significant interactions had good 
fit (χ2 (16) = 20.78, p = .19; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = .04, CI 90%: .01 - .07, p = .69) and 
there were no modification indices suggestions for improving model fit that were within 
the theoretical framework. Figure 7 presents the path model structure with all paths 
included in the model. Table 23 presents standardized parameter estimates.  In first 
examining the parameters that were also in the earlier Prescriptive Blame model, the 
pattern was mostly the same with some exceptions. Participants attributed more 
Controllability, but less Responsibility to the obese target (coded as −0.5) compared to 
the average weight target (the Prescriptive model indicated more Responsibility). There 
were no significant differences for Blame for weight group as was the case in the earlier 
Prescriptive model. Unlike the previous model in which Attribution Type was not 
significant, the individual target (coded as −0.5) resulted in greater Responsibility 
attributions than the group target. Similar to the Prescriptive Model, health choice did not 
predict any of the blame-related attributions. Similarly, Controllability still significantly 
predicted Responsibility; Controllability and Responsibility both still significantly 
predicted Blame. 
Then, I examined whether the manipulated independent variables predicted any of 
the hypothesized mediating affective and attitudinal response variables. Weight Group 
and Health Choice significantly predicted both Warmth-competence and Disgust. 
Specifically, the obese target and the unhealthy choice target elicited less Warmth-
competence, but more Disgust. The individual target was significantly less likely to elicit 
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Disgust than the group target, but there were no Attribution Type effects on the Warmth- 
competence variable. Anti-fat attitudes also predicted Warmth-competence and Disgust 
in the hypothesized direction—higher Anti-fat attitudes were related to less Warmth-
competence and greater Disgust. As general Dispositional and Situational Obesity Blame 
attributions measured with the OBAS increased, perceptions of Warmth-competence also 
increased. 
In examining the relationship between the affective and attitudinal responses and 
the blame-related judgments, as hypothesized, general Dispositional Blame attributions 
predicted all three blame judgment-related variables in the hypothesized direction. 
General Situational Blame predicted lower Blame attributions toward the target, but not 
Controllability or Responsibility. Contrary to hypotheses, however, Warmth-competence, 
Anti-fat attitudes and Disgust did not predict any of the three blame-related judgments. It 
was surprising that many of the affective and attitudinal response variables were not 
significant in the models predicting the blame-related judgment variables even though 
most had significant bivariate correlations. VIF multicollinearity statistics did not 
demonstrate that any of the variables had problematic multicollinearity.  
In support of both theories, Controllability and Responsibility attributions were 
significant unique predictors in the multivariate regression path for Blame, but only the 
OBAS remained a significant predictor of Blame. Anti-fat attitudes, Warmth-
competence, and Disgust no longer uniquely predicted blame attributions. For the 
Descriptive Blame model, the model predicting specific attributions of Blame toward the 
target accounted for 54% of the variance. Previously, the Prescriptive Blame model 
accounted for 45% of the variance for specific Blame attributions toward the target. It 
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appears that the bulk of the variance can be accounted for with specific attributions of 
Controllability and Responsibility toward the target, with some additional variance (9%) 
accounted for by the affective and attitudinal responses.  
Again, MODEL INDIRECT was used to estimate the following mediating 
relationships (XMY): (a) WeightControllabilityBlame, (b) 
WeightResponsibilityBlame, (c) ControllabilityResponsibilityBlame, as well as 
the added relationship (d)  OBAS DispositionalControllabilityBlame, (e) OBAS 
DispositionalResponsibilityBlame, (e)  OBAS SituationalControllabilityBlame, 
(f) OBAS SituationalResponsibilityBlame. As Weight Group and the OBAS factors 
were the only independent variable that significantly predicted blame-related judgments, 
mediation was only estimated for these relationships. Both Controllability and 
Responsibility still mediated the relationship between Weight Group and Blame in this 
model; and Responsibility mediated the relationship between Controllability and 
Responsibility. Furthermore, Controllability and Responsibility mediated the relationship 
between general Dispositional Blame attributions and specific Blame attributions toward 
the target. Table 24 displays the indirect effects for each of the mediation analysis. 
Support and likelihood for support  
Hypothesis 3: Do blame attributions predict support for policies with either 
dispositional or situational blame language? And are those with high blame attributions 
more likely to support the policy they chose? Previous research has found that individual 
beliefs about the causes of obesity affect support for public health approaches aimed at 
reducing obesity (Barry et al., 2009). The last step in the path model estimated whether 
blame attributions predicted support for either the dispositional blame language policy 
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(coded as 0) or the situational blame policy, and participants’ likelihood of supporting 
their chosen policy. Results demonstrated that attributions of Blame significantly 
predicted support for the vending machine policy—those with higher Blame toward the 
target were more likely to support the Dispositionally-framed policy. General 
Dispositional blame attributions also predicted support for the Dispositionally-framed 
policy and General Situational blame attributions predicted support for the Situationally-
framed policy. Blame toward the target, conversely, did not predict likelihood of support, 
but General Situational blame attributions predicted likelihood of support. Moreover, 
Support and Likelihood to Support had a small positive correlation suggesting that those 
who chose the Situationally-framed policy were more likely to support the policy than 
those who chose the Dispositionally-framed policy. 
Discussion Study 2 
The goal of this study was threefold. First, I was interested in understanding 
general attributions and attitudes toward people who are obese, attributions of blame, 
what predicts blame attributions and how those attributions relate to support for laws 
aimed at improving health behaviors. Second, I was interested in comparing two 
competing theoretical models of blame—one a prescriptive model of blame that is rooted 
in the rational actor model of how people ought to make blame attributions, the second a 
descriptive model rooted in dual process theory that acknowledges the influence of 
psychological motivations and biases in making blame attributions. Third, I was 
interested in the utility of the Obesity Blame Attribution Scale (OBAS) created in Study 1 
as a predictive measure of general blame attributions.  
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With respect to the first goal of the study, the results demonstrated that weight as 
a cue prompted specific stereotypes, attitudes, and emotions. Although well researched 
(Cuddy, Fiske, Glick, & Xu, 2008), to our knowledge, the Stereotype Content Model has 
not yet explored obesity within the four-cluster paradigm. According to the mean values 
of warmth and competence elucidated in the current study, people who are obese would 
fall along the low warmth-low competence cluster similar to welfare recipients and poor 
Blacks and Whites. Although it is a limitation that we did not collect warmth and 
competence ratings from a variety of stereotyped groups because it was beyond the scope 
of the current project, these results do provide preliminary findings for where people who 
are obese may fall when comparing them to other groups in a within-sample design. To 
extend the theoretical work on the SCM, bivariate correlations also demonstrated that 
perceptions of low warmth-low competence were related to higher Anti-fat attitudes, 
higher OBAS Dispositional Blame and lower OBAS Situational Blame.  
These findings also provided context for whether the other-based emotional 
appraisals that are elicited for obese targets fit within the SCM framework. As our 
findings revealed, within the low warmth-low competence cluster predicted emotions, 
participants only endorsed more disgust toward people who are obese compared to people 
who are average weight, but not anger or contempt as would be predicted. Previous 
research examining these three emotions on perceptions of people who are obese 
similarly found more feelings of disgust (and contempt) than anger (Vartanian, Thomas, 
& Vanman, 2013). According to research on moral emotions, anger is elicited when a 
group is perceived as taking one’s resources (e.g.., poor people on government 
assistance) or infringing on the freedoms of others; contempt is elicited when people 
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violate their duties within the community or social structure; and disgust is elicited 
people cause degradation and impurity to themselves or others (Rozin, et al., 1999). 
These three emotions have also been described as approach-avoidance emotions such that 
contempt and disgust promote avoidance and anger promotes approach. Perhaps the 
circumstances with people who are obese is that they are not perceived as taking 
resources or violating duties within the community, despite the argument that obesity 
costs taxpayers indirectly through things such as increased medical bills and more missed 
days of work (Finkelstein et al., 2009).  
Instead, judgments of disgust may stem from the disease-connoting concept 
(Oaten et al., 2009; Lieberman, Tyber, & Latner, 2012; Park et al., 2007) in which 
obesity is thought to serve as a heuristic cue for pathogen infection because obesity is a 
deviation from species-typical health (Oaten et al., 2009). Others have proposed that 
obesity elicits the pathogen-avoidance system because people who are obese present a 
greater risk of disease than average weight people, and this has created a learned 
relationship between contagion and weight (Liberman et al., 2012). Disgust has also been 
specifically linked to the stereotype that people who are obese have no self-control 
(Vartanian, 2010), which has been linked to being perceived as having lower social status 
(Vartanian & Silverstein, 2013). Theoretical work on the SCM describes the warmth and 
competence dimensions as stemming from assessments important for surviving in the 
social world—assessing the person’s perceived intent in the social world and the person’s 
perceived ability to act on that intent. Thus, being perceived as low warmth-low 
competence fits within previous research that people who are obese are perceived as 
having low self-control and low status. From our results, these cognitive warmth-
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competence assessments, at least in part, are also positively related to anti-fat attitudes 
and dispositional blame.  One surprising finding for Dispositional Blame (but not for 
Situational Blame) is that greater blame attributions were related to more Warmth-
competence. One plausible conclusion is that when participants have high Dispositional 
Blame attributions, they perceive targets as more culpable (having more control, 
responsibility and subsequent blame over their weight), and therefore possessing a certain 
level of competence. In examining the language present in the OBAS items, especially 
the Responsibility factor (which is part of the higher-order Dispositional Blame factor), 
there are phrases such as “choose behaviors,” “are aware,” “understand how.” These 
suggest beliefs about capabilities – which the competence scale is proposed to measure. 
Although not included in the path model for theoretical reasons (and parsimony), 
obesity also elicited an increase in other negative emotions. The obese target elicited 
more pity, sympathy, empathy and disappointment. According to the SCM, emotions 
such as these are elicited when the target is perceived along paternalistic ambivalent 
stereotypes of warm but incompetent. Within this cluster, targets are still perceived as 
unable to act on their intent, but having a relatively benign intent to begin with. Although 
our data did not suggest people who are obese fit within this cluster, perhaps they elicited 
more sympathizing emotions because many Americans struggle with weight issues or 
know someone who does. Unlike other groups that have low warmth-low competence 
(e.g., poor people, welfare recipients), participants may have endorsed these emotions 
because of self-referencing. Self-referencing is a cognitive strategy where an observer 
relates the information about the target to his or her own self-structure. As such, 
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participants may place themselves in the shoes of a target who has problems with self-
control related to food.  
With respect to the blame-related judgment variables (also known as the structural 
linkage variables), in support of our hypotheses and previous research, participants had 
stronger controllability beliefs toward the obese target in both the prescriptive and 
descriptive models. On the other hand, there was a surprising finding with respect to 
responsibility. The obese target was perceived as having more responsibility over her 
(their) weight in the prescriptive model that only included the manipulated variables and 
controllability, but having less responsibility in the descriptive model that included the 
manipulated variables, controllability and the additional attitude measures. One reason 
may be due to the varying denotations of the term “responsibility.” The question that 
measured responsibility did not specifically define responsibility and participants could 
have interpreted this in different ways. Perhaps when controlling for attitudes in the 
Descriptive model, the effect of weight on perceptions of responsibility changed because 
once negative attitudes and blame attributions were included in the model, the variance 
left over was actually measuring “responsible” in a positive way such as the denotation in 
“I am a responsible person who eats well” instead of the typical “responsibility” over 
one’s actions as blame theories would state.  
Contrary to hypotheses and previous research, whether the attributions were 
toward the group or individual and whether the target made healthy choice or unhealthy 
choice statements, had very little effect on the outcome variables. In the prescriptive 
model, health choice did interact with weight group so that health choice exacerbated 
blame attributions for obese targets compared to average weight targets; however, this 
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effect was not present in the descriptive model when the additional attitude measures 
were included. Because there was not a main effect for health choice predicting blame, 
this suggests that in this study it was not just people in general who were judged 
negatively for eating poorly (Stein & Nemeroff, 1995) but that people who are obese are 
judged even more negatively (blameworthy, in this case) when they eat poorly. McClure 
and colleagues (2011) similarly found that negative attitudes were aggravated when 
comparing nonstereotypical flattering photographs (an obese woman who was exercising 
and an obese woman who was well-dressed) to a stereotypical non-flattering photograph 
(an obese woman who was eating junk food and an obese woman shown from behind 
emphasizing large body size). The current work extends this previous research by 
including more standardized stimuli and including additional aggravating/mitigating 
information in the form of ostensible verbal statements, instead of the information 
depicted in the photograph. 
To address both the first and second goals of this study, we were also interested in 
comparing competing blame theories. Although this study does not definitely answer the 
theoretical debate on prescriptive versus descriptive models of blame, the results seems to 
lend support for both models. In both the descriptive and predictive models, and in 
support of both Shaver’s and Alicke’s theories of blame, controllability and responsibility 
were significant predictors of blame with medium standardized regression weights. In the 
prescriptive model, the characteristics of the target, controllability, and responsibility 
accounted for almost half of the variance for blame attributions toward the target. In the 
descriptive model with controllability and responsibility (what Alicke terms structural 
linkages), the addition of the affective and attitudinal response variables only increased 
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the variance accounted for by an additional 9%. Alicke’s Culpable Control model 
predicts that affective and attitudinal responses may either directly or indirectly predict 
blame attributions. There is partial support for the presumption that affective and 
attitudinal responses simultaneously affect structural linkages and blame attributions. 
Whereas most of the affective and attitudinal responses measured did not significantly 
predict structural linkages or blame attributions, general dispositional obesity blame 
attributions did simultaneously predict structural linkages (controllability and 
responsibility) and blame attributions.  
Contrary to hypotheses, the only affective and attitudinal response variable that 
we included in this study that predicted specific blame attributions were the OBAS 
Dispositional factor and OBAS Situational Factor. At first blush, this does not seem like a 
monumental finding. After all, blame attributions should predict blame attributions. 
Closer examination of each variable, however, does demonstrate two things: (a) 
predictive validity for the OBAS as part of the third goal of the study, and (b) a 
relationship between general attitudes and specific attributions because the OBAS 
measured general blame attributions about “people who are obese/fat” at time 1 and the 
dependent variable measured specific attributions of blame to the target person or group 
that was “interviewed” for our study about vending machine policies at time 2. Although 
the anti-fat attitudes, emotional reactions and warmth-competence ratings did not predict 
structural linkages or blame in the descriptive model, they did have bivariate 
relationships with the variables of interest. The multicollinearity assessment did not yield 
any multicollinearity (except with warmth and competence, for which we created a single 
higher-order factor score).  
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It is possible that spontaneous evaluations are not best measured with affective 
and attitudinal responses to scales that measure these constructs. Previous research 
applying the CCM has traditionally manipulated target characteristics, such as likability, 
which have significantly predicted blame attributions (Alicke & Zell, 2009). In the 
current study, the manipulated weight group variable did significantly predict blame 
attributions, whereas the measured variables did not. Although understanding the 
underlying mechanisms for spontaneous evaluations is central to the theory, capturing 
these mechanisms may be methodologically difficult. In support of this contention, 
Kanazawa (1992) recommends that experimenters not use “too much experimental 
prompt or probe to obtain [causal] attributions” (p.661), which includes asking 
participants to provide causal attributions.  One method provided by Kanazawa (1992) is 
to have participants engage in free-response and use attribution statements as the 
dependent measures. Another methodological tool may be a reaction time paradigm, a 
common methodology in dual-process model research toward stigmatized groups (e.g., 
Pryor et al., 2004). 
 The hypothesis that blame attributions would predict support for public policy 
was supported. Although obesity was not a large concern for American politics prior to 
2000, it became part of the political agenda following the Surgeon General’s Report in 
2001. For example, at the Federal level, the Affordable Care Act includes a provision 
requiring restaurants and vending machines to post nutritional information; at the local 
level, mayor Bloomberg of New York City implemented a law restricting the sale of 
sodas greater than 16 ounces (this has since been overturned by the court). Now that it is 
part of the political agenda, understanding what factors influence support and public 
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opinion of such law and policy is important because public opinion and perceived 
legitimacy in law is predictive of compliance with the law. According to Tyler (1990), 
because lawmakers are interested in securing compliance with the laws they make, it is 
ideal to establish conditions that lead to the public generally agreeing with their decisions 
and policies. Within the public health domain, public support and opinion may be even 
more important because, in the words of Tyler (1990), “laws are passed and enforced to 
mandate behavior that people would prefer to avoid” (p.19). As we know, health 
behaviors are particularly vulnerable to the belief that the government should not intrude 
(Gostin, 2010; Zernicke, 2003). If the law is to be used as a tool for addressing obesity 
(Gostin, 2010), then it would be most effective to do so in a manner in which the public 
agrees. 
 In addition to support for law and policy, it is also important to understand what 
effects, if any, laws have on actual behavior. On one hand, it is possible that law and 
policy has its intended effects on behavior. On the other hand, it is possible that law and 
policy does not have its intended effects. Empirically testing the assumptions law and 
policy has about behavior can provide insight into whether laws and policies are, 
effective, ineffective (no effect on behavior), or contribute to behavior that are in 
opposition to the intent of the law or policy. The goal of Study 3 is to do just this by 
examining the effects of the obesity-targeted law created for Study 2.  
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Table 19. Global fit statistics for variables that measured as observed factor scores from 
estimated models 
Model # 
item
s 
# est. 
parameters 
Chi-
Square 
Value 
Chi-
Square 
DF 
Chi-
Square 
p-
value 
CFI RMSEA 
Estimate 
RMSEA 
Lower 
CI 
RMSEA 
Higher 
CI 
RMSEA 
p-value 
AFA 
Factor 
13 117 233.13 65 .001 .97 .11 .09 .12 .001 
SCM 
Factor 
12 60 450.61 54 .001 .94 .18 .16 .19 .001 
OBAS 
Factors 
39 322 2881.66 1626 .001 .98 .05 .05 .05 .35 
Note. AFA – Anti-fat Attitudes; SCM – combined warmth and competence factor from the 
Stereotype Content Model. OBAS – Obesity Blame Attribution Scale developed in Study 1. The 
OBAS has good fit. The AFA and SCM have acceptable fit but modifications were not made to 
improve model fit because it was thought best to remain close to the authors’ recommendations. 
The only exception was the combination of warmth and competence into a single higher-order 
factor score because of multicollinearity issues in the path model  
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Table 20. Emotional reactions toward obese and average weight target 
 Obese Average   
 M  SD M  SD F(df) P 
Anger 0.22 0.59 0.21 0.62 0.01 .98 
Disgust 0.60 0.85 0.24 0.65 13.61 <.001 
Contempt 0.37 0.74 0.33 0.74 0.13 .72 
Pity 0.81 0.98 0.26 0.64 26.51 <.001 
Sympathy 1.27 1.18 0.51 0.82 33.11 <.001 
Admiration 0.56 1.03 1.13 1.20 15.65 <.001 
Envy 0.21 0.74 0.49 1.00 5.86 <.05 
Distrust 0.45 0.75 0.33 0.65 1.77 .19 
Empathy 1.34 1.23 0.87 1.06 9.96 <.01 
Disappointment 0.99 1.16 0.50 0.98 12.67 <.001 
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Table 21. Bivariate correlations among variables in path model predicting blame 
  Type Weight Choice AFA 
OBAS- 
Control 
OBAS- 
Resp 
OBAS- 
DB 
OBAS- 
SB Food 
OBAS- 
SB Gov't 
OBAS- 
HO-DB  
OBAS- 
HO-SB  Disgust Comp  Warmth 
SCM 
HO Control Resp. Blame Support 
Likely 
Support 
Type 1.00                    
Weight .01 1.00                   
Choice .00 .03 1.00                  
AFA -.05 -.08 -.07 1.00                 
OBAS- 
Control 
.01 -.11 -.04 .59 1.00                
OBAS- 
Resp 
.00 -.14 -.03 .56 .97 1.00               
OBAS- 
DB 
-.05 -.14 -.02 .64 .91 .91 1.00              
OBAS- 
SB Food 
-.10 .13 .03 .04 -.17 -.16 -.19 1.00             
OBAS- 
SB Gov't 
-.11 .12 .01 .04 -.19 -.19 -.22 .85 1.00            
OBAS- 
HO-DB 
.01 -.12 -.03 .59 .99 .98 .93 -.17 -.19 1.00           
OBAS- 
HO-SB 
-.10 .14 .02 .04 -.19 -.19 -.23 .96 .96 -.19 1.00          
Disgust .13 -.23 -.18 .29 .20 .20 .21 -.10 -.07 .20 -.09 1.00         
Comp .10 .52 .34 -.24 -.11 -.09 -.13 .19 .12 -.10 .17 -.32 1.00        
Warmth .01 .29 .37 -.20 -.07 -.03 -.08 .23 .16 -.06 .20 -.28 .83 1.00       
SCM HO .07 .47 .36 -.23 -.10 -.07 -.12 .21 .14 -.10 .18 -.32 .99 .91 1.00      
Control .07 -.28 -.02 .21 .39 .40 .38 -.11 -.13 .39 -.13 .16 -.16 -.07 -.14 1.00     
Resp -.08 -.03 -.05 .24 .41 .41 .41 -.14 -.16 .41 -.16 .14 -.10 -.08 -.10 .47 1.00    
Blame -.03 -.29 -.04 .31 .49 .48 .55 -.28 -.31 .49 -.31 .22 -.27 -.16 -.25 .52 .44 1.00   
Support -.08 .11 .11 -.26 -.38 -.40 -.38 .24 .23 -.39 .25 -.10 .12 .10 .12 -.26 -.18 -.32 1.00  
Likely 
Support 
.03 .06 .00 -.09 -.06 -.04 -.12 .29 .30 -.05 .32 .04 .02 .00 .01 .03 .01 -.02 .13 1.00 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). DB = Dispositional Blame, SB = Situational Blame, HO = higher-order 
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Table 22. Parameter estimates for prescriptive path model (model 1) 
 
 
  
Model Beta B SE Est./SE P 
Control      
     Type −0.01 −0.01 0.08 −0.11 0.91 
     Weight −0.11 −0.23 0.10 −2.23 <.05 
     Choice −0.02 −0.04 0.15 −0.30 0.77 
     Weight X Choice  −0.05 0.21 0.28 0.76 0.45 
      
Responsibility      
     Control 0.55 0.67 0.06 10.53 <.001 
     Type −0.01 −0.01 0.08 −0.11 0.91 
     Weight −0.09 −0.23 0.10 −2.23 <.05 
     Choice −0.06 −0.14 0.10 −1.33 0.18 
     Weight X Choice 0.05 0.23 0.30 0.77 0.44 
      
Blame      
     Responsibility 0.36 0.48 0.06 8.26 <.001 
     Control 0.32 0.35 0.05 6.73 <.001 
     Type −0.01 −0.01 0.08 −0.11 0.91 
     Weight −0.21 −0.56 0.16 −3.50 <.001 
     Choice −0.05 −0.14 0.10 −1.33 0.18 
     Weight X Choice −0.13 −0.67 0.31 −2.20 <.05 
      
Support      
     Blame −0.50 −0.43 0.08 −5.68 <.001 
      
Likelihood of Support      
     Blame 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.82 0.41 
      
Covariances      
     Support          Likelihood 0.23 0.23 0.09 2.53 <.01 
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Table 23. Parameter estimates for descriptive path model (model 2) 
Model Beta B SE Est./SE p 
SCM      
     Type 0.07 0.13 0.10 1.32 0.19 
     Weight 0.44 0.80 0.10 8.24 <.001 
     Choice 0.33 0.61 0.10 6.40 <.001 
      Disp. Blame 0.16 0.15 0.06 2.36 <.05 
     Sit. Blame 0.16 0.17 0.05 3.42 <.001 
     AFA −0.27 −0.31 0.07 −4.60 <.001 
      
Disgust      
     Type 0.16 0.39 0.19 2.04 <.05 
     Weight −0.28 −0.69 0.19 −3.69 <.001 
     Choice −0.21 −0.52 0.19 −2.72 <.01 
      Disp. Blame −0.02 −0.03 0.13 −0.20 0.84 
     Sit. Blame −0.09 −0.12 0.11 −1.14 0.25 
     AFA 0.37 0.57 0.17 3.36 <.001 
      
Control       
     Type 0.07 0.16 0.16 1.04 0.30 
     Weight −0.24 −0.55 0.17 −3.33 <.001 
     Choice −0.01 −0.01 0.16 −0.09 0.93 
      Disp. Blame 0.40 0.48 0.10 4.89 <.001 
     Sit. Blame −0.05 −0.06 0.08 −0.72 0.47 
     AFA −0.03 −0.04 0.12 −0.36 0.72 
     Disgust 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.53 0.60 
     SCM 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.37 0.71 
      
Responsibility      
     Control 0.47 0.53 0.06 9.33 <.001 
     Type −0.14 −0.37 0.17 −2.10 <.05 
     Weight 0.20 0.50 0.18 2.74 <.01 
     Choice −0.02 −0.05 0.18 −0.28 0.78 
      Disp. Blame 0.22 0.30 0.12 2.47 <.01 
     Sit. Blame −0.11 −0.15 0.09 −1.65 0.10 
     AFA −0.03 −0.04 0.14 −0.29 0.77 
     Disgust 0.11 0.11 0.11 1.05 0.29 
     SCM −0.03 −0.04 0.11 −0.34 0.73 
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Blame      
     Control 0.31 0.39 0.06 6.95 <.001 
     Responsibility 0.19 0.21 0.05 4.26 <.001 
     Type −0.07 −0.21 0.17 −1.24 0.21 
     Weight −0.08 −0.24 0.18 −1.37 0.17 
     Choice 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.35 0.73 
     Disp. Blame 0.22 0.33 0.11 2.94 <.001 
     Sit. Blame −0.19 −0.30 0.08 −3.67 <.001 
     AFA 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.27 0.79 
     Disgust 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.92 0.36 
     SCM −0.08 −0.13 0.10 −1.27 0.20 
      
Support      
     Blame −0.20 −0.16 0.08 −2.16 <.05 
      Disp. Blame −0.31 −0.38 0.13 −2.88 <.001 
     Sit. Blame 0.20 0.26 0.12 2.21 <.05 
      
Likelihood Support      
     Blame 0.22 0.16 0.06 2.75 <.01 
      Disp. Blame 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.51 0.61 
     Sit. Blame 0.39 0.47 0.08 5.58 <.001 
      
Covariances      
     SCM             Disgust  −0.28 -0.20 0.05 -4.02 <.001 
    Support          Likelihood 0.15 0.15 0.09 1.63 0.10 
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Table 24. Standardized indirect effects within path models 
Path (XMY) Estimate SE p 
Prescriptive Model (Model 1)    
WeightControllabilityBlame −0.04  <.05 
WeightResponsibilityBlame −0.03  <.05 
ControllabilityResponsibilityBlame 0.18  <.001 
Descriptive Model (Model 2)    
WeightControllabilityBlame −0.07  <.01 
WeightResponsibilityBlame 0.04  <.05 
OBAS DispControllabilityBlame 0.12  <.001 
OBAS DispResponsibilityBlame 0.04  <.05 
OBAS SitControllabilityBlame −0.02  .47 
OBAS SitResponsibilityBlame −0.02  .08 
ControllabilityResponsibilityBlame 0.09  <.001 
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Figure 5. Warmth and competence means for obese and average weight group mapped 
onto the figure from the original published article (Fiske et al., 2002, Study 1 Figure 2, 
non-student sample).  
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Figure 6. Path Model 1 for prescriptive blame model based on Shaver’s (1985) Theory of 
Blame model. Significant paths are solid and non-significant paths are dashed. 
Categorical variables are in dotted boxes. Parameter estimates are presented separately in 
Table 22. 
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Figure 7. Path model 2 for descriptive blame model based on Alicke’s (2000) Culpable 
Control model. Significant paths are solid and non-significant paths are dashed. 
Categorical variables are in dotted boxes. Parameter estimates are presented separately in 
Table 23. 
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CHAPTER 4  
STUDY 3: CONSEQUENCES OF OBESITY LAW AND POLICY 
 
Although previous research has found that policies that blame people who are 
obese have been perceived as more stigmatizing (Puhl et al., 2012) and that people who 
are obese who were primed with negative stereotypes had lower intentions to exercise 
and eat nutritionally, the dependent measures in these studies were limited (Seacat & 
Mickelson, 2009). For instance, Puhl and colleagues (2012) asked people to rate the 
stigmatizing effects of health messages but did not actually measure whether the ads 
increased stigma using experimental methods. Moreover, Seacat and Mickelson (2009) 
did not measure actual exercise and eating behaviors, but rather self-reported intentions 
to exercise and eat healthier. With these limitations in mind, the current study 
experimentally examined how law and policy that blame people who are obese influence 
food consumption and physical activity behavior, and whether effects differ as a function 
of dispositional blame (toward people who are obese) or situational blame (toward the 
environment). 
Participants  
The participants (N=86) for this study included two groups. The community 
member sample (n = 45) was recruited through Craigslist, flyers, newspaper ads, and 
word of mouth. Community member participants either called or emailed if they were 
interested in participating and were asked to respond to several questions, including 
height and weight (the research assistant calculated BMI), to determine eligibility. 
Community member participants were compensated either $5 or $10 for completing the 
study (compensation was increased after n = 10 to increase participation). The 
undergraduate student sample (n = 41) was recruited via the university’s mass screening, 
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which allows researchers to contact students interested in participating in research based 
on their responses to the mass screening questionnaire completed at the beginning of the 
semester. Student participants were emailed if they met the eligibility criteria for 
calculated BMI based on the height and weight they indicated on the mass screening 
questionnaire. Student participants were compensated with course credits. Both samples 
were entered into a lottery to win a $100 gift card as additional incentive for 
participation. BMI was calculated based on the Center for Disease Control’s calculator 
for adults over the age of 20 (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). Sample 
characteristics are displayed in Table 25.  
Method 
Procedures 
 Participants were recruited for an ostensible healthy vending machine taste test 
study. Once participants were determined eligible for the study and an in-laboratory 
appointment was scheduled, they were emailed a questionnaire to be completed prior to 
arriving at the study. Participants were told that the researchers were collecting a variety 
of information that the city would like to know about the taste-testers to get a 
representative sample of people who live in the city and to save time on the day of the 
actual study. The true purpose for completing the study prior to the in-laboratory study 
was to conceal the hypotheses of the study. Once participants arrived to the Taste Testing 
laboratory in the basement of the building, research assistants read a script that explained 
the study. Each participant was told that the city hired the psychology department to 
conduct a series of studies to taste test snack foods in an effort to provide healthy, but 
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tasty, choices in vending machines and to examine new proposed vending machine 
policies.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions and read an 
excerpt from a proposed law. The policy was typed in a format similar to an actual 
proposed law and contained the manipulated language that blamed the obesity epidemic 
on either a) people who are obese (dispositional blame), b) an obesogenic environment 
(situational blame), c) or no mention of blame (control condition). After participants 
completed manipulation check questions, they were asked to taste and rate six snack 
items on a platter (see picture below). Each food item was presented on the same size 
plate, placed in random order in front of the participant, and given a label that contained a 
picture of the food product packaging and the food product’s name. 
 
 
The research assistants asked each person to try the items and rate each item using 
the same questions in Study 2 (e.g., taste, health, salty). Each snack item was weighed 
prior to being given to the participant outside of participant’s view behind a room divider. 
The weight of each item (in grams) was held constant across all participants. Each snack 
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item weighed 30 grams, with the exception of the two chip items that were weighed to 21 
grams because of the amount of space they took up on the plate. Participants were 
encouraged to try every item and to consume as much as they would like. Because 
participants may modify eating behavior when others are present (Roth, Herman, Polivy 
& Pilner, 2001), research assistants explicitly told participants they were leaving the 
room for ten minutes. Each snack item was weighed before and after (away from 
participants) as a measure amount-consumed (Fredrickson et al., 1998; Mori, Chaiken, & 
Pliner, 1987) and caloric intake (Major, Hunger, Bunyan, & Miller, 2014). 
When the research assistants returned, they causally asked participants how 
everything was and removed the food. To measure ego-depletion, participants completed 
a series of math problems, which was counter-balanced to be completed just after the 
taste test task or just before they completed the exit questionnaire upstairs. Research 
assistants escorted participants until standing equidistance between the elevator and 
stairs, and explicitly pointed and stated they may take the elevator or the stairs. 
Participants’ decision was recorded as a measure of physical activity choice. The first 
research assistant returned to the taste testing laboratory to weigh each snack item out of 
the view of participants and recorded the difference in weight as the food consumption 
dependent variable.  
A second research assistant met the participant on the third floor to confirm 
whether they took the elevator or stairs. Upstairs, participants completed the exit 
questionnaire, which included the counter-balanced ego-depletion math problem task (if 
they did not complete it downstairs), current eating and physical activity habits, 
intentions for future healthy eating and physical activity, emotional reactions, and 
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acceptance of stigma. To confirm BMI, participants were asked to hold a hand-held 
machine after research assistants manually entered the required information into the 
machine (i.e., height, weight, age, gender), which was all gathered during the pre-study 
survey (for community members) or mass screening (for students). After the exit 
questionnaire but before being debriefed, participants were shown a table with additional 
snacks and flyer for a gym. We recorded what, if any, items participants took from the 
table.  
Materials 
Independent measures 
 Screening measures 
 Community member participants were recruited via advertisements in the 
community, and called/emailed the research team if they wanted to complete the study. 
The research assistant asked a series of filler questions (age, gender, voter registration 
status, education level, parent’s education level, food allergies, dietary restrictions) and 
height and weight, which were used to calculate BMI for purposes of eligibility. 
Screening items are presented in Appendix K. Student participants were screened using a 
mass screening procedure. At the beginning of each academic semester, students are 
invited to participate in a survey that includes demographic questions and measures 
submitted by various researchers in the psychology department. For purposes of the 
current study, only height and weight were used as a means to calculate BMI. Students 
were recruited via email if they were average weight, overweight, or obese. Participants 
from both groups were scheduled (by phone or email) and emailed the link to the pre-
study dependent measures. 
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 Type of blame manipulation 
Legal scholars have noted that many of the strategies governments have 
proposed/implemented for reducing obesity may be grouped as either attributing 
responsibility to individuals who are obese or environmental factors, such as the food 
industry and the government (Benforado et al., 2004; Winstanley, 2007). As such, the 
blame manipulation was embedded in a written proposed policy for healthy vending 
machines and varied by: (A) Dispositional Blame, (B) Situational Blame, (C) No Blame 
control. The policy language was identical to Study 2, except the addition of the No 
Blame control condition policy. The manipulated language appeared in the legislative 
findings rationale section of the policy and included elements of blame, responsibility, 
and controllability as theorized in blame theories. The policies and manipulated language 
are presented in Appendices J and L. 
Pre-study control measures  
Public Trust and Confidence in Institutions. As part of the cover story, 
participants also completed an adapted 35-item Public Trust and Confidence in 
Institutions measure (Tomkins et al., 2011-2014). The measure was modified to include 
assessment of public trust and confidence in public health agencies (e.g., Food and Drug 
Administration, the Center for Disease Control). Although the measure is not directly 
related to the hypotheses of the current study, the measures are relevant to public policy 
decisions and support the cover story about public health policy decisions.  Items are 
presented in Appendix M. 
Clinical measures. Previous research has shown that weight-based stigma may 
have negative consequences for the people who are overweight, including depression, 
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isolation, and social withdrawal (Bannon, et al., 2009; Miller, Rothblum, Barbour, Brand, 
& Felicil, 1990). To measure individual differences for mental health outcomes, 
participants completed the 21-item short form Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-
21; Antony et al., 1998) that measures depression, anxiety, and stress. Each item has four 
response options: “did not apply to me at all“(0), “applied to me to some degree or some 
of the time” (1), “applied to me to a considerable degree or a good part of the time” (2), 
and “applied to me very much or most of the time” (3?). Higher scores indicate more 
symptomology for depression, anxiety, and stress. Because the DASS-21 consists of half 
of the original items, responses are added together and doubled, which provides very 
similar results to the original DASS normative sample (Henry & Crawford, 2005). Table 
26 contains descriptive statistics by sample (Stress Cronbach’s α =.85; Depression 
Cronbach’s α =.90; Anxiety Cronbach’s α =.88). Items are presented in Appendix N. 
Food preferences. As part of the cover story of the taste test study and for a filler 
to disguise the research hypotheses, participants completed the Food Choice 
Questionnaire (FCQ; Steptoe, Pollard, & Wardle, 1995). The FCQ is a 68-item measure 
that assess nine factors participants may consider when choosing what to eat, such as 
health, mood, convenience, sensory appeal, natural content, price, weight control, 
familiarity, and ethical concerns. Response options are on a 4-point Likert scale with “not 
at all important,” “a little important,” “moderately important,” and “very important.” 
Higher scores indicate that factor is more important to the individual. The entire scale 
was included as part of the cover story of a taste test study; however, the FCQ-Health 
subscale was included in analyses because it measures the importance of healthy eating 
(FCQ-Health Cronbach’s α =.84). The FCQ-Health subscale has 6 items with higher 
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values indicating a greater interest in eating foods because they are healthy. Table 26 
contains descriptive statistics by sample. Items are presented in Appendix P. 
Concerns with body image. Concerns with body image was measured using the 
Body Shape Questionnaire (BSQ; Cooper, Taylor, Cooper, & Fairburn, 1987; Dowson & 
Henderson, 2001) because restrained eating is related to how individuals perceive their 
bodies and their level of body shame. The short version BSQ is a 14-item scale that 
measures perceptions and attitudes toward one’s appearance and size. Response options 
are on a 6-point Likert scale and include “never,” “rarely,” “sometimes,” “often,” “very 
often,” and “always.” An example item is “Has worry about your shape made you diet?” 
Higher scales indicate greater concerns with body image. Table 26 contains descriptive 
statistics by sample (Cronbach’s α =.97). Items are presented in Appendix Q. 
Tendency to diet. One of the primary dependent variables in this study was the 
amount of food consumed during the taste test study; therefore, we examined 
participants’ tendency to diet using the Revised Restraint Scale (RRS; Polivy, Herman, & 
Howard, 1988). The RRS is a 10-item scale assessing weight fluctuations, degree of 
chronic dieting, and related attitudes towards weight and dieting. Example questions 
include “Do you eat sensibly in front of others but splurge when alone?” and “How many 
pounds over your desired weight were you at your maximum weight?” The response 
options for this scale vary depending on the question—all have five response options but 
some are Likert scale responses while others ask for a quantitative value. Scores are 
calculated by assigning a 0 for the first response, 1 for the second response, 2 for the third 
response, 3 for the fourth response, and 4 for the fifth response. Higher scores indicate 
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more restrained eating (Cronbach’s α =.75). Table 26 contains descriptive statistics by 
sample. Items are presented in Appendix R. 
In-lab dependent measures 
Manipulation check questions. Just after they read the policy, participants 
provided their impressions of the policy that served as a manipulation check. To ensure 
participants read the policy, they were asked three factual questions about the policy: (a) 
“How much money is spent on vending machines annually?” (the correct answer did not 
vary across conditions: $500,00) (b) “What was one of the causes for obesity mentioned 
in the policy? and (c) “What type of factors does the policy blame for obesity?” The 
correct answer for (b) and (c) varied by the condition as either indicating dispositional 
cause/blame, situational cause/blame or no cause/blame. Manipulation check questions 
were forced choice until the correct response was selected. To ensure the policy was 
eliciting blame, participants were also asked “How much do you think the policy blames 
[insert participant’s answer to blame question]?” on the scale “not at all” (1), “somewhat” 
(2), “quite a bit” (3), or “completely” (4). Items are presented in Appendix S. 
As expected there were significant differences across the three policies [F(2, 83) 
= 3.80, p < .05]. According to LSD post-hoc tests, participants perceived the dispositional 
blame policy as more blameworthy (M = 2.31, SD = 0.86) than the control policy (M = 
1.78, SD = 0.75) and the situational blame policy (M = 1.89, SD = 0.75), but the 
situational blame policy was not perceived as more blameworthy than the control policy. 
On the same scale 1 to 4 scale, we also asked three questions to ensure the three policies 
were of equal quality and valence. As expected, participants perceived all three policies 
as similarly high in quality [F(2, 83) = 0.16, p = .86; overall M = 2.67, SD = 0.79] and 
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evoking similar positive feelings [F(2, 83) = 0.57, p = .57; overall M = 2.30, SD = 0.92] 
and similar negative feelings [F(2, 83) = 2.07, p = .13; overall M = 1.71, SD = 0.81].  
Amount and type of food consumed. Scholars have suggested that weight-based 
stigma and stigmatizing public health campaigns may have the unintended effects of 
increasing food consumption (Puhl et al., 2012). Conversely, others have suggested that 
body shame may decrease or restrain eating (Fredrickson, et al., 1998). To measure the 
quantity and type of foods participants ate, we weighed the snacks before the taste testing 
task and after the taste testing task for a weight difference score in grams (Fredrickson et 
al., 1998; Mori, et al., 1987).  
The food options included paired unhealthy-healthier items that were pilot tested 
for healthiness in two previous studies (i.e., ratings from Study 2). Online participants 
provided healthiness ratings for several snack items based on pictures of the snack items. 
Items were selected for an in-person pilot test of Study 3 with university students (n = 17) 
based on the healthiness rating as well as a desire to have a variety of flavors that might 
appeal differently to participants (chocolatey, salty, and fruity). In pilot testing, it was 
revealed that participants perceived baked potato chips as similarly unhealthy to regular 
potato chips. As such, baked potato chips were replaced with veggie chips and all other 
foods from pilot testing remained in Study 3. The final snack items included unhealthy 
items: (a) snickers candy bar, (b) salted wavy potato chips, and (c) skittles; and healthier 
paired items: (a) kind bar, (b) salted veggie chips, and (c) dried fruit.  
As part of the cover story that participants were participating in a vending 
machine taste test study, participants rated each food item based on seven characteristics: 
(a) tastiness, (b) healthiness, (c) saltiness, (d) sweetness, (e) how filling, (f) cost 
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effectiveness, and (g) likelihood of purchasing from a vending machine. Paired-sample t-
tests compared the mean values between the unhealthy-healthier paired foods. As 
expected, participants rated the unhealthy items as significantly less healthy than their 
paired healthier item. Table 27 presents descriptives and paired sample t-tests for each 
characteristic. 
Physical Activity. Scholars have suggested that weight-based stigma and 
stigmatizing public health campaigns may have the unintended effects of decreasing 
motivation for physical activity (Puhl et al., 2012). As a proxy measure for physical 
activity within a laboratory setting, we had participants meet a research assistant upstairs 
to complete the Exit Questionnaire. Participants were told that the researchers needed the 
basement Taste Testing laboratory for the next participant and asked if the participant 
would mind completing the Exit Questionnaire upstairs. The research assistants walked 
participants to the end of the hallway equidistance between the stairs and elevator and 
explicitly told participants they could choose to take the stairs or the elevator. 
Participants’ choice was recorded as a measure of physical activity by the first researcher 
(and confirmed by the second researcher). Overall, 17% (n = 15) of participants took the 
elevator and 83% (n = 71) of participants took the stairs. 
Ego-depletion measure. Previous research has found that people may engage in 
restrained eating when experiencing weight-based stigma or discrimination and that 
short-term restrained eating may contribute to depleted cognitive resources needed to 
make long-term healthy decisions (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). As 
such, people who engage in restrained eating may binge eat followed a period of restraint. 
To measure whether participants are engaging in restrained eating, participants completed 
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the ego-depletion math problems. Following methods employed in previous research 
(Vohs, et al., 2008), participants were told the researchers were interested in how well 
people calculated math problems related to cost per unit of vending machine items and 
were read the following instructions:  
“It is important you do well on these calculations so that the task force knows  
how well people are able to make these calculations when purchasing snacks in  
vending machines. This math test is sensitive to brief amounts of practice,  
therefore, everyone is allowed some practice time before taking the test. You may  
practice these problems for as long as you want. When you no longer want to  
practice anymore problems, please ring the bell to alert the experimenter.”   
 
All math problems were 3 digit by 3 digit multiplication problems with one decimal place 
(e.g., 24.0 X 32.6) and consisted of a front and back page. Research assistants recorded 
the time the problems were started to the time when participants rang the bell. Lower 
values indicate participants spent less time (in seconds) on the math problems, which is 
indicative of giving-up or ego-depletion. The math problems were counter-balanced so 
that they were either administered right after the taste testing or right after participants 
took the elevator or stairs and began the Exit Questionnaire.  
There was a single outlier who spent 41 minutes on the math problems and was 
subsequently removed (otherwise the range was 0 seconds to 23 minutes). Once the 
outlier was removed, the average time spent on the math problems was 333 seconds (5.5 
minutes). ANOVA revealed that there was a significant order effect F(1,80) = 5.48, 
p<.05. Those that completed the study downstairs persisted longer with the math 
problems (M = 400.34, SD = 316.77) than participants who completed them upstairs (M = 
265.78, SD = 187.29). One reason may be that choosing between the elevator and stairs 
(or actually walking up the stairs) was cognitively taxing, however there was not a 
significant difference on the time to complete the math problems for participants who 
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took the elevator or the stairs F(1,80) = 0.62, p = .43. An alternative explanation was that 
participants upstairs knew they were close to finishing the study and therefore ended the 
task earlier. Because of the order effect, the order variable will be included as a control 
variable in any analyses that includes the ego-depletion score. 
Emotional reactions. To measure whether the manipulated variables had any 
emotional effects, participants completed a short version of the Positive and Negative 
Affects Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). The modified PANAS 
includes 21 positive and negative emotions with instructions to indicate how they 
currently feel. Response options are on a 5-point Likert scale including “very slightly or 
not at all,” “a little,” “moderately,” “quite a bit,” and “extremely.” Higher scores indicate 
feeling that emotion more strongly (positive scale Cronbach’s α = .88; negative scale 
Cronbach’s α = .81). Emotions are presented in Appendix T.  
Current eating and physical activity habits. As a control measure, we asked 
participants to report their current eating habits and physical activity/exercise habits. 
With a single item the question asked, “How would you describe your current eating 
habits?” and “How would you describe your current exercise/physical activity habits?”  
Response options were on a 5-point Likert scale with response options “not at all likely” 
(1), “a little likely,” “moderately likely.” “quite a bit likely,” and “extremely likely” (5).   
Intent to eat healthy or exercise. Similar to Puhl and colleagues’ (2012) study 
that examined intentions for complying with public health messages, this study asked 
participants for their intentions to eat healthy or increase physical activity with a single 
question for each. With a single item, the question asked “How likely is it that you will 
eat healthier in the future?’ and “How likely is it that you will be more physically active 
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in the future?’ Response options were on a 5-point Likert scale with response options 
“not at all likely” (1), “a little likely,” “moderately likely,” “quite a bit likely,” and 
“extremely likely” (5).   
Acceptance of stigma. A modified version of the Weight Bias Internalization 
Scale (WBIS; Durso & Latner, 2008) measured participants’ belief that negative 
stereotypes and negative statements about people who are obese apply to him or her. The 
modified version created specifically for this study changed words such as “overweight” 
to “weight” so the measure is applicable to obese and average weight participants. The 
scale consists of 11 items with response options on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”  Example items include “I hate myself for my 
weight” and “My weight is a major way that I judge my value as a person.” Higher scores 
indicate more internalization of weight bias (Cronbach’s α =.93). Items are presented in 
Appendix U. 
Additional snacks and gym flyer. After BMI was measured and participants were 
paid (or told they would get research credit), we measured whether participants took 
additional snacks or a gym flyer. These second measures were employed because 
participants may have felt observed when they were tasting the foods or choosing 
between the elevator and stairs, but may have felt less observed if they thought the study 
was over. The gym flyer was a 5 x 6 color flyer on cardstock with a description of the 
gym (i.e., a gym for everyday people), an advertised price of $10 a month, and a free 
tour. The additional snacks were displayed in a basket and included items like chocolate 
bars, chips, and cheese crackers. Overall, 23% (n = 20) of participants took a gym flyer 
and 76% (n = 65) did not take a gym flyer. Forty-eight percent (n = 41) of participants 
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took additional snacks and 51% (n = 44) did not take additional snacks. One community 
member did not have data for any of the upstairs measures because he/she got lost in the 
building and did not complete the study (this person contacted the PI and was mailed 
compensation).  
Hypotheses  
(1) Hypothesis 1: Previous research has indicated that exposure to negative obesity 
stereotypes may inhibit participants’ reported intent to eat healthy and engage in 
physical activity (Seacat & Mickelson, 2009). Based on this previous research, we 
expect that participants who are exposed to the Dispositional Blame condition will be 
less likely to report that they will engage in future healthy eating and physical activity 
than the No Blame condition. Hypotheses surrounding the Situational Blame 
condition are exploratory. It may be that the Situational Blame condition results are 
similar to the No Blame control condition results because blame is not directed at the 
individual. On the other hand, Situational Blame could be similar to the Dispositional 
Blame condition because of the blame language. We expect the blame policy effects 
to be present even when controlling for BMI, and that those with a higher BMI will 
report less likelihood of engaging in future healthy behaviors.  
(2) Hypothesis 2: To extend previous research that has relied on self-report intentions to 
eat healthier, we measured how much participants consumed during the taste testing 
study and whether participants took additional snacks upon exiting the study. It was 
hypothesized that, similar to reported intentions, participants who were exposed to the 
Dispositional Blame condition will consume more grams of snacks than the No 
Blame condition. Again, there were no directional hypotheses for the Situational 
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Blame condition, but it may be the case that the results for Situational Blame mirror 
those of the Dispositional Blame condition or No Blame condition, depending on how 
the Situational Blame policy is perceived. We expect the effect of the blame policy to 
be present even when controlling for BMI, but that those with a higher BMI will 
consume more grams of snacks.  
(3) Hypothesis 3: Again, as an extension to previous research that has relied on self-
report intentions to engage in physical activity, we measured physical activity with 
the choice to take the elevator or stairs when leaving part 1 of the study and whether 
participants took a flyer for a local gym upon exiting the study. It was hypothesized 
that participants who are exposed to the Dispositional Blame condition will be less 
likely to engage in physical activity than the No Blame condition. Again, there were 
no directional hypotheses for the Situational Blame condition, but it may be the case 
that the results for Situational Blame mirror those of the Dispositional Blame 
condition or No Blame condition, depending on how the Situational Blame policy is 
perceived. We expect the blame policy effect to be present even when controlling for 
BMI, but that those with a higher BMI will engage in less physical activity. 
(4) Hypothesis 4: An alternative hypothesis is that rather than consuming more calories, 
participants will engage in restrained eating while in the taste testing study because of 
social norms to eat healthy or a general tendency to diet. If participants in the 
Dispositional Blame condition eat healthier than the No Blame or Situational Blame 
Conditions, we expect that ego-depletion will be related to restrained eating 
(Fredrickson et al. 1998), especially for people with high BMI high body shame, and 
high restrained eating scores. We also expect that restrained eating will result in a 
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subsequent decrease in physical activity and later increased food consumption during 
the follow-up measures when participants no longer think they are being monitored 
(Puhl et al., 2012). 
(5) Hypothesis 5:  Previous research has found that participants perceive some health 
messages as more stigmatizing than others (Puhl et al., 2012). We extended this 
previous research and hypothesized that the Dispositional Blame policy will increase 
stigma, increase negative emotions and decrease positive emotions, relative to the 
Situational Blame policy and No Blame policy. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1: Does the type of blame language contribute to greater intentions 
for eating healthier in the future and engaging in more physical activity, especially for 
those with a higher BMI? A Generalized Linear Model with a Logit link was estimated to 
predict intentions for eating healthy in the future (an 5-point ordinal response). The 
predictor variables included the Group (community members as the reference group), 
Type of Policy (dummy coded into two variables with No Blame Control policy as the 
reference group), BMI as a continuous variable (centered at 28), the interaction between 
Type of Policy x BMI, Current Eating Habits, the FCQ-Health (centered at 3), which 
measures participants’ beliefs that eating healthy is important. The Type of Policy x BMI 
interaction was not significant and was removed from the model.  
The model predicting intentions to eat healthy with the predictors was compared 
to the thresholds-only model and was significant χ2 (6) = 16.97, p <.01. Parameter 
estimates demonstrated that contrary to the hypothesis, the Dispositional Blame policy 
did not predict intent to eat healthy compared to the No Blame control condition; 
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however, Situational Blame resulted in reporting less intention to eat healthy compared to 
No Blame control condition. To examine whether there were significant differences 
between the Situational and Dispositional Blame conditions, a second regression was 
estimated with Dispositional Blame as the reference group. There was a marginal effect 
in which participants in the Dispositional Blame condition were more likely to report 
intentions to eat healthy than the Situational Blame condition (β = -0.53, SE = 0.30, p = 
.08). Sample Group and BMI did not predict intentions to eat healthy. Current eating 
habits did not predict intentions to eat healthy, but participants who endorsed higher 
levels of the importance of eating healthy measured with the FCQ-Health had higher 
intentions of eating healthy in the future. Table 28 displays the parameter estimates for 
the model in which the reference group was the No Blame control condition. 
A Generalized Linear Model with a Probit link was estimated to predict intentions 
for engaging in physical activity in the future. The predictor variables included the Group 
(community members as the reference group), Type of Policy (dummy coded with No 
Blame Control policy as the reference group), BMI as a continuous variable (centered at 
28), the interaction between Type of Policy x BMI, Current Physical Activity Habits, and 
the FCQ-Health (centered at 3). The Type of Policy x BMI interaction was not significant 
and was removed from the model.  
The model predicting intentions to engage in physical activity with the predictors 
was compared to the thresholds-only model and was significant χ2 (6) = 13.35, p <.05. 
Parameter estimates demonstrated that contrary to the hypothesis, none of the variables 
predicted intentions to engage in physical activity, although Current Physical Activity 
habit was marginally significant. The test of model effects, however, indicated that there 
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was a significant difference for Type of Policy. The model was re-estimated so that the 
Dispositional Blame Policy was the reference group. Relative to the Dispositional Blame 
policy, the Situational Blame policy resulted in less intention to engage in future physical 
activity B = −0.84, SE = 0.30, χ2 = 7.62, p <.01, but still no difference for the control 
condition. Table 28 displays the parameter estimates for the model with Dispositional 
Blame as the reference group.  
Hypothesis 2: Does the type of blame language contribute to greater food 
consumption, especially for those with a higher BMI? Is restrained eating and ego-
depletion related to amount of food consumed (hypothesis 4)? To estimate the effects on 
food consumption, a repeated measures general linear model (GLM) was estimated with 
Type of Policy, BMI (centered at 28), the Restrained Eating scale (centered at 12), the 
Ego-depletion score (centered at 338), and the ego-depletion order variable that predicted 
grams consumed for each of the six snack items. Contrary to hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 
4, none of these variables were significant predictors of food consumed; however, one 
pattern emerged for the Skittle-Fruit pair and the Wavy chip-Veggie chip pair, but 
another pattern emerged for Snickers-Kind Bar pair. Figure 8 displays the estimated 
marginal means (in grams) consumed for each of the six snack items. In general, 
participants consumed more of the healthy than the unhealthy snacks. According to the 
trends for the Skittle-Fruit and the Wavy chip-Veggie chip pairs in the Situational and 
Dispositional Blame conditions, food consumption for unhealthy snacks decreased in 
both blame conditions, but consumption of the healthy snacks increased in both blame 
conditions. Unhealthy and healthy snack consumption, however, had similar mean values 
to each other in the No Blame control condition. For the Snickers-Kind Bar pair, the 
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largest difference between healthy and unhealthy snack consumption was in the No 
Blame control group, for which unhealthy food consumption decreased compared to the 
healthy food consumption.  
To predict the probability that participants would take additional snacks upon 
leaving the study (coded as 1), a stepwise logistic regression was estimated in which Step 
1 included the sample and manipulated variables Group (community members as the 
reference group), Type of Policy (dummy coded with No Blame Control policy as the 
reference group), BMI as a continuous variable (centered at 28), and the interaction 
between Type of Policy x BMI. The model with the interaction term demonstrated a non-
significant Policy Type x BMI interaction; therefore the model was re-estimated without 
the interaction. The model predicting taking additional snacks, however, was not 
statistically significant χ2 (4) = 2.50, p= .65, R2 = .03. In Step 2 we included control 
variables predicted to be related to food consumption. We included the Restrained Eating 
scale, the measure of Ego-depletion, a Restrained Eating x Ego-depletion interaction 
term, and the Ego-depletion order variable. This model was still not statistically 
significant χ2 (3) = 1.34, p= .72, R2 = .05; thus I was unable to predict differences in 
people who took additional snacks and people who did not take additional snacks even 
though approximately half the sample took additional snacks.  
Hypothesis 3: Does the type of blame language inhibit choice for physical 
activity, especially for those with a higher BMI? Is restrained eating and ego-depletion 
related to physical activity choice (hypothesis 4)? To predict the probability that 
participants would choose to take the stairs (coded as 1), a stepwise logistic regression 
was estimated in which Step 1 included the sample and manipulated variables Group 
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(community members as the reference group), Type of Policy (dummy coded with No 
Blame Control policy as the reference group), BMI as a continuous variable (centered at 
28), the interaction between Type of Policy x BMI. The model with the interaction term 
demonstrated a non-significant Policy Type x BMI interaction; therefore the model was 
re-estimated without the interaction. The Odds Ratio of the intercept only model 
indicated that participants were 5.25 times more likely to choose the stairs over the 
elevator. A test of the full model versus the intercept only model was statistically 
significant, χ2 (4) = 25.88, p<.001, R2 = .29. The model was able to correctly classify 
50% of those who took the elevator and 94% of those who took the stairs, for an overall 
success rate of 87%. Table 29 shows the logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and 
odds ratio for each of the predictors.  
Step 1 results revealed that participants in the Dispositional Blame condition were 
more likely to take the stairs relative to the No Blame control condition. There was not a 
significant difference between the Situational Blame and No Blame control condition. 
We estimated the model again with Dispositional Blame as the reference group so that 
differences between Dispositional Blame and Situational Blame could be examined. 
Participants were more likely to take the stairs in the Dispositional Blame condition than 
the Situational Blame condition B = −2.98, SE = 1.36, Wald = 4.77, Exp(B) = .05, p <.05. 
Furthermore, as expected, students were more likely to take the stairs than community 
members; however, contrary to our predictions, BMI was only marginally predictive of 
physical activity choice. In Step 2 we included control variables predicted to be related to 
physical activity choice. We included the Restrained Eating scale, the measure of Ego-
depletion, a Restrained Eating x Ego-depletion interaction term, and the Ego-depletion 
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order variable. Contrary to hypothesis 4, the interaction between Restrained Eating and 
Ego-depletion was not significant so the model was re-estimated without the interaction 
term. Although the model was still significant χ2 (7) = 28.03, p < .001, R2 = .30, the 
variables from Step 2 were not incrementally statistically significant χ2 (3) = 1.15, p = 
0.76. Neither the individual difference Restrained Eating scale, nor the actual measure of 
Ego-depletion (or order for the ego-depletion task) predicted the probability of choosing 
the elevator or stairs. Participants in the Dispositional Blame condition were still more 
likely to take the stairs relative to the Situational Blame condition and the No Blame 
control condition, and students were still more likely to take the stairs compared to 
community members. 
A similar process was estimated for whether participants took the gym flyer at the 
end of the study. A Stepwise logistic regression was estimated predicting the probability 
that participants would take a gym flyer in which Step 1 included the sample and 
manipulated variables Group (community members as the reference group), Type of 
Policy (dummy coded with No Blame Control policy as the reference group), BMI as a 
continuous variable (centered at 28), and the interaction between Type of Policy x BMI. 
As before, the model with the interaction term demonstrated a non-significant Policy 
Type x BMI interaction; therefore the model was re-estimated without the interaction. 
The Odds Ratio of the intercept only model indicated that participants were 0.32 times 
less likely to take a gym flyer than not take a gym flyer. A test of the full model versus 
the intercept only model was statistically significant, χ2 (4) = 9.94, p<.05, R2 = .12. The 
model was able to correctly classify 100% of those who did not take a flyer and only 5% 
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of those who took the flyer, for an overall success rate of 77%. Table 30 shows the 
logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the predictors.  
Step 1 results revealed that participants in the Dispositional Blame condition were 
more likely to take a flyer relative to the No Blame control condition. Unlike the stairs or 
elevator choice dependent variable that demonstrated no effects, participants in the 
Situational Blame condition were more also likely to take a gym flyer than the No Blame 
control condition. When re-estimating the model, there were no differences between the 
Dispositional and Situational Blame conditions. In addition, students were more likely to 
take a gym flyer than community members; however, contrary to our predictions, BMI 
did not predict taking a gym flyer. In Step 2 we included control variables predicted to be 
related to physical activity choice. We included the Restrained Eating scale, the measure 
of Ego-depletion (and order variable), and a Restrained Eating x Ego-depletion 
interaction term. The interaction between Restrained Eating and Ego-depletion was not 
significant so the model was re-estimated without the interaction term. Although the 
model was still significant χ2 (7) = 14.76, p < .05, R2 = .17, the variables from Step 2 
were not incrementally statistically significant χ2 (3) = 4.82, p = 0.19. Neither the 
individual difference Restrained Eating scale, nor the actual measure of Ego-depletion 
predicted the probability of choosing the elevator or stairs. There was a marginal effect 
for the order of the Ego-depletion task such that participant who completed the task 
upstairs were more likely to take a flyer than people who completed the task downstairs. 
Participants in the Dispositional Blame condition were still more likely to take the stairs 
relative to the Situational Blame condition and the No Blame control condition, and 
students were still more likely to take the stairs. 
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Hypothesis 4: As an alternative hypothesis, if participants consumed fewer snacks 
in the dispositional blame condition, does restrained eating explain this effect? The 
results for this hypothesis were presented above with hypotheses 2 and 3. 
Hypothesis 5: Does the type of blame language increase perceived weight-based 
stigma, increase negative emotions, and decrease positive emotions, especially for those 
with a higher BMI? To predict internalization of weight-based stigma, a stepwise 
regression was estimated in which Step 1 included the sample and manipulated variables 
Group (community members as the reference group), Type of Policy (dummy coded with 
No Blame Control policy as the reference group), BMI as a continuous variable (centered 
at 28), and the interaction between Type of Policy x BMI. Again, the interaction terms 
were not significant so they were removed from the model and the model was re-
estimated. The model predicting Internalization of Weight-based Stigma was significant 
F(4, 73) = 4.28, p < .01, R2 = .19. Although the Type of Policy dummy variables were not 
significant predictors, higher BMI and being a student predicted higher internalization of 
weight-based stigma. In Step 2, variables hypothesized to be related to weight-based 
internalization of stigma were included: Body Shame, Stress, Depression, and Anxiety. 
The model was statistically significant F(8, 69) = 14.31, p < .001, R2 = .62 and accounted 
for significantly more of the variance (Δ F(4, 69) = 19.91, p < .001, R2 Δ = .34). Table 31 
displays the model parameters for both regressions. 
With respect to Negative Emotions, a similar stepwise regression was estimated 
with the same variables that were included in the Weight-based Stigma model. The 
significance tests for predicting Negative emotions did not change regardless of inclusion 
of the interaction between Type of Policy and BMI was included or not. Neither step 1 
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F(4, 73) = 0.15, p = .96, R2 = .01, nor step 2 resulted in significant models F(8, 69) = 
1.50, p = .17, R2 = .15.  
With respect to Positive Emotions, a similar stepwise regression was estimated 
with the same variables that were included in the Weight-based Stigma model. The 
interaction terms were not significant so they were removed from the model and the 
model was re-estimated. The model predicting Positive Emotions was significant F(4, 73) 
= 5.71, p < .001, R2 = .24. Step 1 results revealed that contrary to hypotheses, there were 
no differences between Dispositional Blame and No Blame control; however, participants 
in the Situational Blame condition reported greater positive emotions than the No Blame 
control condition. When the model was re-estimated with Dispositional Blame as the 
reference group, there were no differences. In addition, community members reported 
greater Positive Emotions than students, but BMI did not predict Positive Emotions. Step 
2 was also statistically significant F(8, 69) = 3.79, p < .001, R2 = .62, but did not account 
for significantly more of the variance (Δ F(4, 69) = 19.91, p = .17, R2 Δ = .07 than the 
model in Step 1. The Situational Blame relative to the No Blame control variable and the 
Group variable remained significant in Step 2. Table 32 displays the model parameters 
for both regressions.  
Discussion Study 3 
 The primary purpose of study 3 was to examine what effects, if any, blame-based 
policies aimed at reducing obesity have on health behaviors. We know from previous 
research that some health messages are perceived as more motivating, whereas others are 
perceived as more stigmatizing (Puhl et al., 2012) and that participants reported less 
intentions to engage in healthy behaviors following exposure to negative stereotypes 
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(Seacat & Mickelson, 2009). The current research extends this work by measuring the 
effects of blame language, which varied by blame attribution type, on food consumption, 
physical activity, and mental health outcomes.  
With respect to the manipulated policy, our hypotheses were partially supported. 
In consideration of the findings from Seacat and Mickelson (2009), our first hypothesis 
was that intentions to eat healthy and engage in physical activity would decrease when 
participants were in the dispositional blame condition. Contrary to the hypothesis, there 
were no differences for intentions for eating healthy or physical activity for the 
dispositional blame policy compared to the no blame control policy. Although we did not 
have specific hypotheses for the situational blame condition, the results indicated that 
participants reported less likelihood to eat healthy in the situational blame condition 
compared to the no blame control condition, but there were no differences for physical 
activity. When comparing the situational blame to dispositional blame, however, the 
dispositional blame policy resulted in greater intentions for physical activity and eating 
healthy (although the effect was marginal for healthy eating) than the situational blame 
policy. These results would suggest the policy that blamed people who are obese for the 
obesity epidemic was more motivating than the policy that blamed environmental factors, 
but not more motivating than the control no blame policy. These findings are 
contradictory to Seacat and Mickelson’s (2009) findings that stereotype threat—which 
also emphasized that individual characteristics caused obesity in a written format—
inhibited motivations for healthy behavior. Although our measure included a single item 
each for physical activity and healthy eating, Seacat and Mickelson (2009) included 11 
items that were averaged together into a single scale that included both physical activity 
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and maintaining a healthy diet items. Perhaps their items were better able to assess 
specific intentions (e.g., “How likely is it that you will exercise even when you feel you 
have very little time?”), which are known to be more predictive (Sheeran, 2002). For 
instance, research employing intention-behavior research, such as the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (e.g., Ajzen et al., 1991) finds that even though only 20 to 30% of behavior is 
explained by intentions (Sheeran & Orbell, 1998), intentions that are single action, rather 
than a goal (an outcome achieved through a variety of single actions) are more likely to 
become actual behaviors (Sheeran, 2002). As such, participants under stereotype threat in 
the Seacat and Mickelson (2009) may have had difficulty endorsing specific actions, 
whereas participants in the dispositional blame condition in the current study found it 
easier to endorse our items that measured general goals for healthy behavior.  When 
examining the effects of manipulated variables on intentions for health behavior, 
therefore, future research should employ both measures of single actions and more 
general goals. Furthermore, employing measures that incorporate a variety of health 
behaviors may be more inclusive—especially for samples with varying weights, 
nutritional beliefs, and physical abilities. 
Our next hypotheses aimed to measure whether the blame policies affected actual 
physical activity and eating healthy behavior, as opposed to intentions, because there is 
well-documented research that has indicated that intentions do not necessarily predict 
behavior (Sheeran & Orbell, 1998). Again, with the stereotype literature in mind, we 
hypothesized that the dispositional blame condition would contribute to an increase in 
food consumption during the taste testing study—especially for unhealthy foods—and 
taking additional snacks upon leaving the study. Our hypotheses would support results 
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that either found participants consumed more grams total (healthy + unhealthy snack 
total) or that they consumed more grams of unhealthy food (Major et al., 2014). Overall, 
there was no support for the eating dependent measures and results for food consumption 
were trending in the opposite direction. Trends for the skittle-fruit and wavy chip-veggie 
chip pairs found that the blame conditions elicited more consumption of healthy foods 
compared to unhealthy snacks, and that the control condition demonstrated similar grams 
consumed for unhealthy and healthier snacks. The model predicting who took additional 
snacks was not significant and could not be further interpreted, even though about half of 
the participants took additional snacks and half did not. These findings do beg the 
question of what is driving these effects, especially because I included several variables 
thought to be relevant to food consumption (BMI, restrained eating, whether the person 
was a student, and ego-depletion).  
We also predicted that participants would decrease physical activity by taking the 
elevator instead of the stairs and not take a gym flyer upon leaving the study. Although 
neither hypothesis was supported, there were significant differences for both of the 
physical activity dependent measures in the opposite direction. Contrary to hypotheses, 
participants in the dispositional blame condition were more likely to take the stairs and 
take a gym flyer relative to the no blame control condition. And for the gym flyer only, 
those in the Situational Blame condition took a gym flyer more than the control 
condition. Participants were also more likely to take the stairs in the dispositional blame 
condition than the situational blame condition, but there were no differences between 
dispositional and situational blame conditions. Similar to the intentions variables, 
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participants who read about people who are obese being blamed for the obesity epidemic 
were more likely to engage in physical activity—at least in the short term.  
An alternative explanation to Stereotype Threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995) was 
provided by Objectification Theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), which posits that 
body shame contributes to restrained eating and subsequent depletion of attention 
resources. This in turn may contribute to an increase in unhealthy behaviors once the 
period of restraint is over—the idea behind binge eating. Although we measured 
restrained eating as an individual difference variable and participants completed a 
measure of ego-depletion as a possible explanation for effects in the opposite direction to 
the stereotype threat hypotheses (i.e., participants were refraining from unhealthy 
behaviors because they were being observed), measures of restrained eating were not 
related to any of the manipulated variables or dependent measures.  
It may be that instead of producing body shame (Objectification Theory) or 
inducing the anxious feelings that one will confirm a stereotype (Stereotype Threat 
Theory), the current study induced something else. Although our hypotheses and research 
design were guided by weight-based stigma literature because no known studies have 
examined the effects of blame and being blamed has theoretically been linked to 
increasing stigma, the effects of blame may elicit different interpersonal reactions. Blame 
involves identifying behaviors that are morally or socially reproachful, and once causality 
and responsibility are determined, a person is blamed more (and punished more) if they 
do not offer mitigating information such as a justification, excuse, lack of intention 
(Shaver, 1985). It is within possibility that, as a counter-measure to combat being 
blamed, participants offered visible behavior as mitigating information. We know that 
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people are motivated to avoid blame in criminal settings (Gray & Wegner, 2011). It may 
be the case the people in a non-criminal setting are also motivated to avoid being blamed 
to minimize “social” punishment. Future research should measure the extent to which 
participants may be feeling blamed and whether they are motivated to reduce blame by 
providing a justification, an excuse, or demonstrating lack of intention. Perhaps randomly 
assigning participants to receive mitigating versus aggravating information could test this 
assertion. 
Although we did not specifically measure self-blame, participants may also have 
been motivated to reduce self-blame. Self-blame is the degree to which people attribute 
blame to their own behavior, which is thought to contribute to a sense of control because 
of causal attributions. Research on self-blaming, however, has been mixed, resulting in 
disagreement whether feeling in control positively affects or negatively affects the person 
experiencing self-blame (e.g., Affleck, et al., 1985; Frazier, Berman, & Steward, 2001). 
Differences in effects have been posited to be due to differences in characterological and 
behavioral self-blame (Hall, French, & Marteau, 2003). Characterological self-blame 
results when negative outcomes are attributed to one’s own character, which is 
immutable. Behavioral self-blame, on the contrary, results when negative outcomes are 
attributed to one’s own behavior, since actions and inactions are mutable (Janoff-Bulman, 
1979). Having this sense of control, however, could contribute to one of two things: 1) 
feeling in control over one’s own behavior may result in positive feelings because there is 
an ability to change, or 2) having that control over one’s own behavior may result in 
negative feelings that one did not behave differently. According to Niedenthal and 
colleagues (1994), behavioral and characterological self-blame result in different 
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emotional appraisals such that guilt follows thoughts of “I should have behaved 
differently” (behavioral) and shame follows thoughts of “I should be different” 
(characterological). In applying these principles to the results, participants may also have 
been motivated to avoid the feelings of guilt associated with behavior self-blame. 
Participants who read the dispositional blame policy may have been aware that choosing 
the stairs and taking the gym flyer would be one way to change their behavior and avoid 
guilt. Future research should include measures of self-blame as a possible mediator for 
being blamed and behavior. 
Despite not finding any significant differences for the policy manipulation on 
internalization of weight-based stigma or negative emotions, these findings may continue 
to support the notion just discussed that experiencing blame is not the same as 
experiencing stigma. There was a surprising effect for positive emotions; participants in 
the Situational Blame condition reported greater positive emotions than the No Blame 
control condition. In following the discussion about the effects of blame and self-blame, 
it is possible that reading about environmental factors being to blame for the obesity 
epidemic resulted in a shift of blame externally and thus contributed to more positive 
emotions.  
Central to the study was the hypothesis that people with higher BMI would have 
stronger effects than people with lower BMI. Contrary to this expectation, when 
controlling for BMI in all of our models, BMI did not interact with any other independent 
variables and was not related to any of our modeled dependent variables (except for 
internalization of weight based stigma and body shame). Although we sought to include 
participants of varying weights and BMI, our average BMI for the obese group was about 
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37 (the cut-off for “obese” is 30) and most of the participants would not be considered 
“morbidly” obese. One explanation could be that we did not capture a true sample of 
participants who might be affected by policies that blame them. One limitation of the 
study is that we recruited for the study by advertising it as a taste testing study and for the 
first half of the study, we specifically included “Do you like free food?” on the flyer and 
newspaper advertisements because we thought it would attract people who like to eat. It 
came to our attention that people who are obese—especially those who may be self-
conscious about their weight and worried about confirming stereotypes—may not 
respond to an advertisement for free food or even just doing a taste testing study. Future 
research could focus on recruiting participants who are restrained eaters or create a 
recruitment situation where participants feel less vulnerable about confirming weight-
based stereotypes. 
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Table 25. Sample characteristics for Study 3  
 Community Members Students 
Sample size n = 41 
 
n = 45 
Mean age (SD) 
 
33.37 (12.35), range 19-60 19.93 (1.93), range 18-27 
Gender 
 
54% female, 56% male 71% female, 29% male 
Race 
 
 
7.3% Asian, 2.4% Black, 
9.8% Hispanic/Latino, 2.4% 
Native American, 76% 
White, 2.4% Other 
0% Asian, 9% Black, 2.2% 
Hispanic/Latino, 2.2% 
Native American, 91% 
White, 2.2% Other 
Mean BMI (SD) 
 
28.63 (7.63) 27.55 (7.10) 
Mean % Body Fat (SD) 
 
26.54 (11.43) 26.20 (8.93) 
Weight group based on 
BMI 
Average (n = 16) 
Overweight or Obese (n = 
25) 
 
Average (n = 25) 
Overweight or Obese (n = 
20) 
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Table 26. Pre-study control measures by sample  
  Community 
Members 
Students 
 Range of 
possible values 
M (SD) M (SD) 
Clinical measures    
     DASS-21 Stress 0 – 42 10.55 (7.47) 14.28 (9.79) 
     DASS-21 Depression 0 – 42 4.60 (6.06) 7.86 (9.33) 
     DASS-21 Anxiety 0 – 42 3.35 (4.35)* 6.23 (8.01)* 
Food preferences    
    FCQ – Health 0 – 6 3.67 (0.39) 3.55 (0.45) 
    FCQ – Mood 0 – 6 3.22 (0.59) 3.26 (0.60) 
    FCQ – Convenience 0 – 5 3.69 (0.39)* 3.46 (0.56) 
    FCQ – Sensory 0 – 4 3.72 (0.40) 3.74 (0.32) 
    FCQ – Natural content 0 – 3 3.35 (0.69) 3.13 (0.65) 
    FCQ – Price 0 – 3 3.79 (0.33) 3.74 (0.42) 
    FCQ – Weight 0 – 3 3.40 (0.65) 3.35 (0.47) 
    FCQ – Familiarity 0 – 3 3.42 (0.56)* 3.16 (0.55)* 
    FCQ – Ethical 0 – 3 3.00 (0.65)* 2.57 (0.59)* 
Concerns with body image 
(BSQ) 
0 – 5 1.36 (1.24)* 2.12 (1.44)* 
Tendency to diet (RRS) 0 – 40 12.41 (5.06) 14.05 (5.90) 
Note. * p < .05 
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Table 27. Snack items taste testing ratings 
 Snickers Kind Bar Skittles Dried fruit Wavy 
Chips 
Veggie 
Chips 
 M (SD) 
 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Healthiness 0.22 (0.42) 2.16 (0.62) 0.04 (0.20) 2.39 (0.76) 0.16 (0.41) 1.77 (0.73) 
           t-test t (83) = -22.94** t (84) = -26.40** t (84) = -17.89** 
Tastiness 2.44 (0.72) 2.14 
(0.81) 
2.22 (0.82) 1.58 (0.88) 2.07 (0.86) 1.89 (0.79) 
           t-test t (83) = 2.40* t (84) = 5.00** t (84) = 1.55 
Saltiness 0.74 (0.66) 0.58 
(0.54) 
0.04 (0.24) 0.07 (0.26) 2.29 (0.72) 1.22 (0.61) 
           t-test t (83) = 1.85 t (84) = -1.14 t (84) = 12.60** 
Sweetness 2.48 (0.63) 1.35 
(0.72) 
2.69 (0.62) 1.68 (0.79) 0.12 (0.36) 0.02 (0.15) 
           t-test t (83) = 12.24** t (84) = 10.95** t (84) = 2.37* 
How filling 1.18 (0.75) 1.76 
(0.69) 
0.51 (0.59) 1.34 (0.68) 0.96 (0.59) 1.22 (0.68) 
           t-test t (83) = -5.98** t (84) = -8.99** t (84) = -2.97* 
Cost 
effectiveness 
1.46 (0.81) 1.43 
(0.70) 
1.41 (0.88) 1.19 (0.66) 1.45 (0.85) 1.53 (0.70) 
           t-test t (83) = 0.29 t (84) = 1.92 t (84) = -0.78 
Likelihood 
of purchase 
1.57 (0.97) 2.02 
(0.96) 
1.18 (1.01) 1.32 (1.05) 1.25 (0.96) 1.75 (0.99) 
           t-test t (83) = -3.04* t (84) = -0.82 t (84) = -4.05** 
Note. ** p<.01, * p<.05 
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Table 28. Generalized linear model predicting intentions to eat healthy and intentions for 
physical activity from policy type, BMI, importance of healthy eating and current habits 
Predictor B SE Wald χ2 p 
Intentions to Eat Healthy     
    Group  −0.08 0.25 0.10 0.75 
    Dispositional blame −0.40 0.30 1.78 0.18 
    Situational blame −0.92 0.32 8.43 <.01 
    No blame control 0       
    BMI 0.01 0.02 0.45 0.50 
    Importance of health 0.87 0.33 7.07 <.01 
    Current eating habits 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.62 
     
Intentions for Physical Activity     
    Group −0.02 0.24 0.01 0.94 
    No blame control −0.39 0.30 1.71 0.19 
    Situational blame −0.84 0.30 7.62 <.01 
    Dispositional blame 0.00    
    BMI 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.85 
    Importance of health 0.49 0.30 2.77 0.10 
    Current physical activity 0.21 0.12 3.18 0.07 
Note. For Group variable, community member was coded as 1. For intentions to eat 
healthy, the No Blame Control group was the reference group. For intentions for physical 
activity, the Dispositional Blame group was the reference group 
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Table 29. Logistic regression predicting choosing the stairs from policy type, BMI, 
restrained eating and ego-depletion 
Predictor Β SE Wald χ2 p Exp (B) 
Step 1      
    Group 3.61 1.19 9.17 <.01 36.96 
    No blame control   6.02 <.05  
    Dispositional blame 2.79 1.29 4.68 <.05 16.24 
    Situational blame −0.26 0.89 0.09 0.77 0.77 
    BMI −0.10 0.06 3.14 0.08 0.90 
Step 2      
    Group 3.86 1.31 8.69 <.01 47.58 
    No blame control   6.19 <.05  
    Dispositional blame 2.92 1.33 4.84 <.05 18.58 
    Situational blame -0.23 0.91 0.07 0.80 0.79 
    BMI -0.10 0.06 2.41 0.12 0.91 
    Restrained eating 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.91 1.00 
    Ego-depletion -0.05 0.09 0.30 0.58 0.95 
    Order  0.67 0.87 0.58 0.45 1.95 
Note. Choosing the stairs coded as 1. Community member coded as 1. Downstairs coded 
as 1 
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Table 30. Logistic regression predicting taking a gym flyer from policy type, BMI, 
restrained eating and ego-depletion 
Predictor Β SE Wald χ2 p Exp (B) 
Step 1      
    Group 1.22 0.61 4.06 0.04 3.39 
    No blame control   4.48 0.11  
    Dispositional blame 1.69 0.87 3.82 0.05 5.44 
    Situational blame 1.77 0.88 4.03 0.05 5.89 
    BMI −0.03 0.04 0.41 0.52 0.97 
Step 2      
    Group 1.14 0.64 3.19 0.07 3.13 
    No blame control   4.72 0.09  
    Dispositional blame 1.81 0.90 4.03 0.04 6.08 
    Situational blame 1.96 0.95 4.23 0.04 7.10 
    BMI −0.04 0.05 0.59 0.44 0.96 
    Restrained eating 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.57 1.00 
    Ego-depletion 0.05 0.06 0.70 0.40 1.05 
    Order  −1.29 0.67 3.64 0.06 0.28 
Note. Choosing the stairs coded as 1. Community member coded as 1. Downstairs coded 
as 1 
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Table 31. Regression predicting internalization of weight-based stigma from policy type, 
BMI, body shame, and clinical measures 
Predictor B SE Beta t p 
Step 1      
    Group −0.46 0.20 −0.25 −2.32 <.05 
    Dispositional blame 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.79 0.43 
    Situational blame 0.04 0.25 0.02 0.15 0.88 
    BMI 0.05 0.01 0.37 3.53 <.01 
Step 2      
    Group −0.04 0.15 −0.02 −0.29 0.77 
    Dispositional blame 0.21 0.17 0.11 1.21 0.23 
    Situational blame 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.38 0.70 
    BMI 0.03 0.01 0.24 3.07 <.01 
    BSQ 0.45 0.06 0.68 7.10 <.01 
    Stress 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.95 
    Depression 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.39 0.70 
    Anxiety 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.96 
Note. Community member coded as 1.  
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Table 32. Regression predicting positive emotions from policy type, BMI, body shame, 
and clinical measures 
Predictor B SE Beta t p 
Step 1      
    Group 5.32 1.53 0.36 3.47 <.01 
    Dispositional blame 0.84 1.87 0.05 0.45 0.65 
    Situational blame 5.65 1.90 0.36 2.98 <.01 
    BMI 0.12 0.10 0.12 1.12 0.26 
Step 2      
    Group 4.12 1.60 0.28 2.57 <.05 
    Dispositional blame 0.68 1.85 0.04 0.37 0.71 
    Situational blame 5.10 1.90 0.32 2.69 <.01 
    BMI 0.17 0.11 0.17 1.57 0.12 
    BSQ −0.79 0.69 −0.15 −1.15 0.26 
    Stress 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.32 0.75 
    Depression −0.21 0.13 −0.23 −1.62 0.11 
    Anxiety 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.87 
Note. Community member coded as 1.  
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Figure 8. Estimated means for grams consumed for each of the snack item pairs.  
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CHAPTER 5  
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The rise in obesity—for all age groups—has become a central concern in the 
United States and law-makers are challenged with whether using law as a tool is an 
effective means for addressing obesity. Leading scholars in the area of public health law 
(e.g., Brownell et al., 2010; Gostin, 2010), have proposed several areas where law may be 
used as a tool for preventing obesity (e.g., requiring the food industry to disclose more 
information, prohibiting certain foods or ingredients or taxing unhealthy foods). Despite 
these urges for more law and policy, support for government interventions such as these 
is divided because even though research has found that the public believes individuals are 
to blame for the rise in obesity, research has also found greater support for environment-
based (non-personal responsibility) policies. This who-we-blame-but-what-we-support 
paradox may in part be because American culture rest on ideals of self-determination—
health-related behaviors are considered highly personal and Americans are not likely to 
support policies that regulate behavior. This paradox may also be related, in part, to the 
role of blame in obesity-targeted law and policy. The current research addressed these 
issues in three studies conducted to understand blame and its related constructs, blame as 
a predictor for supporting law and policy, and the effects of blame-based policies on 
health behavior.  
Before addressing the role of blame, the first aim was to develop a scale to 
measure obesity blame attributions toward both people who are obese and toward 
environmental factors such as the food industry and the government. Blame theorists 
have noted the complexity of blame, thus the scale was developed with this in mind. As 
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such, confirmatory factor analysis of the Obesity Blame Attribution Scale (OBAS) 
demonstrated that controllability, responsibility and dispositional blame are separate 
constructs that are part of a higher-order blame factor in congruence with blame theorists. 
Although the OBAS was not related to many of the hypothesized scales that measured 
negative attitudes toward people who are obese, it was predictive of both specific blame 
attributions and support for the anti-obesity policy in Study 2. Despite specific and 
general blame attributions predicting support for the policies, more participants supported 
the situational-blame policy (environmental factors) than the dispositional-blame policy 
(individual factors). The current research, therefore, supports previous findings of the 
paradox between who is blamed and what should be done about it. Although Goffman’s 
Framing Theory (1974) states that how social problems are framed will direct the 
response to the problem, which may not apply within an obesity context. It may be the 
case that even though people who are obese are blamed for their own obesity, Americans 
are not willing to endorse law and policy that blame people who are obese or that dictates 
how individuals should behave.  
In addition to understanding public support for using law as a tool for addressing 
obesity, knowing whether law is an effective tool is good practice for effective law-
making. Our findings revealed that, contrary to stigma research, the dispositional blame 
policy had some short-term effects on our proxy measures of physical activity, but did 
not increase stigma or negative affect. Although the results of the third study do not 
explain what underlying mechanisms are responsible for these effects, one explanation 
discussed was participants’ desire to visibly mitigate the dispositional blame as a means 
of demonstrating “I am not part of the problem.”  If the underlying mechanism is a desire 
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to mitigate blame, then perhaps policies could be reframed from personal responsibility 
(often carries a negative connotation) to self-efficacy (often carries a more positive 
connotation) as a mean for mitigating any self-blame experienced (see generally Pearl & 
Lebowitz, 2014). Self-efficacy theory asserts that behavior change is best achieved 
through expected self-mastery (Sherer et al., 1982) because having the belief that one can 
regulate their own behavior plays a large role in changing unhealthy behaviors (Bandura, 
1990). To achieve this, Bandura explains, people need information, guidance on how to 
regulate behavior, and a firm belief in personal efficacy. As such, adopting health 
practices “requires a shift in emphasis from trying to scare people into healthy behavior 
to empowering them with the tools for exercising personal control over their health 
habits” (p.11). As a viable direction for law and policy, therefore, ideals of personal 
responsibility would not have to be shifted, just reframed more positively as self-efficacy. 
Promoting self-efficacy, however, may be a challenge because of widely held 
negative beliefs about people who are obese, shared both by people who are obese and by 
people who are not obese. As demonstrated in Study 2 and prior research, people who are 
obese are perceived negatively (i.e., lazy and unmotivated) and as blameworthy for their 
weight. Attitudes would, therefore, need to be shifted at both at the individual level and 
the societal level. Although the current studies did not examine whether policies shape 
attitudes toward people who are obese, future research may examine whether health 
messages and policies about obesity can shift negative attitudes to positive self-efficacy 
attitudes. For instance, in Lincoln, Nebraska, the Partnership for Healthy Lincoln has 
attempted to improve health behaviors with a variety of messages. In some, the emphasis 
is on the negative consequences of unhealthy behaviors (“Drop the Pop, Soda Makes you 
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Fat”), whereas others focus on the positive consequences of health behaviors (“Drink 
Better, Feel Better. Pure and Simple”). Copies of the billboards are presented in 
Appendix V. Perhaps attitudes toward people who are obese could be shifted toward self-
efficacy with the more positive health behavior messages.  
From a policy perspective, public health scholars emphasize the importance of 
relying on policies that incorporate both environmental and personal responsibility 
factors (Brownell et al., 2010). Future research should examine support and effectiveness 
of policies that include targeting both individual and environmental factors for obesity. 
Perhaps policies that focus on both will garner more public support because of the noted 
paradox between who we blame, versus what policies are supported. The policies may 
also be more likely to achieve their intended consequences because people who are obese 
may feel a sense of self-efficacy with policies that hold them responsible, but reduce 
feelings of self-blame when environmental factors are also considered.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
200 
 
References 
Affleck, G., Allen, D. A., Tennen, H., McGrade, B. J., & Ratzan, S. (1985). Causal and  
 control cognitions in parent coping with chronically ill child. Journal of Social  
 and Clinical Psychology, 3, 369-379. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human  
 decision processes, 50, 179-211. doi:10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T 
Alicke, M. D., Davis, T. L., & Pezzo, M. V. (1994). A posteriori adjustment of a priori  
 decision criteria. Social Cognition, 12(4), 281-308. doi:  
 10.1521/soco.1994.12.4.281 
Alicke, M. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological  
 Bulletin, 126(4), 556-574. doi: 10.1037//0033-2909.126.4.556 
Alicke, M., & Zell, E. (2009). Social attractiveness and blame. Journal of Applied Social  
Psychology,39(9), 2089-2105.  
Allison, P. (2012). When can you safely ignore multicollinearity. Statistical Horizons, 5. 
Allison, D. B., Basile, V. C., & Yuker, H. E. (1991). The measurement of attitudes  
 toward and beliefs about obese persons. International Journal of Eating  
 Disorders, 10, 599-607. 
Anderson, N. (2008). Would you like some First Amendment rights with that? How  
 mandatory nutritional disclosure on restaurant menus violates the freedom of  
 commercial speech. Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 36, 105-130.  
Antony, M. M., Bieling, P. J., Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Swinson, R. P. (1998).  
 Psychometric properties of the 42-item and 21-item versions of the depression  
 anxiety stress scales in clinical groups and a community sample. Psychological  
201 
 
 Assessment, 10, 176-181. 
Bannon, K. L., Hunter-Reel, D., Wilson, G. T., & Karlin, R. A. (2009). The effects of  
 causal beliefs and binge eating on the stigmatization of obesity. International  
 Journal of Eating Disorders, 42, 118-124. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). Automatic and conscious processing of social information. In R. S.  
 Wyer &   T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 1-43).  
 Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence. 
Baron, J. (1998). Judgment misguided: Intuition and error in public decision making. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Barry, C. L., Brescoll, V. L., Brownell, K. D., & Schlesinger, M. (2009). Obesity  
 metaphors: How beliefs about the causes of obesity affect support for public  
 policy. The Milbank Quarterly, 87, 7-47. 
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal 
approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115(2), 243-267. doi:0033-2909/94 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: is 
the active self a limited resource?. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 74, 1252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252 
Begley, S. (2012, May 8). Obesity fight must shift from personal blame-U.S. panel. 
Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/us-usa-health-obesity- 
 idUSBRE8470LC20120508 
Benforado, A., & Hanson, J. (2008). The great attributional divide: How divergent views  
 of human behavior are shaping legal policy. Emory Law Journal, 57(2), 314-402. 
Benforado, A., Hanson, J., & Yosifon, D. (2004). Broken scales: Obesity and justice in  
202 
 
 America. Emory Law Journal, 53, 1645-1806. 
Benjamin, E. (2006). Public health approaches to obesity: Litigation, legislation, and  
 lessons learned. Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health Law, 1,  
 127-149.  
Bleich, S. (2014, November 24). Want a calorie count with that? FDA issues new rules  
 for restaurants. As cited in NPR The Salt: What’s on Your Plate? Retrieved from   
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/11/24/366405949/want-a-calorie-count- 
with-that-fda-issues-new-rules-for-restaurants 
Bleich, S. N., Wolfson, J. A., & Jarlenski, M. P. (2015). Calorie Changes in Chain  
 Restaurant Menu Items: Implications for Obesity and Evaluations of Menu  
 Labeling. American Journal of preventive medicine, 48, 70-75. 
Blumenthal, J. A. (2005). Does mood influence moral judgment-An empirical test with  
 legal and policy implications. Law & Psychology Review, 29, 1-29. 
Boero, N. (2007). All the news that’s fat to print: The American “obesity epidemic” and  
 the media. Qualitative Sociology, 30, 41–60. doi: 10.1007/s11133-006-9010-4 
Brank, E. M., Hays, S. A., & Weisz, V. (2006). All Parents Are to Blame (Except This  
 One): Global Versus Specific Attitudes Related to Parental Responsibility  
 Laws. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 2670-2684. 
Brank, E. M. & Wylie, L. E. (2010, April). Eat Some Steamed Broccoli if You Want a  
 Toy. Judicial Notebook, APA Monitor Magazine. 
Brownell, K. D., Farley, T., Willett, W. C., Popkin, B. M., Chaloupka, F. J., Thompson, 
J. W., & Ludwig, D. S. (2009). The public health and economic benefits of taxing 
sugar-sweetened beverages. Health Policy Report of the New England Journal of  
203 
 
 Medicine, 361, 1599–1605. doi:10.1056/NEJMhpr0905723  
Brownell, K. D., & Frieden, T. R. (2009). Ounces of prevention—The public policy case 
for taxes on sugary beverages. The New England Journal of Medicine, 360(18), 
1804 – 1808.  
Brownell, K. D., Kersh, R., Ludwig, D. S., Post, R. C. Puhl, R. M., Scwartz, M. B., 
Willett, W. C. (2010). Personal responsibility and obesity: A constructive 
approach to a controversial issue. Health Affairs, 29, 379-387. doi: 
10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0739 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. (2011). Amazon’s mechanical turk: A new 
source of inexpensive, yet high quality data? Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 6, 3-5. doi: 10.1177/1745691610393980 
Burger, J. M. (1981). Motivational biases in the attribution of responsibility for an 
accident: A meta-analysis of the defensive-attribution hypothesis. Psychological 
Bulletin, 90(3), 496-512. 
Burnett, D. (2007). Fast-food lawsuits and the cheeseburger bill: Critiquing congress’s  
 response to the obesity epidemic. Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law,  
 14, 357. 
Byrd, S. (2005). Civil rights and the “Twinkie” tax: The 900-pound gorilla in the war on  
 obesity. Louisiana Law Review, 65, 303-384. 
Byrne, B. M. (2001). Structural equation modeling with AMOS, EQS, and LISREL:  
 Comparative approaches to testing for the factorial validity of a measuring  
 instrument. International Journal of Testing, 1, 55-86. 
Callahan, D. (2013). Obesity: Chasing an elusive epidemic. Hastings Center Report, 43,  
204 
 
 34-40. 
Cawley, J., & Liu, F. (2008). Correlates of state legislative action to prevent childhood  
 obesity. Obesity, 16, 162-167. doi:10.1038/oby.2007.3 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2015a, May 17). Obesity Prevalence Map. 
Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/prevalence-maps.html 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2015b, May 17). Body Mass Index. 
Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/  
Center for Science in the Public Interest (2007, June 14). Kellogg makes historic  
 settlement agreement, adopting nutrition standards for marketing foods to  
 children. Retrieved from http://www.cspinet.org/new/200706141.html 
Center for Science in Public Interest (2010, December 15). Class action lawsuit targets  
 McDonald’s use of toys to market to children. Retrieved from  
 http://www.cspinet.org/new/201012151.html 
Chapple, A., Ziebland, S., & McPherson, A. (2004). Stigma, shame, and blame experienced by  
 patients with lung cancer: qualitative study. British Medical Journal, 328. 
 doi: 10.1136/bmj.38111.639734.7C 
Connors, J., & Heaven, P. C. (1990). Belief in a just world and attitudes toward AIDS  
 sufferers. The Journal of Social Psychology, 130, 559-560. 
Cooper, P. J., Taylor, M. J., Cooper, Z., & Fairburn, C. G. (1987). The development and 
validation of the Body Shape Questionnaire. International Journal of Eating 
Disorders 6, 485-494.  doi:10.1002/1098-108X(198707)6:4<485::AID-
EAT2260060405>3.0.CO;2-O 
Cottrell, C. A. & Neuberg, S. L. (2005). Different emotional reactions to different groups:  
 A sociofunctional threat-based approach to “prejudice.” Journal of Personality  
205 
 
 and Social Psychology, 88, 770-789. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.88.5.770 
Cramer, R. J., Chandler, J. F., & Wakeman, E. E. (2010). Blame attribution as a  
 moderator of perceptions of sexual orientation-based hate crimes. Journal of  
 Interpersonal Violence, 25, 848-862. doi: 10.1177/0886260509336962 
Crandall, C. S. (1994). Prejudice against fat people: Ideology and self-interest. Journal of  
 Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 882-894. doi:10.1037//00223514.66.5.882 
Crandall, C.S., & Martinez, R. (1996). Culture, ideology, and antifat attitudes.  
 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(11), 1165-1176. doi:  
 10.1177/01461672962211007  
Creighton, R. (2010). Fat taxes: The newest manifestation of the age-old excise tax.  
 Journal of Legal Medicine, 31, 123-136. doi: 10.1080/01947641003598310 
Crocker, J., Cornwell, B., & Major, B. (1993). The stigma of overweight: affective  
 consequences of attributional ambiguity. Journal of Personality and Social  
 Psychology, 64, 60. 
Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and competence as universal  
 dimensions of social perception: The stereotype content model and the BIAS  
 map. Advances in experimental social psychology, 40, 61-149. 
Dalbert, C. (2001). The justice motive as a personal resource: Dealing with challenges  
 and critical life events. New York: Plenum. 
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New 
York, NY: Putnam. 
DeJong, W. (1980). The stigma of obsesity: The consequences of naïve assumptions  
 concerning the causes of physical deviance. Journal of Health and Social  
206 
 
 Behavior, 21, 75-87. 
Dowson, J., & Henderson, L. (2001). The validity of a short version of the Body Shape 
Questionnaire. Psychiatry Research, 102, 263–271. 
Durso, L. E., & Latner, J. D. (2008). Understanding self-directed stigma: Development of  
 the weight bias internalization scale. Obesity Journal, 16. 
Farrow, C. V., & Tarrant, M. (2009). Weight-based discrimination, body dissatisfaction  
 and emotional eating: The role of perceived social consensus. Psychology and  
 Health, 24(9), 1021-1034. doi: 10.1080/08870440802311348 
Feigenson, N., Park, J. (2006). Emotions and attributions of legal responsibility and 
blame: A research review. Law and Human Behavior, 30, 143-161. 
doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9026z.  
Finkelstein, E. A., Trogdon, J. G., Cohen J. W., & Dietz, W. (2009). Annual medical  
 spending attributable to obesity: Payer-and service-specific estimates. Health  
 Affairs (Project Hope), 28, 822-831. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.28.5.w822 
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed)  
 stereotype content: competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived  
 status and competition. Journal of personality and social psychology, 82, 878. 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Attribution processes. Social cognition: From brains  
 to culture, (1st ed. pp. 134-163). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Frazier, P., Berman, M., & Steward, J. (2001). Perceived control and posttraumatic stress:  
 A temporal model. Applied and Preventive Psychology, 10, 207–223. 
Fredrickson, B. L., Roberts, T. A., Noll, S. M., Quinn, D. M., & Twenge, J. M. (1998). 
This swimsuit becomes you: Sex differences in self-objectification restrained 
207 
 
eating, and math performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 
269-284. 
Freeman, D. W. (2011). Are we media to blame for obesity epidemic? Retrieved from 
 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20067704-10391704.html 
Gilbert, D. T. (1998). Ordinary personality. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske & G. Lindzey 
(Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 89-150). New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Gorini, A., Miglioretti, M.c & Pravettoni, G. (2012). A new perspective on blame culture:  
 an experimental study. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 18, 671-675.  
 doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2753.2012.01831.x  
Gray, K.c & Wegner, D. M. (2011). To escape blame, don’t be a hero-Be a victim.  
 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 516-519. doi:  
 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.12.012 
Greener, J., Douglas, F., & Teijlingeb, E. (2010). More of the same? Conflicting  
 perspectives of obesity causation and intervention amongst overweight people,  
 health professionals and policy makers. Social Science & Medicine, 70, 1042- 
 1049. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.11.017 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. 
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Gostin, L. O. (2000). Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint. Berkley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
208 
 
Gostin, L. O. (2007). Law as a tool to facilitate healthier lifestyles and prevent obesity. 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 297, 87-90. doi: 
10.1001/jama.297.1.87 
Gostin, L. O. (2010). Public Health Law and Ethics: A Reader. Berkley, CA: University 
of California Press. 
Gudjonsson, G. H., & Singh, K. K. (1989). The revised Gudjonsson blame attribution  
 inventory. Personality and Individual Differences, 10(1), 67-70. 
Hall, S., French, D. P., & Marteau, T. M. (2003). Causal attributions following serious  
 unexpected negative events: A systematic review. Journal of Social and Clinical  
 Psychology, 22, 515-536. 
Hafer, C. L., & Bègue, L. (2005). Experimental research on justworld theory: Problems,  
 developments, and future challenges. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 128–67. 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to  
 moral judgment. Psychological Review; Psychological Review,108(4), 814. 
Harelli, S. & Parkinson, B. (2008). What’s social about social emotions? Journal for the  
 Theory of  Social Behavior, 38, 131-156. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5914.2008.00363.x  
Healthy Food Incentives Ordinance. (2010). San Francisco Health Code Ordinance 290- 
 10 Section1, sections 471.1 through 471.9. 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Henry, J. D., & Crawford, J. R. (2005). The short‐form version of the Depression Anxiety  
 Stress Scales (DASS‐21): Construct validity and normative data in a large non‐ 
 clinical sample. British Journal of Clinical Psychology,44(2), 227-239. 
209 
 
Hensley, S. (2010). San Francisco moving toward ban of toys from most McDonald’s 
Happy Meals. Retrieved from 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/07/26/131039290/san-francisco-banning-
toys-from-most-mcdonald-s-happy-meals 
Hilbert, A., Rief, W., & Braehler, E. (2008). Stigmatizing attitudes toward obesity in a  
 representative population-based sample. Behavior and Psychology, 16. 1529- 
 1534. doi:10.1038/oby.2008.263. 
Hilbert, A., Rief, W., & Braehler, E. (2007). What determines public support of obesity  
prevention? Journal Epidemical Community Health, 61, 585-590. doi: 
10.1136/jech.2006.050906 
Holub, S. C., Tan, C. C., & Patel, S. L. (2011). Factors associated with mothers' obesity  
 stigma and young children's weight stereotypes. Journal of Applied  
 Developmental Psychology, 32(3), 118-126.  
Inzlicht, M., & Kang, S.K. (2010). Stereotype spillover: How coping with threats to  
 social identity affects aggression, eating, decision making, and attention. Journal  
 of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 467-481. doi: 10.1037/a0018951 
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
Jameson, M. (2010, February 1). Who is to blame for obesity, and what should be done  
 about it? Los Angeles Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/01/health/la-he- 
 fat-blame1-2010feb01 
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1979). Characterological versus behavioral self-blame: Inquiries into  
depression and rape. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1798- 
1809.  
210 
 
Johnson, L. M., Mullick, R., & Mulford, C. L. (2002). General versus specific blaming.  
 The Journal of Social Psychology, 142, 249-263. 
Just, D. R., & Payne, C. R. (2009). Obesity: Can behavioral economics help? Annals of  
 Behavioral Medicine, 38, S47-S55. doi: 10.1007/s12160-009-9119-2 
Kanazawa, S. (1992). Outcome or expectancy? Antecedent of spontaneous causal  
 attribution. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(6), 659-668. doi:  
 10.1177/014616729186001 
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. New York, NY: Morton. 
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.),  
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1967. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska 
Press. 
Kelley, H. H. (1973). The processes of causal attribution. America Psychologist, 107-128.  
 doi: 10.1037/h0034225 
Kersh, R., & Morone, J. A. (2002). How the personal becomes political: Prohibitions,  
 public health, and obesity. Studies in American Political Development, 16, 162- 
 175. doi: 10.1017/S0898588X02000081 
Kersh, R. & Morone, J.A. (2005). Obesity, Courts, and the new politics of public health.  
 Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 30, 839-868. doi: 10.1215/03616878- 
 30-5-839. 
Klaczynski, P. A., Goold, K. W., & Mudry, J. J. (2004). Culture, obesity stereotypes,  
 self-esteem, and the “thin ideal”: A social identity perspective. Journal of Youth  
 and Adolescence, 33, 307-317. doi: 0047-2891/04/0800-0307/0 C  
Klein, W. M., Shepperd, J. A., Suls, J., Rothman, A. J., & Croyle, R. T. (2014). Realizing  
211 
 
 the Promise of Social Psychology in Improving Public Health. Personality and  
 Social Psychology Review, 1088868314539852. 
Kohlberg, L.(1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to  
            socialization. In D.A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and     
            research (pp.347-480). Chicago, Ill: Rand McNally. 
 Kozup, J. C., Creyer, E. H., & Burton, S. (2003). Making healthful food choices: The  
  influence of health claims and nutrition information on consumers' evaluations of  
  packaged food products and restaurant menu items. Journal of Marketing, 19-34.  
 Kwan, S. (2008). Framing the fat body: Contested meanings between government,  
  activists, and industry. Sociological Inquiry, 79, 25-50. doi: DOI: 10.1111/j.1475- 
  682X.2008.00271.x 
Lagnado, D. A. & Channon, S. (2008). Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of    
 intentionality and foreseeability. Cognition, 108, 754-770. doi:  
 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009 
Lamb, S. (1986). Treating sexually abused children: Issues of blame and  
 responsibility. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 56(2), 303-307. 
Latner, J. D., Puhl, R. M., Murakami, J. M., & O'Brien, K. S. (2014). Food addiction as a  
 causal model of obesity. Effects on stigma, blame, and perceived  
 psychopathology. Appetite, 77, 79-84.  
 Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York:  
  Plenum Press.  
 Levine, D. & Baertlein, L. (2012, April 4). UPDATE 1-Judge tosses Happy Meal lawsuit  
212 
 
 against McDonald’s, Reuters, retrieved from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/04/mcdonalds-lawsuit 
idUSL2E8F4CX920120404 
 Levine, S. (2011). School lunch politics: The surprising history of America's favorite  
  welfare program. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Lieberman, D. L., Tybur, J. M., & Latner, J. D. (2012). Disgust sensitivity, obesity 
stigma, and gender: Contamination psychology predicts weight bias for women, 
not men. Obesity, 20, 1803-1814. 
Link, B. G., Phelan, J. C., Bresnahan, M., Stueve, A., & Pescosolido, B. A. (1999). 
Public conceptions of mental illness: Labels, causes, dangerousness, and social 
distance. American Journal of Public Health, 89(9), 1328-1333. 
 Lipkus, I. (1991). The construction and preliminary validation of a global belief in a just  
  world scale and the exploratory analysis of the multidimensional belief in a just  
  world scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 12(11), 1171-1178.  
 Lucas, T., Zhdanova, L., & Alexander, S. (2011). Procedural and distributive justice  
  beliefs for self and others. Journal of Individual Differences, 32, 13-25. doi:  
  10.1027/1614-0001/a000032 
 Lusk, J.L. & Ellison, B. (2013).Who is to blame for the rise in obesity? Appetite, 68, 14- 
  20. 
Major, B., Hunger, J. M., Bunyan, D. P., & Miller, C. T. (2014). The ironic effects of  
 weight stigma. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 51, 74-80. 
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014). A theory of blame. Psychological  
 Inquiry, 25, 147-186. 
213 
 
 Mantler, J., Schellenberg, E.G., & Page, J.S. (2003). Attributions for serious illness: Are 
 controllability, responsibility, and blame different constructs? Canadian Journal  
 of Behavioural Science, 35(2), 142-152. doi: 10.1037/h0087196 
Martin D. (2010, July 29) Obese? Just call them fat: plain-speaking doctors will jolt  
 people into losing weight, says minister [Internet]. Daily Mail; c2010 [updated  
2010; cited 29 November 2010]. Available from 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1298394/Call-overweight-people-fat-
instead-obese-says-health-minister.html 
McClure, K. J., Puhl, R. M., & Heuer, C. A. (2011). Obesity in the news: Do 
photographic images of obese persons influence antifat attitudes? Journal of 
Health Communication, 16, 359-371. doi: 10.1080/10810730.2010.535108  
Mello, M. M., Rimm, E. B., & Studdert, D. M. (2003). The McLawsuit: The fast food 
industry and legal accountability for obesity. Health Affairs, 22, 207-216. 
Michelle. (2012, October 3).  About that video [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://www.fatnutritionist.com/index.php/about-that-video/ 
 Miller, C. T., Rothblum, E. D., Barbour, L., Brand, P. A., & Felicil, D. (1990). Social  
  interactions of obese and nonobese women. Journal of Personality, 58, 365-380.  
 Monterosso, J., Royzman, E. & Schwartz, B. (2005). Explaining away responsibility:  
  Effects of scientific explanation on perceived culpability. Ethics & Behavior, 15,  
  139-158. 
 Mori, D., Chaiken, S., & Pliner, P. (1987). “Eating lightly” and the self-presentation of  
  femininity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 693-702. doi: 0022- 
  3514/87/M0.75 
214 
 
Muthén, L. K. & Muthén, B. O. (1998-2010). MPlus User’s Guide. Sixth Edition. Los 
Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén. 
Nestle, M. (2006). Food marketing and childhood obesity—a matter of policy. New  
 England Journal of Medicine, 354(24), 2527-2529. 
New York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of Health, 545 F.Supp.2d 
363 (2008). 
Niedenthal, P. M., Tangney, J. P., & Gavanski, I. (1994). " If only I weren't" versus" If  
 only I hadn't": Distinguishing shame and guilt in conterfactual thinking. Journal  
 of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 585. 
Noll, S. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). A mediational model linking self‐ 
 objectification, body shame, and disordered eating. Psychology of Women  
 Quarterly, 22, 623-636. 
Nudelman, G., & Shiloh, S. (2011). Who deserves to be sick? An exploration of the  
 relationships between belief in a just world, illness causal attributions, and their  
 fairness judgments. Psychology, Health and Medicine, 16, 675-685. 
Nutrition Labeling  and  Education Act  of 1990,  Pub. L. No.  101-535, 104  Stat. 2353- 
 56 (codified  at  21 U.S.C.  §  343(q)(1)(C)-(D) (2000)) 
 Oaten, M., Stevenson, R. J., & Case, T. I. (2009). Disgust as a disease-avoidance  
  mechanism. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 303-321. doi: 10.1037/a0014823 
 O’Connor, N., Kotze, B., & Wright, M. (2011). Blame and accountability 1:  
  understanding blame and blame pathologies. Australasian Psychiatry, 19, 113- 
  118, doi: 10.3109/10398562.2011.562296 
Oliver, J. E. & Lee, T. (2005). Public opinion and the politics of obesity in America.  
215 
 
 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 30, 923-954. 
Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). The cognitive structure of emotions. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Otten, J. J., Saelens, B. E., Kapphahn, K. I., Hekler, E. B., Buman, M. P., Goldstein, B.  
 A., et al., (2014). Peer Reviewed: Impact of San Francisco’s Toy Ordinance on  
 Restaurants and Children’s Food Purchases, 2011–2012. Preventing chronic  
 disease, 11. doi: 10.5888/pcd11.140026 
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon  
 Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 411-419 
Parham v. McDonald's Corporation et al, (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
Park, J. H., Schaller, M., & Crandall, C. S. (2007). Pathogen-avoidance mechanisms and  
 the stigmatization of obsess people. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28, 410-414.  
 doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.05.008 
Parmet, W. (2009). Populations, public health, and the law. Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press.  
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
Pearl, R. L., & Lebowitz, M. S. (2014). Beyond personal responsibility: Effects of causal  
 attributions for overweight and obesity on weight-related beliefs, stigma, and  
 policy support. Psychology & health, 29, 1176-1191.  
Pechmann, C. (2001). A comparison of health communication models: Risk learning  
 versus stereotype priming. Media Psychology, 3, 189-210. doi: 
 10.1207/S1532785XMEP0302_04 
216 
 
Pechmann, C. & Goldberg, M. (1998).  Evaluation of ad strategies for preventing youth 
 tobacco use. Report submitted to the California Tobacco Related Disease  
Research Program, University of California, Office of the President, Oakland, 
CA. 
Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F.Supp. 512 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 
Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act (2005)  
 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-554 
Polivy, J., Herman, C. P., & Howard, K. I. (1988). The restraint scale: Assessment of  
 dieting. Dictionary of Behavioral Assessment Techniques, 377-380. 
Pryor, J. B., Reeder, G. D., & Landau, S. (1999). A social-psychological analysis of HIV- 
 related stigma: A two-factor theory. American Behavioral Scientist,42(7), 1193- 
 1211. doi:10.1177/0002764299042007010 
Pryor, J. B., Reeder, G. D., Yeadon, C., & Hesson-McInnis, M. (2004). A dual-process  
 model of reactions to perceived stigma. Journal of Personality and Social  
 Psychology, 87(4), 436-452. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.87.4.436  
Puhl, R. M., & Brownell, K. D. (2006). Confronting and coping with weight stigma: An  
 investigation of overweight and obese adults. Obesity, 14, 1802-1815. doi:  
 10.1038/oby.2006.208 
Puhl, R. M., & Heuer, C. A. (2009). The stigma of obesity: A review and update. Obesity,  
 17(5),  941-962. doi: 10.1038/oby.2008.636 
Puhl, R. M., & Heuer, C. A. (2010). Obesity stigma: Important considerations for public  
 health. American Journal of Public Health, 100, 1019-1028. doi:  
 10.2105/AJPH/2009.159491 
217 
 
Puhl, R. M., Heuer, C. A., & Sarda, V. (2011). Framing messages about weight  
 discrimination: Impact on public support for legislation. International Journal of  
 Obesity, 35, 863-872. doi: 10.1038/ijo.2010.194 
Puhl, R. M., & Latner, J. D. (2007). Stigma, obesity, and the health of the nation’s  
 children. Psychological Bulletin, 133(4), 557-580. doi: 10.1037/0033- 
 2909.133.4.557  
Puhl, R., Peterson, J. L., & Luedicke, J. (2012). Fighting obesity or obese persons? Public  
perceptions of obesity-related health messages. International Journal of Obesity. 
doi: 10.1038/ijo.2012.156 
Ramasubramanian, S. (2010). Television viewing, racial attitudes and policy preferences:  
 Exploring the role of social identity and intergroup emotions in influencing  
 support for affirmative action. Communication Monographs, 77, 102-120. doi:  
 10.1080/03637750903514300 
Ramasubramanian, S. (2011). The impact of stereotypical versus counterstereotypical  
 media exemplars of racial attitudes, causal attributions, and support for  
 affirmative action. Communication Research, 38, 497-516. doi:  
 10.1177/0093650210384854 
Reuters. (2011, May 9). Retrieved from 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/05_- _May/Fast-
food lobbies_U_S__states_on__Happy_Meal__laws/ 
Robinson, B., Bacon, L. C., & O'reilly, J. (2006). Fat phobia: Measuring, understanding,  
 and changing anti‐fat attitudes. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 14(4),  
 467-480. 
218 
 
Rodin, M., Price, J., Sanchez, F., & McElligot, S. (1989). Derogation, exclusion, and  
 unfair treatment of persons with social flaws: Controllability of stigma and the  
 attribution of prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15, 439-451.  
 doi: 10.1177/0146167289153013 
Rogers, P., Josey, N. & Davies, M. (2007). Victim age, attractiveness and abuse history  
 as factors in the perception of a hypothetical child sexual abuse case. Journal of  
 Sexual Aggression, 13, 121-137. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton  
University Press.  
Roth, D. A., Herman, C. P., Polivy, J., & Pliner, P. (2001). Self-presentation conflict in  
 social eating situations: a normative perspective. Appetite, 36, 165-171. doi:  
10.1006/appe.2000.0388 
Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: a  
 mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three  
 moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity). Journal of personality and social  
 psychology, 76, 574. 
Schwarz, N. (2011). Feelings-as-information theory. Handbook of theories of social  
 psychology, 1, 289-308. 
Seacat, J. D., & Mickelson, K. D.  (2009). Stereotype threat and the exercise/dietary  
 health intentions of overweight women. Journal of Health Psychology, 14, 556- 
 567. doi: 10.1177/1359105309103575 
Shaver, K. G. (1985). The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility, and  
 blameworthiness. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 
219 
 
Shaver, K. G. (1996). Too Much of a Good Thing?. Psychological Inquiry, 7, 244-247. 
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intention—behavior relations: A conceptual and empirical  
 review. European review of social psychology, 12, 1-36.  
 doi:10.1080/14792772143000003 
Sheeran, P., & Orbell, S. (1998). Do intentions predict condom use? Metaanalysis and  
examination of six moderator variables. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 
231-250. DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1998.tb01167. 
Sherer, M., Maddux, J. E., Mercandante, B., Prentice-Dunn, S., Jacobs, B., & Rogers, R.  
 W. (1982). The self-efficacy scale: Construction and validation. Psychological  
 reports, 51, 663-671. 
Sleed, M., Durrheim, K., Kriel, A., Solornon, V., & Baxter, V. (2002). The effectiveness  
 of the vignette methodology: A comparison of written and video vignettes in 
 eliciting responses about date rape. South African Journal of Psychology, 32, 21- 
 28.  
Smith, J. L. (2004). Understanding the process of stereo-type threat: A review of  
 mediational variables and new performance goal directions. Educational  
 Psychology Review, 16, 177–206. doi: 10.1023/B:EDPR.0000034020.20317.89 
South, S. C., Krueger, R. F., & Iacono, W. G. (2009). Factorial invariance of the Dyadic  
 Adjustment Scale across gender. Psychological assessment, 21, 622. 
Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test- 
 performance of African-Americans. Journal of Personality and Social  
 Psychology, 69(5), 797-811. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.69.5.797 
Stein, R., & Nemeroff, C. (1995). Moral overtones of food: Judgments of others based on  
220 
 
 what they eat. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 480-490. doi:  
 10.1177/0146167295215006 
Steptoe, A., Pollard, T. M., & Wardle, J. (1995). Development of a measure of the  
 motives underlying the selection of food: the food choice questionnaire.  
 Appetite, 25(3), 267-284. 
Strnad, J. (2005). Conceptualizing the “fat tax”: The role of food taxes in developed  
 economies. Southern California Law Review, 78.  
Sturgis, P., Roberts, C., & Smith, P. (2014). Middle Alternatives Revisited How the  
neither/nor Response Acts as a Way of Saying “I Don’t Know”?. Sociological  
Methods & Research, 43, 15-38. 
Sutin, A. R., & Terracciano, A. (2013). Perceived weight discrimination and  
 obesity. PLoS One, 8, e70048. 
Teachman, B. A., Gapinski, K. D., Brownell, K. D., Rawlins, M., & Jeyaram, S. (2003).  
 Demonstrations of implicit anti-fat bias: The impact of providing causal  
 information and evoking empathy. Health Psychology, 22(1), 68-78. doi :  
 10.1037/0278-6133.22.1.68 
Tomkins, A. J., Bornstein, B. H., Herian, M. N., & PytlikZillig, L. M. (2011-2014).  
 Testing a three-stage model of institutional confidence across branches of  
 government. Research project funded by National Science Foundation (SES- 
 1061635). 
Townend, L. (2009). The moralizing of obesity: A new name for an old sin? Critical  
 Social Policy, 29, 171. doi: 10.1177/0261018308101625 
Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why people obey the law: Procedural justice, legitimacy, and  
221 
 
 compliance. Yale University. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2012). Overweight and Obesity: Health  
Consequences. Retrieved from  
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/fact_consequences.ht 
ml 
Vartanian, L. R., & Silverstein, K. M. (2013). Obesity as a status cue: Perceived social 
status and the stereotypes of obese individuals. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 43(S2), E319-E328. 
Vartanian, L. R., Thomas, M. A., & Vanman, E. J. (2013). Disgust, contempt, and anger 
and the stereotypes of obese people. Eating and Weight Disorders-Studies on 
Anorexia, Bulimia and Obesity, 18, 377-382. 
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., Schmeichel, B. J., Twenge, J. M., Nelson, N. M., & Tice, 
D. M. (2014). Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: a limited-resource 
account of decision making, self-regulation, and active initiative. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/2333-8113.1.S.19 
Vogel, E. (2011). Legislator wants to tax junk food. Retrieved from 
http://www.lvrj.com/news/legislator-wants-to-tax-junk-food-116007759.html 
Wansink, B., Just, D. R., & Payne, C. R. (2009). Mindless eating and healthy heuristics  
 for the irrational. The American Economic Review, 165-169. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief  
 measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of  
 personality and social psychology, 54, 1063.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-
 3514.54.6.1063 
222 
 
Weiner, B., Perry, R. P., & Magnusson, J. (1988). As attributional analysis of reactions to  
 stigmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 738-748.  
Weiner, B. (1993). On sin versus sickness: A theory of perceived responsibility and  
 social motivation. American Psychologist 48, 957-965. doi: 10.1037//0022- 
 3514.55.5.738 
Weiner, B. (1994). Inferences of responsibility and social motivation. Advances in  
 experimental social psychology, 27, 1-1. 
Whitman, E. (2015, May 18). Is the Berkeley Soda Tax Working? Anti-obesity Law  
 Makes $116K in First Month. International Business Times. Retrieved from  
 http://www.ibtimes.com/berkeley-soda-tax-working-anti-obesity-law-makes-
 116k-revenues-first-month-1929218 
Wilson, M. (2005). Constructing measures: An item response modeling approach. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Winstanley, C. L. (2007). A healthy food tax credit: Moving away from the fat tax and its  
 fault-based paradigm. Oregon Law Review, 86, 1151. 
Wong, P. T. P., & Weiner, B. (1981). When people ask “why” questions, and the  
 heuristics of attributional search. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,  
 41, 650-663. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.40.4.650 
Woodhouse, K. (2011). Blame the fast food? U-M researcher says supersized economies 
drive obesity. Retrieved from http://www.annarbor.com/news/university-of-
michigan-researchers-find-supersized-economies-lead-to-supersized-bellies/ 
Zernicke, K. (2003). Is Obesity the Responsibility of the Body Politic? New York Times,  
 Nov.9,sec. 4, 3. 
223 
 
Appendix A 
 
Causes of Obesity Scale (Klaczynski et al., 2004) 
Please indicate your opinions about the following statements below 
 strongly 
disagree  
  strongly 
agree  
Some people are obese is because their parents used to 
give them food with lots of sugar and fat in it. (1) 
        
People get obese because they don’t exercise very 
much (2) 
        
Most obese people are obese because their parents are 
obese (3) 
        
It seems like most obese people really don’t like to 
exercise (4) 
        
Obese people usually have medical conditions that 
cause them to get overweight (5) 
        
The parents of most obese people let them watch too 
much TV when they were children (6) 
        
People wouldn’t get overweight if they stopped 
snacking between meals (7) 
        
People get obese because in school, at work, and at 
home, they can get their hands lots of fatty food (8) 
        
People who are obese get that way because they like 
eating more than thin people (9) 
        
The baby fat obese people were born with is almost 
impossible to lose (10) 
        
Obese people keep eating even when they are full (11)         
Obese people get obese because they like watching TV 
too much (12) 
        
Almost all obese people try really hard to lose weight, 
but just can’t (13) 
        
Lots of obese people learned bad eating habits from 
their parents (14) 
        
One big reason for getting obese is being lazy (15)         
Some obese people don’t try to lose weight because 
they seem proud of being overweight (16) 
        
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If obese people had more willpower, they’d be able to 
stop eating too much (17) 
        
Most people who are obese inherited genes that cause 
obesity from their parents (18) 
        
Obese people often try to escape from their problems 
by eating (19) 
        
Obese people can’t change the fact that they inherited 
“obese” genes (20) 
        
If obese people just knew how unhealthy it is to be 
obese, they’d exercise and diet more (21) 
        
Some people who are obese grew up in places where 
there are lots of adults who eat too much (22) 
        
Obese people really can’t control how much they eat 
(23) 
        
By joining weight loss groups, obese people can lose 
weight (24) 
        
Obese people can blame their parents for giving them 
too much unhealthy food (25) 
        
By making their diets healthier, obese people can 
control their weight (26) 
        
Almost all obese people could lose weight if they truly 
wanted to (27) 
        
Obese people are “stuck” being obese, usually because 
of hormones they can’t control (28) 
        
By exercising and eating healthy foods, obese people 
could get a lot skinnier (29) 
        
People who are obese could be thinner if they really 
wanted. (30) 
        
Obese people usually don’t have the energy to lose 
weight (31) 
        
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Appendix B 
 
Anti-fat Attitudes Questionnaire (AFA; Crandall, 1994) 
 
The following statements ask for your opinions about factors related to obesity. Please read each 
statement carefully and respond to the statements using the scales provided that range from “very 
strongly disagree” to “very strongly agree” 
 
 
  
 very 
strongly 
disagree 
       very 
strongly 
agree 
I really don’t like fat people much.                   
I don’t have many friends that are fat.                   
I tend to think that people who are 
overweight are a little untrustworthy. 
                  
Although some fat people are surely 
smart, in general, I think they tend not 
to be quite as bright as normal weight 
people. 
                  
I have a hard time taking fat people too 
seriously. 
                  
Fat people make me somewhat 
uncomfortable. 
                  
If I were an employer looking to hire, I 
might avoid hiring a fat person. 
                  
I feel disgusted with myself when I gain 
weight. 
                  
One of the worst things that could 
happen to me would be if I gained 25 
pounds. 
                  
I worry about becoming fat.                   
People who weigh too much could lose 
at least some part of their weight 
through a little exercise. 
                  
Some people are fat because they have 
no willpower. 
                  
Fat people tend to be fat pretty much 
through their own fault. 
                  
I am reading each question carefully                   
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Appendix C 
 
Obese Stereotypes Scale (Klaczynski et al., 2004) 
 
In my opinion, obese people are/have: 
 strongly disagree   strongly agree 
A strong sense of 
morality 
        
Not very 
intelligent 
        
Easily distracted         
Dirty and messy         
Friendly         
Boastful, Brag a 
lot 
        
Too dependent on 
others 
        
Popular         
Brave         
Irresponsible         
Not very much 
self-control 
        
Untrustworthy         
Whiny         
Tattletales         
Low self-esteem         
 Lazy         
A positive 
outlook on life 
        
 Gossipy         
Honest         
Easily confused         
Gloomy         
Unfriendly         
Loud         
Don’t like 
themselves very 
        
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much 
Greedy         
A certain “inner 
strength” 
        
Socially awkward         
Think that 
“everyone’s out to 
get them” 
        
Funny         
Boring to talk to         
Wasteful         
Nosey         
Talented         
Happy with TV 
and video games 
        
Helpful         
Self-centered         
Ashamed         
Lonely         
Don’t get 
annoyed very 
easily 
        
Mean         
228 
 
Appendix D 
Social Distance Scale (Link et al., 1999) 
Please indicate how willing you would be in the following scenarios using the scale “definitely 
not willing” to “definitely willing” 
 Definitely not 
willing 
  Definitely 
wiling 
How willing would you be to have someone 
who is obese marry into your family? 
        
How willing would you be to make friends 
with someone who is obese? 
        
How willing would you be to move in next 
door to a person who is obese? 
        
How willing would you be to spend an 
evening socializing with someone who is 
obese? 
        
How willing would you be to start working 
closely with someone who is obese? 
        
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Appendix E 
 
Beliefs about Justice for Self and Others (Lucas et al., 2011) 
 
Please read each statement carefully and respond to the statements using the scale provided that 
ranges from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree.”  
 
  
 strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
I feel that other people generally earn the rewards and 
punishments they get in this world. 
             
Other people usually receive the outcomes that they 
deserve. 
             
Other people generally deserve the things that they are 
accorded. 
             
I feel that other people usually receive the outcomes that 
they are due. 
             
Other people usually use fair procedures in dealing with 
others. 
             
I feel that people generally use methods that are fair in 
their evaluations of others 
             
Regardless of the outcomes they receive, other people are 
generally subjected to fair procedures. 
             
Other People are generally subjected to processes that are 
fair. 
             
I feel that I generally earn the rewards and punishments I 
get in this world. 
             
I usually receive the outcomes that I deserve.              
I generally deserve the things I am accorded.              
I feel that I usually receive the outcomes that I am due.              
People usually use fair procedures in dealing with me.              
I feel that people generally use methods that are fair in 
their evaluations of me. 
             
Regardless of the specific outcomes I receive, I am 
generally subjected to fair procedures. 
             
I am generally subjected to processes that are fair.              
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Appendix F 
Belief in a Just World Scale (Lipkus, 1991) 
Please read each statement carefully and respond to the statements using the scale 
provided that ranges from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree.”  
 Strongly 
disagree 
    Strongly 
agree 
I feel that the world 
treats me fairly 
            
I feel that I get what I 
deserve 
            
I feel that people treat 
me fairly in life 
            
I feel that I earn the 
rewards and 
punishments I get 
            
I feel that people treat 
me with the respect that I 
deserve 
            
I feel that I get what I am 
entitled to have 
            
I feel that my efforts are 
noticed and rewarded 
            
I feel that when I meet 
with misfortune, I have 
brought it upon myself. 
            
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Appendix G 
 
Food Rating Questionnaire 
 
These questions will be provided for each food item 
 
Please indicate your thoughts about each food you are presented with  
 
Food item: ____________________________  
 
 Not at 
all 
     Very 
How tasty is this food 
item? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How healthy is this food 
item? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How salty is this food 
item? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How sweet is this food 
item? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How filling is this food 
item? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How cost effective do you 
think this food item would 
be? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely would you be 
to buy this item from a 
vending machine? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
If you would not eat any of this snack, please indicate 
why:____________________________________________________________________
__________________________________ 
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Appendix H            
 
Stereotype Content 
These questions all derive from Fiske et al. (2002) short questionnaire 
1. As viewed by society, how competent are members of this group?  
2. As viewed by society, how confident are members of this group?  
3. As viewed by society, how capable are members of this group?  
4. As viewed by society, how efficient are members of this group?  
5. As viewed by society, how intelligent are members of this group?  
6. As viewed by society, how skillful are members of this group?  
7. As viewed by society, how warm are members of this group? 
8. As viewed by society, how good natured are members of this group? 
9. As viewed by society, how sincere are members of this group? 
10. As viewed by society, how friendly are members of this group? 
11. As viewed by society, how well-intentioned are members of this group? 
12. As viewed by society, how trustworthy are members of this group? 
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Appendix I 
Other-based emotion appraisals 
When thinking about the community member who was interviewed, to what degree do 
you feel the following emotions? 
 very slightly 
or not at all 
a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
pity           
disgust           
anger           
admiration           
envy           
contempt           
distrust           
sympathy           
empathy           
disappointment           
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Appendix J 
 
Support for Public Policy  
Dispositional blame manipulation 
 
File No. 109873                         Ordinance No. 290-10 
 
[Health Initiative for Vending Machines] 
 
Ordinance amending Title 8 of the Health Code by adding Sections 8.20.121 to 
amend the contents of vending machines. 
  
Be it proposed by the Health Initiative Task: 
Title 8 of the Health Code should be amended to include section 8.20.121 to read 
as follows: 
 
SEC. 8.20.121 FINDINGS 
 
1. In the last thirty-five years, obesity has grown into a public health concern. Many 
Americans are obese according to a 2011 report issued by the Center for Disease 
Control.  
2. According to health reports conducted by this task force, individuals are to blame for 
the health crisis and for being obese. Some of the leading factors that cause obesity 
include people who make poor choices at vending machines, people who eat foods 
that lack nutritional value, people who do not exercise, and people who eating large 
portion sizes. 
3. A recent survey of vending machine operators found that the consumption of snack 
foods in vending machines is one of the primary contributing factors to obesity in this 
city. The findings of the task force revealed that almost $500,000 are spent annually 
in vending machines. 
4. To improve the public’s health, the city will need to target obese people who are 
responsible for making bad choices at vending machines.  
 
TITLE AND PURPOSE 
  
 This ordinance shall be known as the “Vending Machine Ordinance.” The intent 
of this ordinance is to improve the health of city residents by amending the snack options 
in vending machines. These standards will help people who are obese make better 
choices by only allowing snack foods that are approved by the city. 
 
 
Proposed by: 
The 2012 Health Initiative Task Force 
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Situational blame manipulation 
 
File No. 109873                         Ordinance No. 290-10 
 
[Health Initiative for Vending Machines] 
 
Ordinance amending Title 8 of the Health Code by adding Sections 8.20.121 to 
amend the contents of vending machines. 
  
Be it proposed by the Health Initiative Task: 
Title 8 of the Health Code should be amended to include section 8.20.121 to read 
as follows: 
 
SEC. 8.20.121 FINDINGS 
 
1. In the last thirty-five years, obesity has grown into a public health concern. Many 
Americans are obese according to a 2011 report issued by the Center for Disease 
Control.  
2. According to health reports conducted by this task force, environmental factors are to 
blame for the health crisis and for the public’s obesity. Some of the leading factors 
that cause obesity include the food industry providing unhealthy choices, the food 
industry pricing healthy foods too high, and lifestyle demands that promote eating 
food that is not prepared at home. 
3. A recent survey of vending machine operators found the consumption of snack foods 
in vending machines is one of the primary contributing factors to obesity in this city. 
The findings of the task force revealed that almost $500,000 are spent annually in 
vending machines. 
4. To improve the public’s health, the city will need to target vending machines that are 
responsible for not providing healthier options. 
 
TITLE AND PURPOSE 
  
 This ordinance shall be known as the “Vending Machine Ordinance.” The intent 
of this ordinance is to improve the health of city residents by amending the snack options 
in vending machines. These standards will require vending machines to provide better 
options by only allowing snack foods that are approved by the city. 
 
 
Proposed by: 
The 2012 Health Initiative Task Force 
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Appendix K 
Qualification for study three screening and script 
Hi and thank you for your interest in our study about food policies in the city. Before we 
can schedule you for an appointment, we have some questions to see if you qualify for 
the study.  
 
1. Are you a city resident? 
a. If yes, for how long? 
2. Are you registered to vote? 
3. Did you vote in the last election? 
4. What is your age? 
5. What is your gender? 
6. What is your marital status? 
7. Do you have any children? 
a. If yes, how many? 
8. What is your height? 
9. What is your weight? 
10. Do you smoke? 
a. If yes, how much do you smoke? 
11. Are you allergic to any foods? 
12. Do you have any special dietary needs? 
 
Research assistant will calculate the person’s BMI using height and weight to classify 
participants as either obese (BMI greater than 30), overweight (between 25 and 30) or 
average weight (between 18.5 and 24.9). 
If they do not qualify: I am sorry, but based on your responses you do not qualify for the 
study. Thank you for your interest.  
If they qualify: Based on your responses, you qualify for the study. The psychology 
department has been hired by a task force that would like to get the opinions of 
community residents about some food policies that have been proposed for improving the 
public’s health. To do so, they would like us to conduct a series of taste test studies at the 
university. Do you think you would be interested in coming to the university to provide 
us with your opinions about different snack items that may be offered in vending 
machines?  
If not: Okay, well thank you for your interest. Have a good day. 
If yes: Great. Before we schedule your appointment we would like for you to fill 
out an online questionnaire that will provide the task force with some information about 
the people who will be doing the taste testing and to save time on the day of the taste 
testing. Once we receive your completed questionnaire, we will call you back to schedule 
an appointment within a couple of weeks. [If funding is received we will provide a $5 
Amazon gift card for completing the pre-study measures]  
Research assistant should get their email address and email them a link to the Qualtrics 
pre-study measures. 
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Appendix L 
Blame Manipulation/Instructions 
Instructions for Vending Machine Taste Test:  
In an effort to promote healthier lifestyles for all city residents, a new task force was 
formed to address various health initiatives. The task force has decided to make 
promoting healthy lifestyles as one of its initiatives for this year because it is an 
important public health concern. One of the initiatives they are proposing is to change the 
snack options that are available in vending machines to provide tasty, but health 
conscious snack items. To analyze whether the new policy is feasible, the task force has 
asked the Department of Psychology at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln to conduct a 
series of studies to gather opinions and suggestions from city residents. You are here 
today because the task force is interested in your opinions and suggestions. Today you 
will be trying several snack foods that they are thinking of putting into the vending 
machines. We will bring in samples of several snack items and you will be asked rate 
each snack item according to several factors such as taste, health, cost, etc. Do you have 
any questions?  
Before we begin the taste testing, we would like for you to read the rationale of the policy 
so you get a better idea of the goals of the task force. 
 [TYPE OF BLAME MANIPULATION; SEE BELOW] 
[AFTER TASTE TEST]. Thank you for your opinions and responses. We are waiting for 
another participant who is coming in and need to use the taste testing room. To receive 
your compensation and complete the exit interview, please head upstairs. [RA walks into 
hallway to participant]. Here is the elevator and stairs, please meet the other research 
assistant upstairs on the 2nd floor – one floor above where you came in. 
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No blame manipulation 
 
File No. 109873                         Ordinance No. 290-10 
 
[Health Initiative for Vending Machines] 
 
Ordinance amending Title 8 of the Health Code by adding Sections 8.20.121 to 
amend the contents of vending machines. 
  
Be it proposed by the Health Initiative Task: 
Title 8 of the Health Code should be amended to include section 8.20.121 to read 
as follows: 
 
SEC. 8.20.121 FINDINGS 
 
1. In the last thirty-five years, obesity has grown into a public health concern. Many 
Americans are obese according to a 2011 report issued by the Center for Disease 
Control.  
2. A recent survey of vending machine operators found the consumption of snack foods 
in vending machines is one of the primary contributing factors to obesity in this city. 
The findings of the task force revealed that almost $500,000 are spent annually in 
vending machines. 
3. To improve the public’s health, the city will need to amend the contents of vending 
machines.  
 
 
 
TITLE AND PURPOSE 
  
 This ordinance shall be known as the “Vending Machine Ordinance.” The intent 
of this ordinance is to improve the health of city residents by amending the snack options 
in vending machines. These standards will require vending machines to provide better 
and more cost effective options by only allowing snack foods that are approved by the 
city. 
 
 
Proposed by: 
The 2012 Health Initiative Task Force 
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Appendix M 
 
Public Trust and Confidence in Institutions (Tompkins et al, in prep) 
 
For the following questions we would like for you to think about public health agencies. 
When we say public health agencies we mean governmental agencies that regulate and make 
laws about the public’s health, such as the Food and Drug Administration, the United States 
Department of Agriculture, the Surgeon General, the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, and the Department of Health and Human Services. 
 strongly 
disagree  
     strongly 
agree  
Most decision makers of public health agencies 
care about residents in the area they regulate. 
             
Most decision makers of public health agencies 
are competent to do their jobs.  
             
My confidence in public health agencies is high.               
Public health agencies do not protect my 
interests. 
             
I am generally confident in people.               
I am a loyal person               
I trust what people say.                
I think public health agencies act in the interests 
of some groups over others.  
             
Most officials in public health agencies lack 
integrity  
             
Public health agencies are a legitimate authority 
on deciding health policies  
             
Being loyal to public health agencies is 
important to me.  
             
I feel I should accept decisions made by public 
health agencies.  
             
The procedures by which public health agency 
decision makers make decisions are fair.  
             
Most members of public health agencies treat 
people with respect.  
             
I believe public health agencies share my values 
about how natural resources should be regulated.  
             
I trust public health agencies.               
I feel like public health agencies listen to the 
opinions of the people it regulates.  
             
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For the most part, the decisions made by public 
health agencies are made out of care and concern 
for area residents.  
             
Most public health agency decision makers have 
the skills necessary to do their jobs.  
             
I believe public health agencies will perform its 
functions as it should.  
             
Public health agencies are out of touch with 
what’s going on in its communities.  
             
I am rarely surprised in my dealings with others.               
I am faithful to the commitments I make               
I think that most people would try to be fair.               
The decisions made by public health agencies are 
biased.  
             
Public health agencies are made up of mostly 
honest individuals  
             
Public health agencies use their power 
appropriately. 
             
Public health agencies can always count on me.                
Good citizens will obey natural resource 
regulations set for an area by public health 
agencies.  
             
In my experience, public health agencies 
generally have been fair in their dealings with 
the community.  
             
Even when dealing with people who disagree 
with it, public health agencies still treat people 
with dignity.  
             
I believe that public health agencies support my 
values about natural resources allocation.  
             
My trust in the public health agencies is high               
Citizens can influence public health agency 
decisions.  
             
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Appendix N 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (Antony et al., 1998) 
 
Please read each statement and indicate how much the statement applied to you over the past 
month.  
 Did not 
apply to me 
at all 
Applied to me to some 
degree, or some of the 
time 
Applied to me to a 
considerable 
degree, or a good 
part of time 
Applied to me 
very much, or 
most of the time 
I was intolerant of anything that 
kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing. 
        
I felt I was rather touchy.         
I found it difficult to relax.         
I found myself getting agitated.         
I felt that I was using a lot of 
nervous energy. 
        
I found it hard to wind down.         
I tended to over-react to 
situations. 
        
I felt that life was meaningless.         
I felt that it had nothing to look 
forward to. 
        
I couldn’t seem to experience 
any positive feeling at all. 
        
I was unable to become 
enthusiastic about anything. 
        
I felt that I wasn’t worth much 
as a person. 
        
I felt down-hearted and blue.         
I found it difficult to work up 
the initiative to do things. 
        
I was aware of the action of my 
heart in the absence of physical 
exertion. 
        
I experienced breathing 
difficultly. 
        
I experienced trembling (e.g. in 
the hands). 
        
I felt I was close to panic.         
I felt scared without any good 
reason. 
        
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I was worried about situation in 
which I might panic and make a 
fool of myself. 
        
I was aware of dryness of my 
mouth. 
        
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Appendix O 
 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
 
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate 
how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
 Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself          
At times, I think I am no good at all         
I feel that I have a number of good 
qualities 
        
I am able to do things as well as most 
other people 
        
I feel I do not have much to be proud of         
I certainly feel useless at times         
I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least 
on an equal plane with others 
        
I wish I could have more respect for 
myself 
        
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a 
failure 
        
I take a positive attitude toward myself         
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Appendix P 
 
Food Choice Questionnaire (Steptoe, et al., 1995). 
 
It is important to me that the food I eat on a typical day: 
 Not at all 
important 
A little 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Very 
important 
Is easy to prepare         
Contains no additives         
Is low in calories         
Tastes good         
Contains natural ingredients         
Is not expensive         
Is low in fat         
Is familiar         
Is high in fiber and roughage         
Is nutritious         
Is easily available in shops 
and supermarkets 
        
Is good value for money         
Cheers me up         
Smells nice         
Can be cooked very simply         
Helps me cope with stress         
Helps me control my weight         
Has a pleasant texture         
Is packaged in an 
environmentally friendly way 
        
Comes from countries I 
approve of politically 
        
Is like the food I ate when I 
was a child 
        
Contains a lot of vitamins and 
minerals 
        
Contains no artificial 
ingredients 
        
Keeps me awake/alert         
Looks nice         
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Helps me relax         
Is high in protein         
Takes no time to prepare         
Keeps me healthy         
Is good for my 
skin/teeth/hair/nails etc. 
        
Makes me feel good         
Has the country of origin 
clearly marked 
        
Is what I usually eat         
Helps me to cope with life         
Can be bought in shops close 
to where I live or work 
        
Is cheap         
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Appendix Q 
 
Body Shape Questionnaire (Dowson & Henderson, 2001 
 
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate 
how often you have experienced each of these during the past month.  
 
 
 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very 
Often 
Always 
Have you been so worried about your 
shape that you have been feeling that 
you ought to diet? 
            
Has being with thin people made you 
feel self-conscious about your shape? 
            
Have you ever noticed the shape of 
other people and felt that your own 
shape compared unfavorably? 
            
Has being undressed, such as when 
taking a bath, made you feel fat? 
            
Has eating sweets, cakes or other 
high calorie food make you feel fat? 
            
Have you felt excessively large and 
rounded? 
            
Have you felt ashamed of your body?             
Has worry about your shape made 
you diet? 
            
Have you thought that you are that 
shape you are because you lack self-
control? 
            
Have you worried about other people 
seeing rolls of fat around your waist 
and stomach? 
            
Have you felt that it is not fair that 
other people are thinner than you? 
            
Has seeing your reflection (e.g. in 
mirror or shop window) made you 
feel bad about your shape? 
            
Have you been particularly self-
conscious about your shape when in 
the company of other people? 
            
Has worry about your shape made 
you feel you ought to exercise? 
            
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Appendix R 
Restrained Eating Scale (Polivy, et al., 1988) 
 
 
How often are you dieting? 
 Never 
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Usually 
 Always 
 
What is the maximum amount of weight (in pounds) you have ever lost within one month? 
 0-4 
 5-9 
 10-14 
 15-19 
 20+ 
 
 What is your maximum weight gain within a week? 
 0-1 
 1.1-2 
 2.1-3 
 3.1-5 
 5.1+ 
 
In a typical week, how much does your weight fluctuate? 
 0-1 
 1.1-2 
 2.1-3 
 3.1-5 
 5.1+ 
 
Would a weight fluctuation of five pounds affect the way you live your life? 
 Not at all 
 Slightly 
 Moderately 
 Extremely 
 
 
 
Do you eat sensibly in front of others and splurge alone? 
 Never 
 Rarely 
 Often 
 Always 
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 Do you give too much time and thought of food? 
 Never 
 Rarely 
 Often 
 Always 
 
Do you have feeling of guilt after overeating? 
 Never 
 Rarely 
 Often 
 Always 
 
How conscious are you of what you’re eating? 
 Not at all 
 Slightly 
 Moderately 
 Extremely 
 
How many pounds over your desired weight were you at your maximum weight? 
 0-1 
 1-5 
 6-10 
 11-20 
 21+ 
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Appendix S 
 
Manipulation Check Questionnaire 
 
We would like to ask you a few questions to make sure you understood the proposed 
vending machine policy you just read and to get your general impressions about the 
proposed policy. 
 
How much money is spent on vending machines annually? 
 
a) $100,000 
b) $300,000 
c) $500,000 
d) $700,000 
What was one of the causes for obesity mentioned in the policy? (situational blame 
condition is first and dispositional blame condition is second) 
 
a) High calorie foods 
b) Food industry pricing foods to high 
c) Processed food that is high in preservatives 
d) Cause was not mentioned 
 
a) High calorie foods 
b) People who do not exercise 
c) Processed food that is high in preservatives 
d) Cause was not mentioned 
 
What type of factors does the policy blame for obesity? 
 
a) Environmental factors 
b) Individual factors 
c) Health factors 
d) Blame was not mentioned 
 
How much do you think the policy blames [insert participant’s answer to previous 
question]? 
 
 0  1  2  3  5  
 
Not at all blameworthy     Very blameworthy 
 
 
What are your general impressions of the vending machine policy? 
  
250 
 
Appendix T 
 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale  
 
Instructions: This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions.  Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer next to that word.  Indicate 
to what extent you currently feel. 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
Active 1 2 3 4 5 
Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
Blameworthy 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix U 
Weight Bias Internalization Scale 
Please rate your agreement with the following statements. [modified so it can apply to both obese 
and average weight] 
 strongly 
disagree  
   strongly 
agree  
I feel that I am just as competent as 
anyone  
          
I am less attractive than most other 
people because of my weight  
          
I feel anxious about my weight 
because of what people might think 
of me  
          
I wish I could drastically change my 
weight  
          
Whenever I think a lot about my 
weight, I feel depressed  
          
Because of my weight, I don’t feel 
like my true self  
          
I hate myself for my weight            
My weight is a major way that I 
judge my value as a person  
          
I don’t feel that I deserve to have a 
really fulfilling social life, as long as 
I'm this weight  
          
I am OK being the weight that I am            
Because of my weight, I don’t 
understand how anyone attractive 
would want to date me  
          
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Appendix V 
 
 
 
